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i





POLICING MECHANISMS TO COUNTER TERRORIST ATTACKS IN SOUTH
AFRICA


by


RUFUS KALIDHEEN



Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of



MAGISTER TECHNOLOGICAE
(Policing)



SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE



at the


UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA



SUPERVISOR: PROF. R. SNYMAN



MARCH 2008







ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


Greatness is not where we stand, but in what direction we are moving. We
must sail sometimes in the wind and sometimes against it – but sail we
must and not drift, nor lie at anchor – Oliver Wendell Holmes



Certainly, completing this thesis has been a rite of passage into realm of self-knowledge,
and I could not have achieved this success without the encouragement and support of the
following people:

• Professor Rika Snyman: for her encouragement for the completion of this thesis.

• My family: many thanks to my family who have accommodated my absence in
the fulfilment of this thesis.

• My Editor: thanks for your constant encouragement, support and guidance.

• Senior executive members of the SAPS: my thanks to your support in the form of
access to the ambits of the service.

• Ernest and Dumi: thanks for your words of encouragement throughout my study.




This thesis is dedicated to ??DJ?? and the belief that ??impossible is nothing??.









iii

DECLARATION




I, Rufus Kalidheen (student number: 36788333), hereby declare that ??Policing
Mechanisms to counter terrorist attacks in South Africa?? is my own work and that all the
sources that I have used or quoted, have been indicated and acknowledged by means of
complete references.


????????????????????.. ????????????????..
R. Kalidheen Date





iv

ABSTRACT


Terrorism remains a cardinal threat to national, regional, and international peace and
security. It violates the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights and freedom
and remains an affront to the Global Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the values
and principles enunciated in Africa??s Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU).
Moreover, it presents a grave and direct threat to the territorial integrity, security and
stability of States. In this regard, effective counter terrorism mechanisms and approaches
remain fundamental tools in curbing the threats and devastating effects of terrorism.
Since the advent of the ??war on terror??, issues regarding terrorism and counter-terrorism
have become pronounced norms within the international realm. Yet, while an abundance
of literature has been focussed and analyzed on counter terrorism approaches within the
United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Russia and India; little has been
documented on effective counter terrorism approaches in South Africa post-2001. Given
emerging trends of terrorist camps within the country and the fact that South Africa will
be hosting the international event of the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup, it is imperative
that South Africa improves the overall direction of its counter terrorism strategy.

Essentially, this study offers recommendations for the most effective counterterrorism
mechanism, which will aid policing in South Africa. History and current events indicate
that South African Police Service (SAPS) has the capacity and capability to successfully
deal with threats of terrorism. What is lacking is a concrete proactive counter terrorism
approach that makes SAPS stand out as the lead department in countering terrorism. Yet,
it should be borne in mind that the most important principle of any counter terrorism
operational concept is to co-ordinate an operation with an integrated approach. Bearing
this in mind, this study includes an assessment of the counterterrorism methodologies of
various agencies responsible for counter terrorism within South Africa, with SAPS being
the focal point. To establish the most effective counter terrorism strategy applicable to the
South African context, this study considers a comparative analysis of counter terrorism
strategies adopted within specified developed (Russia, US and UK) and developing
countries (India and Algeria) as well as a conceptual analysis of relevant policing
mechanisms that are currently considered as appropriate mechanisms to counter terrorism
within specified countries.

The synopsis of best-case practices of counter terrorism in developed and developing
countries as well as the relevant literature on policing mechanism are then synthesized
and interrogated into conceptualising an effective policing mechanism to counter
terrorism in South Africa.


Keywords: Terrorism, Counter Terrorism, Policing, Mechanisms, South African Police
Services (SAPS).


v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY ...................................................................................................... 1
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION..................................................................................................................... 2
1.3. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES.............................................................................................. 2
1.3.1. AIM................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.3.2. OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................................... 2
1.4. VALUE OF RESEARCH ..................................................................................................................... 2
1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY......................................................................................................... 2
1.5.1. RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN .................................................................................................. 3
1.5.2. TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLING............................................................................................... 3
1.5.2.1. Operationalising the data sampling process............................................................................ 3
1.5.3. METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION........................................................................................................ 4
1.5.4. DATA ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................... 4
1.5.5. METHODS USED TO ENSURE VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY.................................................................. 5
1.6. RESEARCH STRUCTURE ................................................................................................................. 5
1.7. DE-LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ................................................................................................ 6
1.7.1. GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARY ............................................................................................................. 7
1.7.2. TIME FRAME..................................................................................................................................... 7
1.7.3. DEFINITIONAL CONCEPTS ................................................................................................................. 7
1.7.3.1. Defining Terrorism .................................................................................................................. 8
1.7.3.2. Defining Counter terrorism.....................................................................................................10
1.7.3.3. Policing...................................................................................................................................11
1.8. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................................................................12
1.9. SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................................12

CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE OF TERRORISM....................................................................................13
2.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................13
2.2. CURRENT GLOBAL TRENDS OF TERRORISM .........................................................................13
2.2.1. DEFINING TRENDS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY.....................................................................................13
2.2.2. CURRENT PATTERNS OF TERRORISM ................................................................................................15
2.3. TYPOLOGIES OF TERRORISM......................................................................................................16
2.3.1. DEFINING AND CONCEPTUALISING TERRORISM TYPOLOGIES ...........................................................17
2.3.2. SUBSET OF TERRORIST TYPOLOGIES.................................................................................................18
2.3.2.1. Political Terrorism..................................................................................................................18
2.3.2.2. Crime-related terrorism..........................................................................................................26
2.3.2.3 Pathological terrorism.............................................................................................................28
2.3.3. GEOGRAPHIC SPECIFICATIONS OF TERRORISM .................................................................................29
2.3.3.1. International acts of terrorism ................................................................................................29
2.3.3.2. Trans-national acts of terrorism .............................................................................................29
2.3.3.3. Domestic acts of terrorism......................................................................................................30
2.3.4. SUMMATION OF TERRORIST TYPOLOGIES ........................................................................................30
2.4. TERRORISTS MODUS OPERANDI (METHOD OF OPERATION) ...........................................31
2.4.1. THE TARGET....................................................................................................................................31
2.4.2. TERRORIST TACTICS ........................................................................................................................33


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2.4.2.1 Bombing ...................................................................................................................................33
2.4.2.2 Assassinations ..........................................................................................................................36
2.4.2.3. Hostage taking ........................................................................................................................36
2.5. TERRORIST SUPPORT BASE..........................................................................................................38
2.6. SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................................39

CHAPTER 3: COUNTER TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE: INTERNATIONAL OVERVIEW OF
MECHANISMS IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ..............................................40
3.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................40
3.2. MULTILATERAL ENTITIES AND THEIR APPROACH TO COUNTER TERRORISM........40
3.2.1. UNITED NATIONS (UN) ...................................................................................................................40
3.2.2. AFRICAN UNION (AU) (FORMERLY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY - OAU).....................41
3.2.3. THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) ...........................................................................................................43
3.2.4. INTERNATIONAL POLICE (INTERPOL) ...........................................................................................45
3.2.5. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MULTILATERAL ENTITIES APPROACH TO COUNTER TERRORISM
..................................................................................................................................................................46
3.3. COUNTER TERRORISM IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES...........................................................47
3.3.1. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (US)..................................................................................................48
3.3.1.1. Extent of Terrorism .................................................................................................................48
3.3.1.2. US Counter Terrorism Strategic Approach ............................................................................50
3.3.1.3. Specific Counter Terrorism Strategies....................................................................................53
3.3.1.4. The Counter Terrorism Operational Approach ......................................................................56
3.3.1.5. Measuring the effectiveness of US Counter terrorism measures ............................................58
3.3.2. UNITED KINGDOM (UK) ..................................................................................................................59
3.3.2.1. Extent of Terrorism .................................................................................................................59
3.2.2.2. Counter Terrorism Strategic Approach ..................................................................................62
3.3.2.3. Counter Terrorism Operational Approach .............................................................................65
3.3.2.4. Measuring the effectiveness of UK Counter terrorism measures............................................67
3.3.3. RUSSIA ............................................................................................................................................67
3.3.3.1. Extent of Terrorism .................................................................................................................67
3.3.3.2. Counter Terrorism Strategic Approach ..................................................................................70
3.3.3.3. Counter Terrorism Operational approach..............................................................................71
3.3.3.4. Measuring the effectiveness of Russia??s Counter terrorism measures....................................73
3.4. COUNTER TERRORISM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.........................................................74
3.4.1. INDIA ...............................................................................................................................................74
3.4.1.1. Extent of Terrorism .................................................................................................................74
3.4.1.2. India??s Counter Terrorism Strategic Approach ......................................................................75
3.4.1.3. India??s Counter Terrorism Operational Approach .................................................................76
3.4.1.4. Measuring the effectiveness of India??s Counter Terrorism Measures ....................................78
3.4.2. ALGERIA..........................................................................................................................................78
3.4.2.1. Extent of Terrorism .................................................................................................................79
3.4.1.2. Counter Terrorism Strategic Approach ..................................................................................81
3.4.2.3. Algeria??s Counter Terrorism Operational Approach..............................................................82
3.4.2.4. Measuring the effectiveness of Algeria??s Counter Terrorism Measures .................................83
3.5 SYNTHESIS OF POLICING MECHANISMS UTILISED IN COUNTER TERRORISM
APPROACHES IN THE SPECIFIED COUNTRIES..............................................................................83
3.6. SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................................85


CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTER TERRORISM.........................86


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4.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................86
4.2. HISTORICAL CONCEPTUALISATION OF COUNTER TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA86
4.3. MANIFESTATIONS OF TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA .......................................................90
4.4. DOMESTIC TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA ............................................................................94
4.4.1. PAGAD...........................................................................................................................................94
4.4.1.1. Structure of PAGAD................................................................................................................94
4.4.1.2. Profile of PAGAD Terrorist Activities ....................................................................................95
4.4.1.3. The Qibla Movement and its affiliation to PAGAD ................................................................96
4.4.1.4. PAGAD??s modus operandi......................................................................................................96
4.4.2. THE BOEREMAG...............................................................................................................................97
4.4.2.1. Structure of the Boeremag ......................................................................................................98
4.4.2.2. Profile of Boeremag Terrorist Activities .................................................................................99
4.5. OPERATIONAL RESPONSES BY THE STATE TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM SINCE 199699
4.5.1. OPERATION RECOIL .......................................................................................................................100
4.5.2. OPERATION SALADIN.....................................................................................................................100
4.5.3. OPERATION GOOD HOPE................................................................................................................102
4.5.4. OPERATION CRACKDOWN..............................................................................................................103
4.5.5. OPERATION LANCER......................................................................................................................104
4.5.6. OPERATION ZEALOT AND HOPPER.................................................................................................105
4.6. THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY ..............................................105
4.6.1. ENABLING LEGISLATION ................................................................................................................106
4.6.1.1 The Anti-Terrorism Bill..........................................................................................................106
4.6.1.2. Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and Related Activities Act.......109
4.6.2. CURBING MONEY LAUNDERING ....................................................................................................110
4.7. SOUTH AFRICA??S COUNTER TERRORISM OPERATIONAL APPROACH........................111
4.8. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOUTH AFRICA??S COUNTER TERRORISM
APPROACH ..............................................................................................................................................112
4.9. SUMMARY.........................................................................................................................................112

CHAPTER 5: POLICING MECHANISMS TO COUNTER TERRORISM: ARTICULATING A
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICING MECHANISM TO COUNTER TERRORISM...............................113
5.1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................113
5.2. THE POLICING APPROACH OF TERRORISM AS CRIME ....................................................115
5.3 OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLICING MECHANISMS .............................................115
5.3.1 TYPES OF POLICING MECHANISMS..................................................................................................115
5.3.1.1. Militaristic.............................................................................................................................116
5.3.1.2. Para-military.........................................................................................................................116
5.3.1.3 Criminal Justice .....................................................................................................................116
5.3.1.4 Community .............................................................................................................................117
5.3.1.5 Intelligence Led /Problem Orientated....................................................................................118
5.3.1.6 Integrated Policing Mechanism .............................................................................................120
5.4. SOUTH AFRICA??S POLICING MECHANISMS ..........................................................................122
5.4.1 TRANSITION TO COMMUNITY POLICING ..........................................................................................122
5.4.2 THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICA??S POLICING MECHANISMS ............................................123
5.4.2.1 Current status of South Africa??s policing mechanism............................................................123
5.4.2.2 South Africa??s evolving policing mechanism .........................................................................125
5.4.3 MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAPS POLICING MECHANISMS...............................................127
5.4.4. PROPOSED SAPS POLICING MECHANISM TO COUNTER TERRORISM................................................128


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5.5. SUMMARY.........................................................................................................................................132
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TOWARDS A POLICING NEXUS
MECHANISM TO COUNTER TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA .................................................134
6.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS..............................................................................................................134
6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................................................136
6.2.1. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A POLICING MECHANISM TO COUNTER TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA:
INTEGRATION, COORDINATION, INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING, AND THE COMMUNITY. ...........................136
6.2.2. EXECUTIVE AUTHORIZATION .........................................................................................................138
6.2.3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED COUNTER TERRORISM UNIT (CTU)
................................................................................................................................................................139
REFERENCE LIST ..................................................................................................................................159

LIST OF FIGURES, GRAPHS AND TABLES

FIGURE 2.1: TYPOLOGIES OF TERRORISM.....................................................................................32
FIGURE 3.1: EU COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY 2005............................................................59
FIGURE 3.2: MPS COUNTER TERRORISM COMMAND .................................................................80
FIGURE 4.1: OPERATIONAL CONCEPT - OPERATION SALADIN.............................................116
FIGURE 4.2: OPERATIONAL CONCEPT - OPERATION GOOD HOPE ......................................117
FIGURE 5.1: AN INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING AND CRIME REDUCTION PROCESS ....133
FIGURE 5.2: ELEMENTS OF SOUTH AFRICA??S COUNTER TERRORISM APPROACH AS
CONCEPTUALIST FROM INTERVIEWS WITH EXPERTS AND ACADEMICS ........................146
FIGURE 6.1: SUMMATION OF INTERNATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGIES .100
FIGURE 6.2: GRAPHIC SET-UP OF ENVISAGED CTU...................................................................151

GRAPH 2.1: TERRORIST INCIDENCES GLOBALLY, 2001-2007 ....................................................31
GRAPH 2.2: TERRORIST INCIDENCES BY TARGET GROUP 2001-2007 .....................................47
GRAPH 3.1: TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE US.............................................................................73
GRAPH 3.2: TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE UK ............................................................................81
GRAPH 3.3: TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN RUSSIA.............................................................................87
GRAPH 3.4: TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN INDIA................................................................................92
GRAPH 3.5: TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN ALGERIA.........................................................................97

TABLE 2.1: PUBLIC ORDER AND THE MEASURE OF THE TERRORIST ACTIVITY 29
TABLE 2.2: THE 15 WORST BOMBING ATTACKS SINCE ..............................................................49
TABLE 3.1: LEVEL OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN SPECIFIED COUNTRIES .........................97
TABLE 4.1: SUCCESS ACHIEVED BY OPERATION GOOD HOPE..............................................118
TABLE 4.2: SUCCESSES OF OPERATION CRACKDOWN IN THE WESTERN CAPE .............119
TABLE 5.1: SERIOUS CRIME BETWEEN 2001-2007........................................................................139

INFORMATION BOX 2.1: EXAMPLE OF A TERRORIST BOMBING: PAN AM 103 ...................50


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INFORMATION BOX 3.1: A LIST OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE US.....................63
INFORMATION BOX 3.2: LIST OF US DEPARTMENT INVOLVED IN US CT STRATEGY .....71
INFORMATION BOX 3.3: LIST OF TERRORIST ATTACKS IN UK AND ON UK CITIZENS....75
INFORMATION BOX 3.4: TERRORIST ATTACKS IN RUSSIA.......................................................84
INFORMATION BOX TABLE 4.1: LIST OF PAGAD TARGETS ....................................................110
INFORMATION BOX 5.1: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF POLICING.........................................129
INFORMATION BOX 5.2: BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ??COMMUNITY POLICING?? IN SOUTH
AFRICA .....................................................................................................................................................137


ANNEXURE 1: BACKGROUND ON USAMA BIN LADEN...............................................................143
ANNEXURE 2: MAJOR TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS: AN ILLUSTRATION OF AL QAEDA
.....................................................................................................................................................................145
ANNEXURE 3: UN CONVENTIONS.....................................................................................................148
ANNEXURE 4: THE LONDON BOMBINGS .......................................................................................150
ANNEXURE 5: THE EIGHT NEW CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE INDIAN COUNTER
TERRORISM MANAGERS AND POLICYMAKERS BETWEEN 1989 AND 2001: .......................152
ANNEXURE 6: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF THE WESTERN CAPE ORGANISATIONAL
STRUCTURE OF PAGAD AND THE BOEREMAG ...........................................................................153
ANNEXURE 7: SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM...............................154
ANNEXURE 8: PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST
AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT, 2004 ............................................................................................156



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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACSRT African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
ALF Animal Liberation front
ANC African National Congress
AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb
AU African Union
AUPSC African Union Peace and Security Council
BSF Border Security Force
CATS Crimes against the State
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CISF Central Industrial Security Force
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions
COSCO China Ocean Shipping Company
CSVR Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation
CTC Counter Terrorism Centre
CTED Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate
CTIC Counter Terrorism Interdepartmental Community
CTSA Counter Terrorism Security Advisers
CTWG Counter terrorism Working Group
DoS Department of State
EAG Eurasia Group on Money Laundering
ETA Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna
EU European Union
EUROPOL European Police
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations
FICA Financial Intelligence Centre Act
FIS Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front)
FIU Financial Investigation Unit
FN Forces Nouvelle
FSB Federal Security Bureau
GSPC Groupe Salafist pour la Predication et le Combat
HUM Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
IB Intelligence Bureau
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IIPB Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade
IIU Intelligence and Investigation Unit
ILP Intelligence led Policing
INTERPOL International Police
IRA Irish Republican Army
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
ISS Institute for Security Studies
JCPS Justice, Crime, Prevention and Security Cluster
JEM Justice Equality Movement (Sudan)
JOC Joint Operations Commission
JSC Joint Security Cluster
JTAC Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre


xi

JTTF Joint Task Team Force
KKK Klu Klux Klan
LOC Line of Control
LRA Lord??s Resistance Army
LT Lakshkar-e-Toiba
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MI5 Military Intelligence (UK Internal)
MI6 Military Intelligence (UK External)
MIPT Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
MK uMkhonto we Sizwe
MPS Metropolitan Police Service
NCC National Coordination Committee (South Africa)
NCIS National Criminal Intelligence Services
NCTC National Counter Terrorism Committee (Russia)
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa??s Development
NIA National Intelligence Agency
NICOC National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
NIM National Intelligence Model
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NYPD New York Police Department
OAU Organisation of African Unity
PAC Pan African Congress
PAGAD People against Gangsterism and Drugs
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PICOC Provincial Intelligence Coordinating Committee
PIJ Palestine Islamic Jihad
PKK Kurdistan Workers Party
PLF Palestine Liberation Front
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation
POCDATARA Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and
Related Activities Act
RIRA Real Irish Republican Army
SA South Africa
SACP South African Communist Party
SAIIA South African Institute of International Affairs
SANCO South African National Civic Organisation
SANDF South African National Defence Force
SAPS South African Police Service
SASS South African Secret Service
SCIC Supreme Council of Islamic Courts
SCU Special Counter terrorism units
SPG Special Protection Group
SPIR Special Purpose Islamic Regiment
UDF United Democratic Front
UN United Nations
UNISA University of South Africa
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USA United States of America


xii

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction






xiii



1

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Terrorism is a global threat with global effects; its methods are murder
and mayhem, but its consequences affect every aspect ?? – from
development to peace to human rights and the rule of law. No part of
our mission is safe from the effects of terrorism; and no part of the
world is immune from this scourge –
Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, 2005

The above statement by Former Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), quoted
from the report entitled ??In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All?? (2005), aptly captures the essence of the threat of terrorism facing the
world today. Terrorism remains a cardinal threat to national, regional, and international
peace and security. It violates the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights and
freedom and remains an affront to the Global Charter of the UN and the values and
principles enunciated in Africa??s Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU). Moreover,
it presents a grave and direct threat to the territorial integrity, security and stability of
States. In this regard, effective counter terrorism mechanisms and approaches remain
fundamental tools in curbing the threats and devastating effects of terrorism. Since the
advent of the ??war on terror??, issues concerning terrorism and counter terrorism have
evolved into pronounced norms within the global system. Yet, whilst an abundance of
literature have been focussed and analysed on counter terrorism approaches within the
United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Russia and India; little has been
documented on effective counter terrorism approaches in South Africa post 2001. Given
emerging trends of terrorist camps within the country and the fact that South Africa will
be hosting the international event of the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup, it is imperative
that South Africa improves the overall direction of counter terrorism strategy in the
country. The key will be to reflect on an integrated and holistic approach to state security,
both in terms of the nature of specific tools and programs and the wider societal contexts
in which they emerge.

As such, this study consists of a search for the most effective counter terrorism
mechanism, which will aid the policing of terrorism in South Africa (SA). The study will
initially be a terrorist threat assessment in South Africa. It will include an assessment of
the counter terrorism methodologies of various agencies responsible for counter terrorism
within South Africa, with the South African Police Service (SAPS) being the focal point.
Furthermore, to establish the most effective counter terrorism strategy applicable to the
South African context, this study will consider the counter terrorism strategies adopted
within specified developed and developing countries. The eventual aim is to provide an
appropriate mechanism to combat terrorism in South Africa for the national enforcement
agency in the country, the SAPS. This will be elaborated upon in Section 1.3 of this study.


2

1.2. Research question

In order for South Africa to proactively, counter terrorism, there is a need for SAPS to
reconceptualise and strengthen its counter terrorism strategy to reflect existing global
realities.
1.3. Research aim and objectives

1.3.1. Aim

The aim of this study is to evaluate policing mechanisms to counter terrorism in South
Africa. In achieving this aim, the research assessed the anti terrorism methods adopted by
developed and developing countries globally. The study determined where in the state
structures, counter terrorism could be most effective. It also identified and assessed the
mechanisms adopted to prevent terrorism. The study also considered the role of law
enforcement agencies to counter terrorism. In finality, the study revealed the most
effective method, which South Africa and specifically SAPS, should consider.
1.3.2. Objectives

The following elements were considered as key objectives at the commencement of this
study:

• Assess policing mechanisms to counter terrorism internationally, by countries and
organisations, including experts in the subject matter;
• Identify policing mechanisms in SAPS and determine its effectiveness;
• To reflect on the outcome of the results of the research; and
• To make recommendations on the results obtained.

1.4. Value of Research

This study adds important value to countering terrorism and thereby ensuring a safe
environment in South Africa. SAPS will be able to refer to the research to assist in
adopting refining its policing mechanisms to counter terrorism. The research contributes
as a point of reference for future research on counter terrorism. This research could also
be utilised by other law enforcement agencies and departments responsible to counter
terrorism globally to aid in the development of counter terrorism strategies. Terrorism is
of a dynamic nature and recent measures to counter terrorism are always valued.

1.5. Research Methodology

This study utilised the best possible research method to obtain credible results. This
section will elaborate on the research approach, design, data collection and analysis
adopted to reach the desired outcome for the study.


3

1.5.1. Research approach and design

This study utilised the qualitative research approach. Such an approach considered
qualitative research as ??open and emerging?? (Cresswell, 1998:8) and was necessary since
it considered prior research done on the subject matter and essentially influenced the
study??s understanding and interpretation of events (Struwig and Stead, 2001:13). In this
regard, the study considered both primary and secondary sources of data to conceptualise
and contextualise the understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism. Primary literature
included national strategies of selected countries and interviews with local experts.
Secondary sources included journals, books, newspapers and magazines related to the
topic of terrorism and mechanisms to counter terrorism.
1.5.2. Target population and sampling

The target population in South Africa was counter terrorism experts within academia and
the National office of the SAPS. Interviews were conducted with nine relevant subject
matter experts (see References for list of interviewees and stated expertise) from research
institutions such as the Institute of International Security Studies (ISS), South African
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), University of South Africa (UNISA),
University of Pretoria, and the South African Police Service (SAPS).

The sampling method, which was utilised in this study, was that of non-probability
convenience sampling. This involved the sample group being chosen from that part of the
population who are knowledgeable on the subject matter and are relatively convenient as
it stems essentially from convenience in terms of availability and proximity. Within this
framework, the method of snowball sampling was also utilised. Snowball sampling is
utilised when the desired sample characteristic (in this instance that of policing experts on
terrorism) is rare. This method of sampling relies on referrals from initial subjects
(http://www.statpac.com/surveys/sampling.htm).

1.5.2.1. Operationalising the data sampling process

In this context, interviews were conducted with experts within the field of terrorism and
policing with the aim of identifying practical counter terrorism approaches. The sampling
process allowed for a ??snow ball?? effect whereby subject matter experts provided further
referrals on the subject. This increased the expanse of interviews pertaining to the study
and further gave impetus to an in-depth analysis and critique of the area under discussion.

The study commenced with the identification of known experts within the relevant fields
of terrorism and policing based on their research and expertise as disseminated within the
public domain. These experts are revered within relevant academic, diplomatic and
public domains. Their work as well as their recommendations within their specific
subject areas has influenced policy making and theoretical understandings at the various
levels of government over the years. Their extensive publication list also adds value to
their credibility within the realm of counter terrorism. Within the sphere of academic
credibility, the following experts were chosen: Anneli Botha (Senior Research on
terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies), Boyane Tshehla (Head of the Crime and


4

Justice Programme at the Institute for Security Studies), Clifford Shearing (Professor of
Criminology and the Director of the Institute of Criminology), Michael Hough (Director
of the Institute for Strategic Studies), Hussein Solomon (Director of the Centre for
International Political Studies with emphasis on religious fundamentalism in South Africa)
and Richard Gueli (Researcher for the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research).
With the aim of practical applicability to the study, the following experts were chosen:
Johan Burger (Senior researcher in the Crime and Justice Programme at the Institute for
Security Studies and former Assistant Commissioner at SAPS) and a Senior SAPS
official (Crime Intelligence). To obtain legal objectivity within the ambit of this study,
Andre Thomashausen (Professor at the Institute of Foreign and Comparative Law) was
selected and Kurt Shillinger (Research Fellow at the South African Institute of
International Affairs and former journalist) shed light on the public dimensions of
terrorism.

The relevant experts were contacted and informed of the objectivity of this study and
were allowed an opportunity to participate in this research process. The participants were
provided with a copy of the interview schedule and a letter confirming the authenticity of
the research prior to the interview.
1.5.3. Method of data collection

There are different instruments of data collection, namely, observations, interviews,
documents and audio-visual materials (Silverman, 2005:129). The afore-mentioned
illustrate the four basic forms of data collection in qualitative research. This study made
use of individual semi-structured interviews. Interviews conducted involved verbal
communication either in person or telephonically. Questionnaires were communicated to
interviewees prior to interviews to allow for effective interaction on specified questions.
The focus of these interviews rested on two related pillars. The one involved interviews
on the substantive issues of counter terrorism. The second element of the research was
streamlined towards effective policing mechanisms to counter terrorism.

The counter terrorism approach evaluated considered relevant regulations. These
included the United Nations (UN) and South African regulations. In essence, the counter
terrorism approach as envisioned must comply with these regulations so that it can be
acceptable and correlate to the norms of global governing bodies. The regulation
considering the rights of individuals was also of essence.
1.5.4. Data analysis

According to Struwig and Stead (2001:149), the analysis of data is the interpretation of
data to make it understandable. This study utilised the qualitative method of data analysis.
The basic elements of qualitative data analysis incorporate the ability to collect; to
interpret; to criticise and provide a balanced argument on critical issues that underlie this
study. The Tesch eight-step process of analysis incorporates the critical elements of
qualitative data analysis and was utilised in this study (Technikon SA, 2001: 62). The
Tesch eight-step process is structured as follows:

• get a sense of the whole;


5

• pick a document from a transcribed interview, read through it carefully and
identify its meaning;
• make lists of topics and cluster them together;
• code the information;
• classify them by grouping them together;
• make final decisions and alphabetise the codes;
• assemble same categories and do preliminary analysis; and
• recode if necessary (Technikon SA, 2001: 62).

This analysis used textual data. The data was then qualitatively analysed into manageable
themes. Copious notes made during the interviews were analysed. A critical examination
ensued with information collected from relevant open source information. The objective
was to provide an appropriate argument as a basis for this study.

1.5.5. Methods used to ensure validity and reliability

Reliability in qualitative research is synonymous with consistency. Validity refers to
trustworthiness and credibility in qualitative research. This defined is the degree to
which we rely on concepts, methods and inferences of studies (Struwig and Stead,
2001:148). Other measures that ensured the study??s validity and reliability were methods
relating to triangulation; checking of memberships and whether, the chain of evidence
was correct. Triangulation is often used to indicate that more than one method is
incorporated in order to cross – reference findings for the objective of credibility
(Struwig and Stead, 2001:133).

In this study, triangulation was encapsulated within the literature review where more than
one source was utilised to obtain an unbiased understanding of key concepts.
Triangulation was also encompassed within the process of interviews, were different
authors proved varied and sometimes common approaches to key concepts and themes.
This again assisted in formulating a balanced argument within this thesis. Another
method of ensuring reliability and validity was the cross-referencing of findings between
interviews conducted and information collected from open source references such as that
from journals, newspapers and books.
1.6. Research Structure

The structure of the research encompasses six chapters with specific themes, which
includes the conceptualisation of terrorism globally, a comparative analysis of counter
terrorism mechanisms in developed and developing countries, and the contextualisation
of terrorism in South Africa with emphasis on the formulation of an appropriate policing
mechanism to counter terrorist attacks in South Africa.

Chapter 2 discusses the nature of terrorism globally. The chapter provides a brief
overview of the history as well as the current trends noted in terms of global terrorism.
The chapter provides intricate details on the typologies of terrorism and extent to which
such types of terrorism exist in the global realm. Also analysed, is the threat of terrorism
as it relates to South Africa, as well as the vulnerabilities identified.


6


Chapter 3 analyses current literature on counter terrorism and the debates that have
emerged regarding appropriate counter terrorism mechanisms to combat such threats of
terrorism. The chapter also illustrates a comparative assessment of various counter
terrorism methods adopted by countries, agencies and international entities including
counter terrorism methods suggested by experts. Countries from the developed (United
States, United Kingdom) as well as developing (India, Algeria) countries will be utilised
to highlight the extent of terrorism as well as the differing mechanisms that exist and
thereby hint at possible mechanisms that could be utilised in enhancing South Africa??s
counter terrorism capabilities.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the extent of terrorism and counter terrorism as it
pertains to South Africa. It will outline historical as well as current counter terrorism
mechanisms employed in South Africa and effectively ascertain whether such
mechanisms are appropriate in dealing with current trends and threats of terrorism
identified within the country.

Chapter 5 will reflect upon best practices of policing mechanisms adopted by countries
globally. The chapter will further explore the historical development of policing
mechanisms. The eventual aim is to identify a policing mechanism, which may be a
credible and viable measure to effectively, counter terrorism. The chapter also
incorporates the findings of interviews conducted with relevant experts on a policing
mechanism to counter terrorism to add a practical application to the literature surveyed.

Chapter 6 will be the concluding chapter, which aims to pull the study together and offer
pertinent recommendations on the research topic. It will work towards a synthesis of
literature surveyed and its relevance to research findings with the aim being the
establishment of an appropriate framework for counter terrorism methodology and
structures applicable to South Africa.
1.7. De-limitations of the Study

The limits of the study indicate the parameters of this research. The study on policing
mechanisms to counter terrorism in South Africa was limited in two prominent areas of
concern. Firstly, the study aimed to access information, which usually infringes on the
clandestine activities of the Crime Intelligence Department in SAPS. This resulted in the
study not being able to probe into the Intelligence facet of the SAPS Counter Terrorism
approach, which may be prevalent in the recommendations made in Chapter 6.
Intelligence forms an integral part of the strategy recommended but it occurs amongst
others. It appears that because of related clandestine activities which need to occur in
many intelligence agencies, SAPS has taken a decision to cloak the counter terrorism
strategy from the public domain. This was recommended against in chapter 6 as well.
Incidentally, many countries internationally have also embarked on similar exemptions.

The effects of this reservation, on inviting public discourse on a Counter Terrorism
Strategy, have initiated the second concern. Research in the subject of policing counter
terrorism in South Africa is limited. However, the study reflected on various interrelated
disciplines, which then contributed to a merged product. The restrictions mentioned in the


7

prior concern may not be the only reasons to this limitation. South Africa is a young
democracy, and does not perceive itself as a primary target of international terrorism
(Kasrils, 2007). However, researchers have always reflected on prior research, which
then provides the impetus for further discourse.
The following elements also fall within the realm of delimitation of this study and
include: geographical boundaries, time frames, and definitional concepts.
1.7.1. Geographical boundary

The geographical boundary of the study will be South Africa. The country is in the
Southern tip of the African continent. It has two ocean boundaries, the Atlantic Ocean on
the west coast and the Indian Ocean on the east coast. Its?? country boundaries are
Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. It includes Swaziland and Lesotho
countries within the South African territory. The country divides into nine local provinces.
These are the Eastern Cape; Free State; Gauteng; Kwazulu-Natal; Limpopo; Mpumalanga,
Northern Cape; North West and the Western Cape (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africa).
1.7.2. Time Frame

The time frame of the study regarding counter terrorism strategies internationally
encapsulates the period September 11, 2001 to the present day (US Commission, 9/11
Report). The effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on an influential global power, the US,
prompted a trend which saw increased vigilance being attributed to negating the growing
threats of terrorism. Furthermore, the UN, after the 9/11 attacks commissioned
Resolution 1352 which obligates countries to adopt effective counter terrorism measures.

Counter Terrorism in South Africa will embody the methods utilised post-1994 owing to
the new democratic dispensation in the country. The essence of this is to reflect upon
current counter terrorism methodology dynamics.

However, the period concerning terrorism will not be restricted to the above limitations
but will include historical reflections. This will provide a comprehensive overview of
particular facets of terrorist activities.

1.7.3. Definitional Concepts

Essential concepts will need defining to enable an effective understanding of key variants
that underlie this study. Definitions of concepts such as ??Terrorism?? and ??Counter
Terrorism?? still remain open to interpretation within the academic arena. No common
interpretation exists given the varying dynamics of terrorism itself. As such, this sub-
section seeks to provide an overview of existing definitions with the purpose of
streamlining an interpretation that best serves the objectives of this study.





8

1.7.3.1. Defining Terrorism

Terrorism is a difficult concept to define because it is constantly evolving and partly
because its definition that may be subjectively interpreted. However, it can be maintained,
there are certain fundamental issues of terrorism (Cronin, 2004: 3). Terrorism as argued
by Wilkinson (2006:3) has a political aspect and involves acts of violence, which intends
to bring about political change by influencing the political behaviour of governments,
communities or specific groups.

Other academics like Clutterbuck (2004; 141) contend that terrorism is not a tangible
entity and therefore it cannot be defeated in any realistic sense. The ??war on terrorism??,
may also be considered, as a ??war on crime??; therefore, policing is not amenable solely to
the use of military means. Since the resurgence of terrorism in the 1960s, it is the
conception of ??terror as crime?? and not ??terror as war?? that has primarily driven the
response to terrorism of a liberal democratic nation. In addition, Clutterbuck considers
terrorism as a phenomenon that is global in its range, constant in its presence and
inevitably involves the commission of crime. Any national or international mechanism to
counter terrorism must be predicated on that understanding (2004: 141).

Conversely, Wilkinson (2006) distinguishes terrorism from other elements of crime on
the basis that it plans to propagate a climate of extreme fear amongst its audience. The act
of terror extends beyond the immediate victim. The terrorist subjectively chooses the
targets. The target may be of a random choice or of a symbolic nature. This is dependent
on the terrorists themselves (Wilkinson, 2006:3).

Despite the numerous definitions of terrorism, the international community and
academics have, been unable to provide a suitable definition of terrorism. Schmid and
Jongman (1988: 28) consider the following basic elements of terrorism to provide this
comprehensive definition:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action,
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for
idiosyncratic, criminal, or political response, whereby — in contrast to
assassinations — the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.
The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets)
from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and
violence-based communication processes between terrorists
(organisations), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to
manipulate the main target (audience), turning it into a target of terror, a
target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

In addition to Schmid and Jongman??s definition, numerous other definitions of terrorism
are useful:

Terrorism is the deliberate employment of violence or the threat to use
violence by sub-national groups and sovereign states to attain strategic


9

and political objectives. Terrorists seek to create overwhelming fear in a
target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or
threatened. Acts of individual and collective terrorism committed in
modern times have introduced a new breed of extralegal ??warfare?? in
terms of threats, technology, targets and impact (Alexander, 1994: 1)

Apart from the definition prescribed by academics, Multilateral Organizations, such as
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) defines terrorism as:

Criminal Acts, including (those) against civilians; these acts are
committed with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or the
taking of hostages; with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the
general public or in a group of persons or particular persons; intimidate a
population or compel a government or an international organisation to do
or abstain from doing any act which constitute offences within the scope of
and as defined in the international conventions and protocol relating to
terrorism; are under no circumstance justifiable by considerations of
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other
similar nature (UNSC Resolution 1566, October 2004).

Terrorism researchers also define terrorism by considering the definitions adopted by
State departments. The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism at differing periods as:

??premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience (Hunsicker, 2006: 11).

And
??the calculated use of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or
intimidate governments or society?? (Townshend, 2002:3).

The United States, at an earlier period, utilized the definition in the US Code Title 22
section 2656f (d) since 1983 and reads:

Terrorism is the premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated
against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has defined terrorism as:

??the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives
(Hunsicker, 2006: 13).

The South African government, according to Schönteich (cited in Botha, 2001), has since
1994 adopted internationally acknowledged definitions and categories of terrorism. The
South African government??s official policy on terrorism defines terrorism as:


10


An incident of violence, or the threat thereof, against a person, a group
of persons or property not necessarily related to the aim of the incident,
to coerce a government or civil population to act or not to act according
to certain principles (Botha, 2001).

For the purposes of this study, the following definition of terrorism will be utilised:

An unlawful act of violence or the threat thereof against a person or
persons or property with the aim to intimidate a government or
population to do or abstain from doing any act, according to certain
principles for the furtherance of the perpetrator or perpetrators
objectives.

Given these differing perspectives, in 1977, Laquer aptly wrote that it could be predicted
with confidence that disputes about a comprehensive, detailed definition of terrorism will
continue for a long time; however, they will result in consensus and that they will make
some noticeable contribution to the understanding of terrorism (cited in Clutterbuck,
2004:142).

1.7.3.2. Defining Counter terrorism

If terrorism is considered as a motivation to propagate fear and anxiety then the contrary
may imply that counter terrorism is a foundation on which defensive strategies and tactics
are based (Bolz, Dudonis and Schulz, 2002: 3). Kushner (2003:101) considers counter
terrorism as the use of personnel and resources to prevent terrorism and their support
networks.

When addressing methods on countering terrorism it may be necessary to note methods
adopted in similar acts such as counter insurgency. McCuen (1966), a principle writer on
the topic of revolutionary warfare considers counter insurgency to involve the protecting
of the population against terror and insecurity. In effect, it prompts a response to terror
(Hough, Kruys and du Plessis, 2005:18).

Wilkinson (2006:6) defines counter terrorism as:

?? practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments,
militaries and other groups adopt to fight terrorism.

It also may be useful to consider the meaning of the two terms separately: ??counter?? and
??terrorism??. The term counter is defined as:

?? actions or activities that are intended to prevent other action or
activities or that respond to them (Collins, 2001:345).

Similarly, counter terrorism in this study will be a method or manner in which the
terrorist attack is prevented. It will embody a comportment to defend the terrorist attack.


11

It will include a defensive approach of securing vulnerabilities that may be exploited by
terrorists, for example, the securing of the ports of entry. It will include an offensive,
proactive approach, for example, the collection of intelligence through networks. It
includes the many facets of legislation, enforcement, intelligence and other mechanisms
upon which terrorism will be countered.
1.7.3.3. Policing
In this study, policing is defined as a:
Strategic approach adopted by the police to address criminal activity.
In 1822, the father of Modern policing Sir Robert Peel established the following nine
principles that underlie all mechanisms of policing:
• The basic mission for police existence is to prevent crime and disorder.
• The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval
of police actions.
• Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observance
of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public.
• The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes
proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force.
• Police seek and preserve public favour not by catering to public opinion but by
constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law.
• Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law
or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is
found to be insufficient.
• Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives
reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the
police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time
attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of
community welfare and existence.
• Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never
appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary.
• The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible
evidence of police action in dealing with it (http://www.nwpolice.org/peel.html).
The word ??Police?? generally means the arrangements made in all civilised countries to
ensure that inhabitants keep the peace and obey the law. The word also denotes the
employment of force by officers the peace (or police) for the purpose of maintaining
order, enforcing the law and preventing and detecting crime. In 1829, Sir Richard Mayne
wrote:


12

the primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime: the
next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed.
To these ends all the efforts of police must be directed. The protection of
life and property, the preservation of public tranquility, and the absence
of crime, will alone prove whether those efforts have been successful
and whether the objects for which the police were appointed have been
attained (http://www.nwpolice.org/peel.html).
In attaining these objects, much depends on the approval and co-operation of the public,
and these have always been determined by the degree of esteem and respect in which the
police are held (www.met.police.uk/history/definition.htm).
The above section (1.7) sets out the basic parameters of the study in terms of de-
limitations and the framework of definitional concepts. In summary, the study remained
constrained by the access to relevant information not only by the SAPS but also within
the academic, diplomatic and public fields, as counter terrorism in South Africa, within
the global comparative is new terrain. However, to work on a basic framework of
conceptualising the phenomenon of terrorism and formulating a policing mechanism to
counter terrorism in South Africa, requires an understanding of the definitional concepts
of policing, terrorism, and counter terrorism. Within this context, the section (1.7)
provided some theoretical understanding of limitations and definitional concepts.
1.8. Ethical Considerations

The topic of terrorism thus far in the global arena has been subject to controversial
interpretations. More specifically, certain aspects of religion and ethnicity have a
perceived affiliation with terrorism; for example, the Muslim faith has been at the heart
of recent terrorist debates. However, this study will not target religious or ethnic
peculiarities, but will seek rather to engage with the problematic of counter terrorism.

The research will be conducted within the confines of the necessary regulations
prohibiting plagiarism and adherence to copyright obligations. Moreover, interviewees
(especially those within government structures such as the SAPS) will be afforded the
opportunity to choose anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the subject matter.
1.9. Summary

This chapter provided insight into the theoretical and practical underpinnings regarding
the methodological and conceptual understanding of the broader framework of the thesis.
The following section moves away from methodology and gives insight on the global
extent and parameters of terrorism and counter terrorism. To conceptualise the domestic
sphere, it is imperative to understand the ongoing dynamics within the global sphere.


13

CHAPTER 2
THE NATURE OF TERRORISM

2.1. Introduction

For many, the idea of trying to ??understand?? terrorists is ultimately self-
defeating and perhaps treasonous - they don??t want to ??understand??
terrorists, they simply want to defeat the terrorists??no one tried to
??understand?? the Nazis??[yet]. .trying to understand how and why an
ideology like Nazism could develop was key in ensuring that it never
happens again –
Austin Cline, 2006 (www.atheism.about.com/b/a/242061.htm)

The above quote argues that central to establishing any response mechanism to arising
threats it requires an understanding of the very elements that give rise to such a situation.
Examining the nature of terrorism is representative of this quote. Understanding the
nature of terrorism within the current context remains a multi-dimensional problem.
Discussions on terrorism within debating circles are usually centred on criminal justice
aspects such as prevention and punishment. Yet, the overriding questions surrounding
terrorism are not simply jurisprudential; they go beyond this sphere and find themselves
embedded in philosophical and political jurisdictions. Why terrorists employ the tactic of
terrorism, the methods that they use and the objectives they wish to achieve are
fundamental questions that will aid in understanding the various facets that underlie
terrorism. Essentially, in order to correctly interpret indications and events of terrorism as
well as formulate an apt response to threats of terrorism, it is imperative to clearly
identify and distinguish the various methodologies and typologies that give rise to the
current patterns of terrorism.
2.2. Current Global Trends of Terrorism

Preceding the section on the types of terrorism and the justifications that give rise to
specific types of terrorism, it is crucial that a brief overview is given on defining trends of
terrorist activities and the current patterns of terrorism that exist.
2.2.1. Defining trends of terrorist activity

According to Botha (2001), terrorist activity can be measured by considering public
action. Evaluating the effects of public action may provide a tool to measure activity,
which may be indicative of terrorism. Consider Table 2.1 below as described by Botha
(2001):







14


Table 2.1: Public Order and the Measure of the Terrorist Activity

Zones Effects Of Public Action Measure Risk
Level 1


Public action reflects the constitutional order, with a
basic level of stability within a democratic society.
Ideal in utopia,
however, not realistic
in a democracy.
Possible concerns of
suppression.
Minimal


Level 2
The comfort zone of usual activity, involves
legitimate dissent and protest, both within and
outside parliament. Legitimate protest regarded as a
valuable mode of political communication, criticism
and democratic consultation.

Ideal in a democracy.
The public has
confidence in the
government and its
processes.


Low


LEVEL
3
This could be defined as a ??grey?? area where
contentious issues in society and the behaviour of
individuals and groups result in disorderly conduct
and acts of civil disobedience and conscientious
objection, although the initial objective leading to
these acts does not involve a comprehensive
rejection of the state??s legal authority.. Peaceful acts
of civil disobedience, may on occasion, be infiltrated
or may even be taken over by those who have no
inhibitions about the use of violence, or who have an
ulterior motive.
Although it is a non-
violent means of
individual resistance
to authority it may,
on occasion, provoke
a repressive response
by the authorities or
by members of the
community.


Medium/
High


LEVEL
4
Public action is the security zone, a level of disorder
where the potential or actual occurrence of crime,
conflict, violence and subversion poses a threat to
society or the state. An escalation of the problem
could lead to conditions of anarchy, militarisation
and social collapse.
Internal violence can
firstly endanger
survival and stability
of the constitution;
secondly indirectly
and cumulatively
undermines the
state??s authority.


High
Source: ISS monograph, Anneli Botha, 2001

The above table indicates the levels at which terrorist activity may become prevalent in
public. Generally, the public manifests itself in response to external factors and in a
democracy; it does so in a prescribed manner. Terrorism arises when there is no proper
channel to express their response. While levels 1 and 2 are more prominent in most
democracies, there is a tendency for situations to arise where dissident groups may evolve
into levels 3 and 4 if they are unsatisfied with prevailing conditions regarding rights and
access to basic services.

The defining lines between the varying levels are thin, but the levels of public action help
identify trends and early warning symptoms of emerging terrorist trends. However, in
retrospect it is also essential to note that not all terrorist activity exposed in society is due
to failure or limitations to create a conducive environment for expression. Terrorists may
resort to terrorism for their own subjective reasoning, which may be very obscure from


15

society??s logical norm. This is illustrated through the cult group, Aum Shirnyiko (Martin,
2003: 192).

Within South Africa, it is able to ascertain that public order that can lead to terrorism can
be characterised as bordering between levels 2 and 3. Crime in South Africa has become
a contentious issue and has forced communities to question the authenticity of security
provided by the South African Police Service. Increasingly, as witnessed by the activities
of PAGAD and now more recently in September 2007, dynamics in Port Elizabeth of
communities questioning SAPS and their ability to manage gangsters in the area, these
developments allow space for disorder to emerge within societies
(www.saps.gov.za/dynamicmodules/internetsite/HPallnews.asp). There have also been
reports of an alleged jihadi training facility outside Port Elizabeth as will be discussed
further in Chapter 4. If terrorists were to feed into the insecurities of communities in Port
Elizabeth against the SAPS and government, then South Africa would be moving fully
into level 3 and enter a medium/high risk sphere for terrorism to flourish. In many ways,
the Table assists in establishing a guideline for current and future scenarios for terrorism
in South Africa as measured by public order.
2.2.2. Current patterns of terrorism

Global terrorism, although in existence through time has since post-9/11 been merited as
being the greatest threat to global security. With this as the general perception, countries
have come to understand and accept terrorism as dictated upon by powerful influential
countries like the US. This in itself creates a paradigm of issues, which further
complicates the issue of countering terrorism.

Within this context, interviewee and Research Fellow from the Council on Scientific and
Industrial Research (CSIR), Richard Gueli (2007), considers terrorism to be a mere tool,
which is utilised to gain political and economic influence. It is relied upon by countries
such as Israel, which although has a justifiable threat against terrorism, uses terrorism to
sustain global funding and political sympathy. The US??s war on terrorism, likewise, can
be affiliated to exerting political influence in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan to
secure national interests of energy security. Gueli reiterates that although the US??s long
term threats are the burgeoning economies of China and India, terrorism in some respects
may be utilised to negate the influence of such countries in the global sphere as more
eloquently witnessed through the realisation of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in
Africa to counter growing Asian influence.

Complimenting Gueli??s discernment, Andre Thomashausen from the University of South
Africa (UNISA) argues that terrorism is not a global threat but instead a threat that is
fabricated by an international industry of mercenary services, self-appointed security
experts, and the arms and security industry. Instead of the emphasis on global terrorism,
Thomashausen asserts that funds can be redirected to address the root causes of terrorism
such as socio-economic inequalities.

In contrast, Boyane Tshelhla, Head of the Crime and Justice Programme at the Institute
of Security Studies, sustains the global general perception on terrorism. Tshelhla argues
that terrorism is a not only a threat to international countries but more pertinently to the


16

African continent which arises from the lack of system inadequacies that exist in
developing countries.

In balancing the varying perceptions, this study, contends that global terrorism is on the
increase and can be characterised in political terms as an issue of ??high risk??. The basis of
this assertion stems from empirical evidence on statistics derived from the number of
terrorist incidents from the period 2001-October 2007. Consider Graph 2.1 below, which
provides an overview of terrorist incidences since 2001:

Graph 2.1: Terrorist Incidences Globally, 2001- October 2007

0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Oct-07
Year
In
ci
d
en
ts

Source: statistics adapted from Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT (funded
by US Homeland Security) Knowledge Base (www.tkb.org)

Statistics derived from the National Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT),
illustrate that terrorist incidences have more than doubled from 1732 reported in 2001 to
6639 recorded for 2006. Already from the period January to October 2007, more than
1900 terrorist incidences were noted. If Graph 2.1 is an indication for future trends, then
it can be established that terrorism may be emerging as the new threat to state and human
security and it is imperative that effective counter terrorism strategies are adopted to curb
such threats.
2.3. Typologies of Terrorism

The types of terrorism as well as the justifications behind terrorism are as diverse as the
kind of people who commit terrorist attacks. Terrorists often believe that they have
exhausted all attempts at legitimate religious or political change and have no other option,
but to resort to terrorism, to bring recognition to their cause and bring about
change. Terrorism??s success in yielding tactical gains (e.g. massive publicity, release of
prisoners and large ransom payments) and the fact that the method is relatively cheap, is
easy to organise and carries limited risk are also advantageous factors (Wilkinson,
2006:16). Political oppression, religious intolerance and nationalistic aspirations are just a
subset of the most common reasons cited by terrorists as justifications for their
attacks. Whether motivated by religious, political, or military beliefs there is no single
reason terrorists use to justify their attacks. As such, this section provides a brief
overview of the types of terrorisms that exist and the justifications that underlie terrorism.


17

2.3.1. Defining and conceptualising terrorism typologies

Within the context of terrorism, and as mentioned above, there are as many typologies of
terrorism as there are definitions. Essentially, ??terrorism typology is a classification
system of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations?? (Wadsworth Group, 2002). The
purpose of exploring typologies is to supplement the focus of a counter terrorism
approach owing to the misgivings of the diverse spectrums of definitions on terrorism.

There have been a number of attempts by terrorism experts to categorise typologies of
terrorism emanating from the works of Schmid, Wardsworth, Littleton, and Eskridge.
From the above, the following diagram by AP Schmid (1988) has been popularised in
most academic discourse pertaining to terrorism. Schmid??s typology as compared to
Littleton??s and Eskridge is far more pronounced and contemporary in elaborating on the
aspects of terrorism. This typology is illustrated as follows:

Figure 2.1: Typologies of Terrorism



Source: AP. Schmid (1988: 48)


According to Schmid, there are three typologies of terrorism, these being ??Political
Terrorism??, ??Crime related Terrorism?? and ??Pathological Terrorism??. The distinct forms of
terrorism essentially arises from a variety of criteria based on the nature of terrorist
activity as they stem from goals/objectives/tactics and mindset of terrorists. Political
terrorism is classified as such due to the eventual goal/objective of terrorist activities.
Crime related terrorism reflects upon the activities of terrorism itself. The third typology,
pathological terrorism, characterises perpetrators considered pathologically challenged.
Political
Terrorism
Organized Crime
linked Terrorism
Pathological
Terrorism
State
Sponsored
Terrorism
State Terrorism Vigilante
Terrorism
Insurgent
Terrorism
Single Issue
Terrorism
Nationalist and
Separatist
Terrorism
(including
ethnic)
Religious
Terrorism
Right Wing
and Racist
Terrorism
Socio-
Revolutionary
Terrorism (Left
Wing)


18

2.3.2. Subset of terrorist typologies

Within this framework, subsets of the stated typologies will be classified, defined and
elaborated upon with specific examples in order to obtain a clear understanding of the
stratums that underlie types of terrorist activity.
2.3.2.1. Political Terrorism

Political terrorism embodies violence or the threat of violence against non-combatants in
order to achieve political goals. Political terrorism is defined as:

?? use or threat of terror by a state or a group outside government in
pursuit of a set of ideological objectives that ignore the objectives of
domestic and international law (O?? Sullivan, 1986: 5).

This form of terrorism is used primarily for political ends. Political groups use terrorism
as a modus operandi and it emphasizes their inability to achieve their political objectives
through legitimate means. Political terrorism cannot be understood outside the context of
the development of terrorist or potentially terrorist ideologies, beliefs and lifestyles. It can
be argued that there is no clear classification for political terrorism across regional and
ideological lines (Wardlaw, 1989). In sync with this statement, Schmid (1988:47)
explains the dimensions of the typology of political terrorism within a larger subset of
Insurgency, which is further streamlined into multiple categories (see Schmid diagram on
typologies in Figure 1 above).
a) Insurgent terrorism

This larger category of political terrorism is accredited those who:

Seeks to rebel against or radically change the political system through the use of
terrorist tactics (Combs, 2003: 162)

Insurgent terrorism largely seeks to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of a regime
through fear and uncertainty (Bjorgo, 2005: 57). This category of terrorism is further
exemplified by a number of different manifestations that embody the characteristics of
insurgency, namely, social revolutionary (left wing); right wing and racist; religious;
nationalist and separatist; and single issue terrorism. These are further elaborated upon
below.

The first manifestation of insurgent terrorism as illustrated by Schmid??s Figure (2.1)
above is ??Social revolutionary?? (otherwise known as left - wing terrorism) which is
defined as:

Those acts of terrorism perpetrated by groups/individuals seeking to
overthrow the capitalist economic and social order (Post, 2005: 56).

Social revolutionary groups are epitomized by the ??European fighting Communist
Organisations?? active throughout the 1970s and 1980s such as the Red Army Faction in


19

Germany and the Brigate Rosse in Italy (Combs, 2003: 163). However, since the collapse
of Communism and the End of the Cold war in 1991, the decline in the activities of such
Leftist groups have been evident (Post, 2005: 57).

The second manifestation of insurgent terrorism is ??Right Wing terrorism??, which is
generally aimed at:

Seeking to retain or re-establish an earlier status quo through the use of
terrorist acts (Combs, 2003: 162).

Right wing extremism is a reaction against a perceived threat to a ??groups value system,
its presumption of superiority, or its sense of specialness?? (Martin, 2003: 23). Terrorism
on the extreme right is believed to have increased since the opening of the Berlin Wall in
1989. As Leftist extremism become less relevant in 1991, the idiosyncrasy of rightist
extremism attracted support from ethno-national, ideological and reactionaries from
Europe, North America and Latin America (Martin, 2003: 181). A relevant example of
right wing extremism in the context of South Africa (SA) is that of the Boeremag (further
discussed in Chapter 5). The afore-mentioned right wing group, through terrorist tactics,
attempted to return the fledgling democracy of SA to the past rule of apartheid and the
former glory of the white minority.

The third manifestation of insurgent terrorism is ??Religious terrorism??. English
Clergyman Robert Burton (1577-1640) once wrote:

One religion is as true as another??; and as such all major religions in the
world have justified the use of violence to fight evil in the name of a ??just
cause?? or simply for the sake of ??self-defence??(o??Connor: 2007).

Based on this understanding, religious justifications for terrorism have emerged as one of
the oldest validations in the world. Terrorists who are religiously motivated view their
acts with moral certainty and even consider their acts to have divine sanction. This helps
explain the high level of commitment and willingness to risk death among religious
extremists. Religiously motivated terrorist groups believe that they know what constitutes
being righteous and that this knowledge obligates them to destroy the evil and the unjust
(Martin, 2006:191).

Virtually all of the world's major religions contain martial metaphors. Whole books of the
Hebrew Bible are devoted to the conquests of great kings. In Hinduism, warfare has
contributed to great religious epics such as the Mahabharata (Brown, 2001). Warfare,
however, is not just confined to mythic legends. It has spilled over into history with
conflicts such as the Crusades, the Muslim conquests and the Religious Wars of the
sixteenth century (Gary, 2001).

Religious justifications for violence, including terrorism, were the most frequent, even
before the nineteenth century (Rapoport, 1984: 569). Consider for instance the example
of the war between the Jewish Zealots and the Romans in 48 AD. A Jewish sect called
the Zealots carried out terrorist campaigns to force a revolution against the Romans in
Judea. These campaigns included the use of assassins, also known as the ??Sicarii??, or


20

dagger-men, who would infiltrate Roman-controlled cities and stab Jewish collaborators
or Roman legionnaires with a ??sica?? (dagger) (Hunsicker, 2006: 11). However, the
religious justifications for terrorism are not only ancient but also contemporary (Lutz and
Lutz, 2004: 64).

The early 1980s saw a dramatic emergence of terrorism motivated by extreme Islamist
movements. Organisations which have developed significantly, in terms of capacity, are
Hezbollah in South Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and West bank, al-Gama??at al- Islamaiyya
in Egypt, and the trans-national Al-Qaeda network (refer to Annexure 1 and 2 on Al-
Qaeda and Usama bin Laden).

However, this is not to say that Islamism should be linked with terrorism. Equating
mainstream Islamic religion to terrorism committed by extremists groups acting in the
name of Islamic beliefs and similarly blaming the Christian religion for the actions of
Torquemada (Spanish Domonican Friar, who was appointed as grand inquisitor by Pope
Innocent VIII (1487), executed Jews and suspected Witches) or of the self-styled Phineas
Priesthood (Christian identified movement against inter-racial intercourse, homosexuality
and abortion) in America is incongruous (Randall, 1996; Christian Century, 1999). This
is because the majority of victims of terrorism committed by Islamist fanatics in the
twentieth century are Muslims, as evidenced by atrocities in countries such as Algeria,
Iraq and Afghanistan (Wilkinson, 2006:30).

Islamism in its basic form sets out to create a feeling of belonging even across borders.
Muslims all over the world, for example, belong to a universal ummah (Islamic
community). ??The ummah is not founded on race, nationality, locality, occupation,
kinship or special interest. The foundation of the community in Islam is the principle,
which designates submission to the will of Allah, obedience to His law and commitment
to His cause. What is required of the community at large is likewise required of every
individual member?? (Van Nieuwenhuijze, 1959: 5-22).

Yet, Islamic fundamentalism as practiced by groups such as Al-Qaeda in their quest for a
pan-Islamic Caliphate (which is an ancient government system based entirely on Sharia,
Islamic law, and led by one individual, a Prince of Believers) has become a cause for
concern in the 21st Century (Reeve, 1999:181).

Other non-Islamic religious terrorist groups which have emerged as threats over the past
decade or so include the Aum Shinrikyo, a mixture of Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Christianity, who believed that its leader was the ??enlightened one, and that the world was
soon coming to an end. They were responsible for the 1995 Sarin poisonous gas attacks
on Tokyo??s subway (Marshall, 1999).

Taken as a whole, religion has re-emerged as a major component in the understanding
contemporary political developments, especially in the Middle East, Asia and Africa.
The materialization of this phenomenon and its symbolism varies from religion to
religion and culture to culture but there are some parallels in the organisation of
religious groups and in the methods used by activists to arouse a popular response
(Martin, 2006: 212-213).



21

The fourth manifestation of insurgent terrorism is ??Nationalistic and Separatist
Terrorism??. Wilkinson (2006: 16) defines nationalistic and separatist terrorism as:

Nationalistic terrorism is an outgrowth of an unwavering devotion and
loyalty to a specific group that believes they have been suppressed, treated
unfairly, or persecuted by the ruling authority of the country in which they
live.

Regimes of totalitarianism, such as Nazism and Stalinism, and even more pertinent to
South Africa, that of Apartheid, routinely used mass terror to control and persecute whole
populations. The historical evidence shows that this was a tragically effective way of
suppressing opposition and resistance. Yet, some of these regimes had central to the
demise of these ideologies the existence of liberation movements. While such groups
were characterised as terrorists, such being the case with the African National Congress
(ANC) Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK??s), these groups were effective in facilitating the
downfall of repressive regimes (Ottaway, 1991: 61-82).

The central focus of nationalistic terrorism is the call for attention to the plight of the
suppressed group. The goal is to eventually secure a separate independent homeland or
country for the group. Terrorism is not the primary weapon in the struggles of new
nationalist movements, but its increase may become prevalent in Asia, Africa and the
Middle East (Medimorec, 2001: 92).

Historically, traces of nationalistic endeavours take root in the late 1940??s when Asian
States (like India) and African States (like Ghana) began the backlash against colonial
rule. Nationalistic terrorism became more pronounced in the late 1960s and 1970s with
the rise of secular nationalist and neo-Marxist terrorist groups, such as the Red Brigades.
The root causes of many terrorist campaigns developed in the late 1960s and 1970s were
quite independent from the cold war. However, it is of essence to note that the ideological
conflict between western capitalism and communist evolutionism had a profound impact
on the new patterns of low-intensity conflict that emerged in the later 1960s and 1970s. In
many ways, it is argued that the leaders of insurgent groups espoused ideologies of
Marxist revolutionism (Wilkinson, 2006:24).

Terrorists fighting a nationalist cause usually have large corps of activist and passive
sympathisers. This inhibits the ability of security forces to ply vital intelligence and
cooperation from the public from which they depend to apprehend terrorists. The Ethniki
Organosis Agoniston (EOKA) terrorists were able to rely upon this foundation in their
fight against the British Army and police in Cyprus (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 528).

It is argued, that after the struggle for colonial independence the new states inherited
frontiers, which had little regard for ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions. These
created problems, where people were forced to coexist with others of diverse cultural and
ethnic identities. The struggle to maintain internal cohesion and order were simply
inherited by successor states. Many of them were ill equipped economically, politically
and militarily. These factors contributed to nationalist and other movements (Wilkinson,
2006:23).



22

Due to the effects of colonialists and their abrupt exit from countries, no post-colonial
country has escaped serious internal conflict in the form of separatists?? struggles or inter-
communal strife in the past decade. Examples supporting this assessment are the
Palestinians, Kurds, Tamils, Kashmiris and Sikhs. As the frontiers of these countries
become more established in the post-colonial era, it may be expected that an increasing
number of these desperate groups, which are trapped within these frontiers, will resort to
terrorism (O??Connor, 2007).

In addition, the following serve as contemporary examples of groups who engage in
terrorism for nationalistic reasons.

• Arabs living in the land known as Palestine from which the Jewish nation, Israel,
was created in 1948 began nationalistic terrorist activities around 1970. These
include the Arab Palestinian terrorist organizations HAMAS (Islamic Resistance
Movement) and Hezbollah (Party of God), in the early 2000s. Other active Arab
Palestinian groups include Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Palestine Liberation
Front (PLF), and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
(http://avpv.tripod.com/terror-groups.html).

• Pakistan and India have long clashed over the control of Kashmir. The people of
Kashmir, however, want to be an independent Islamic state. Major Islamic
terrorist groups fighting to create that independent state are Lashkar-e-Tayyaba
(LT), meaning ??Army of the Pure,?? Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), and Harakat ul-
Mujahideen (HUM). Although the terrorists of Kashmir are predominately
thought of as nationalistic terrorists, their struggle is an example of a nationalistic
cause interlocked with a religious struggle (Schofield, 2000: 52).
• The Irish Catholic population of Northern Ireland, ruled by Britain, wants
independence from Britain. The Protestant population of Northern Ireland resists
the movement away from Britain. The major nationalistic terrorist group in 2004
working for separation from England is the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA).
Again, the RIRA's nationalist struggle has religious overtones.
(http://law.jrank.org/pages/11981/Terrorism.html)

• The Chechen Muslims struggle for independence from Russia post 1991 has
resulted in various terror activities in Russia. These include renowned terror
incidents such has the 2002 hostage taking in a Moscow theatre and the capture of
a school in Beslan in 2004 (Murphy, 2004).

• Africa has also seen its share of groups utilising terrorism for nationalistic
pursuits. The Forces Nouvelle in Cote d??Ivoire, the Union of Islamic Courts in
Somalia, the Mai-Mai in Kenya, the Justice for Equality Movement (JEM) in
Darfur, as well the Lord??s resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda all serve as
contemporary African examples fighting for recognition within their respective
countries.




23

The fifth manifestation of insurgent terrorism is ??Single Issue Terrorism??. These are
groups, which coalesce around various social issues such as racial equality, pro-abortion
and anti-abortion, animal rights (Animal Liberation Front, ALF), nuclear issues,
environmental concerns, land and economic rights, and other matters impinging on the
public conscience. The group aims to change one aspect of policy and social behaviour
rather than remodel the political and socio-economic order as a whole (Wilkinson,
2006:4).

The group usually operates within the parameters of legitimate democratic dissent.
However, in certain cases these pressure groups exceed the bounds of legitimate protest.
This form of terrorism is considered the least serious form of random violence against the
public. In certain instances, issue-motivated terrorism may also include elements of
religiously motivated terrorism, with reference to fundamental interpretations of religious
doctrines, such as, the debate about euthanasia (Behm and Palmer, 1991: 174-175).

Many developed countries have experienced forms of single-issue terrorism such as eco-
terrorism. For example, ecological activists have targeted multinational corporations such
as Costain for years arising from the destruction of ecological sites (Badolato, 1991).
Companies not only face financial threats from highly sophisticated, well-organised eco-
organisations, but are also subject to terrorist tactics, such as bomb threats, and the
intimidation of their staff. British police are investigating the tactics used by underground
eco-groups, which distribute leaflets with instructions on how to assemble homemade
explosives. In the US, in 1986, the group ??Earth First?? was responsible for a successful
attack on the Palo Verdes nuclear facility transmission lines in the US. Radical
environmental movements, and acts of terrorism associated with them, are considered to
be on the increase (Liddick, 2006: 59).
b) Vigilante terrorism
Gurr (1988: 97) defines vigilante terrorism as:

??(violent) activity intended to protect the status quo or to return to the
status quo of an earlier period.

Vigilante terrorism is political violence that is perpetrated by non-governmental groups
and individuals (Martin, 2003: 97). A vigilante movement never sees itself as a state of
principled conflict either with the government or with the prevailing concept of law. It is
not revolutionary and does not bring down authority. What characterizes the vigilante
state of mind is the profound conviction that the government or some of its agencies have
failed to enforce their own order in an area under their jurisdiction. Backed by the
fundamental norm of self-defence and speaking in the name of what they believe to be
valid law of the land, vigilantes, in effect, enforce the law and executive justice. Due
process of the law is not an immediate concern (Sprinzak, 1995).

Vigilantism is defined by three basic categories (Terrorismexperts, 2007):

• Crime Control Vigilantism: refers to violent struggle against perpetrators who,
after causing damage to property or harm to people, manage to escape the arm of
the law due to the authorities inefficient, corrupt, or lenient treatment of crime.


24

• Social Group Control Vigilantism: refers to violence that aims to control
competing groups or groups vying for a new social order. They do not focus on
criminals but rather on population groups that want either social or political
change.
• Regime Control Vigilantism: this activity occurs when certain groups feel that the
current regime is not protecting their interests efficiently and by a violent
reaction, they aim to alter the regimes functioning.

The one category that will be reflected upon in this study as it pertains to South Africa is
Crime Control Vigilantism. The actions of PAGAD best illustrate this category of
vigilante terrorism.

c) State terrorism

State repression and political violence were practiced regularly during the 20th century.
State terrorism is defined as (Martin, 2003: 101):

??. actions aimed at preserving an existing order and to maintain state
authority through demonstrations of state power.

Regimes that officially selected violent repression as a policy choice rationalised their
behaviour as a legitimate method to protect the state from internal threat. However,
Martin (2003: 101) argues that there are two distinct manifestations of state terrorism,
namely, overt official state terrorism and covert official state terrorism. The former refers
to the visible application of state political violence. It is a policy of unconcealed and
explicit repression directed against a domestic enemy. Overt official terrorism has been
commonly practiced in totalitarian states such as Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and
Taliban Afghanistan. Covert official state terrorism refers to the secretive application of
state political violence aimed at repression of a domestic enemy. Covert state terrorism
has been commonly practiced in countries with secret police services such as Shah
Mohammad Reza Phlavi??s Iran, President Hafez el-Assad??s Syria and General Augusto
Pinochets Chile (Martin, 2003; Zalman, 2007).

d) State sponsored terrorism

Cline and Alexander (1987: 12) define state sponsored terrorism as:

The deliberate employment of violence or the threat of use of violence by
sovereign states (or sub-national groups encouraged or assisted by
sovereign states) to attain strategic and political objectives by acts in
violation of law. These criminal acts are intended to create
overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or
military victims attached or threatened.

Over the years, it has become apparent that states are involved in terrorism in a variety of
ways, from various levels of general assistance, to operational aid, to initiating and


25

directing a terrorist organization??s activities, and direct attacks perpetrated by official
state agencies. Such forms of involvement classify states as ??states supporting terrorism??
or ??terrorist states??. The second category has become a political weapon used by states to
describe their rivals or by terrorist organizations against opposing countries (Ganor, 1998;
Cronin, 2004:3).

State sponsored terrorism can be illustrated through the example of the Pakistani
government??s involvement in the Kashmir conflict. The intelligence unit of the Pakistani
army supported Muslim dissidents in Kashmir and sought to occupy Kashmir and render
it as a province of Pakistan (Mohan, 1992: 299). A statistical assessment of active
fighters in Kashmir concluded that 40 percent of those opposed to continued Indian rule
in the region were Pakistanis or Afghans, who outnumbered the secular Kashmiri groups
who were seeking an independent state (Stern, 2000:118).

Pakistan has aided other dissident groups elsewhere in India as well (Saikia 2002). It is
not surprising that India has responded by covertly providing aid to Pakistani dissidents.
There is evidence that Indian aid has been to a certain extent effective in destabilizing
Pakistan (Laqueur, 1999:153). In these cases terrorism led to additional terrorism.
However, foreign support did not create the opposition movements in either country, but
clearly intensified the violence (Lutz and Lutz, 2004:49).

States are said to sponsor terrorists for the following reasons:

• Pressure by the Diaspora to support dissident groups: Dissident political
organizations that have resorted to the use of violence have often had support
from Diaspora communities. In addition to giving moral support and financial
aid to dissident groups, supporters abroad have applied pressure on other
governments to support dissidents (Lutz and Lutz, 2004:49). Such communities
can prolong violence by providing safe havens for dissidents in their home
country; by contributing funds and extremist propaganda (Stern, 2000:121). For
instance, the IRA has been able to openly raise funds in the United States; the
PLO has maintained widespread support from the Palestinian community
worldwide and Kashmiris around the world have supported the dissidents in
Kashmir (Byman, 1998:1610 and Mohan, 1992:304).

• As part of a campaign for geographic expansion and political control, at the
expense of existing state structures: Through counter reaction against specific
individuals from the targeted government, terrorists increase publicity and
demonstrate to the people that their charges against the regime are well founded.
Thereafter recruitment follows and more funds collected, especially under state
sponsored terrorism. For example, Hezbollah made use of video recordings of
their attacks. These recordings were sent to Iran where they receive their
financial backing and instructions (Botha, 2001).

• To destroy or weaken the political cohesion of a political entity: State sponsored
terrorism involves the employment of lethal force across international borders
for the purpose of destroying or weakening the political cohesion of a targeted
political entity. The state that resorts to terrorism does not use its own military


26

instruments to deliver the lethal force, but harnesses social elements within the
targeted entity to do so (Maogoto, 2006).

State sponsored terrorism, as a trend, is expected to continue as a form of limited conflict
used by marginalised states. State sponsored international terrorism can also be used as a
tool of domestic or foreign policy. Iran, even with United States sanctions, continues to
use terrorism as a weapon of foreign policy to kill dissidents and to disrupt peace
processes through its support for Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). It also
provides a safe haven for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Wheeler, 2007).

Essentially, the growth of international terrorist movements has been linked to the
willingness of some nations to sponsor campaigns of terror directly or indirectly. States
sponsor terrorism by providing funding, training, a safe haven, weapons and logistical
support to terrorists. State sponsorship increases the danger of terrorism because it
provides the client group with far greater firepower.
2.3.2.2. Crime-related terrorism

Criminal terrorism can be characterised as:

The systematic use of terror for ends of material gains (Wardlaw, 1989:
12).

The primary manifestations of force in this form of terrorism include kidnapping,
extortion, assassination and murder. Targets are selected primarily on considerations of
personal and material gain. If a member of a state structure is selected at all, it is either
for direct personal gain or to reduce interference by governmental authorities in their
efforts to put an end to criminal activity (Hanle, 1989: 111).

However, it is becoming more difficult to efficiently and accurately, distinguish between
crime and crime committed in pursuance of terrorism. This is illustrated, by the problem
of financial offences. In criminal terms, illegally obtained money converts into legal
money as is the case with money laundering. In terrorism terms legally held money as
well as the proceeds of crime, are used to support terrorist activity. Today the
demarcation appears to be breaking down, and the unique features of terrorism and
serious crime have become increasingly unreliable in identifying the motivation of
perpetrators. Theft, extortion and fraud have become regular activities for terrorist groups.
In Japan Aum Shinrikyo was involved in fraud. In Columbia, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Columbia (FARC) was supported by money from narcotics and kidnapping for
ransoms. In June 2002 in the US, two members of Hezbollah were convicted of
smuggling tobacco. The Revolutionary Organization, which has been active in Greece
since 1975, has been regularly involved in human trafficking and smuggling. In Northern
Ireland groups and individuals formerly involved in terrorism have now transformed
themselves into organized crime groups (Clutterbuck 2004:146-147).

Crime related terrorism might also be the consequence of certain dynamic socio-
economic factors, which become prevalent. The dissolution of the Soviet Union into 15


27

independent states provides an apt example. Poor socio-economic conditions contributed
to a deterioration of law enforcement, border forces and to general unemployment.
Control over weapons and explosives weakened, and this threatened not only national,
but also regional and international security. The national security of states in the region
was also threatened by the escalation of criminal gangs and organised crime syndicates.
Criminal terrorism within this region took contained elements of contract assassinations,
kidnappings and intimidation bombings. Targets included business people, politicians,
government officials, government buildings, military personnel, trains and border guards
(Botha, 2001 and Hesterman, 2004).

In South Africa, the phenomenon of taxi violence can be considered as crime related
terrorism. Taxi violence is especially prevalent around Cape Town, Johannesburg and
East London. Taxi violence occurs mainly between owners and operators of minibus
taxis, between members of opposing taxi associations, and between minibus taxi
operators and operators of other modes of transport such as buses. Competition for routes,
licences and passengers exacerbates the problem. An emerging phenomenon in taxi
violence is that of professional hit squads hired by operators to attack rivals in drive-by
shootings. Nearly 1 500 people were said to be killed in taxi-related violence between
1996 and January 2000. In the Western Cape, violence in the transport industry escalated
in April 2000 when a bus owned by the Golden Arrow Bus Company was shot at near the
Nyanga bus terminal. This attack unleashed 57 violent incidents between April and
August 2000, during which two commuters and 11 bus drivers were killed, and 42
commuters were injured. In July 2000 alone, there were 13 attacks by independent
minibus owners and drivers, against buses of the Golden Arrow Bus Company. These
attacks started in late May 2000 (Botha, 2001 and Dugard, 2001).

a) Narco-terrorism

Although narco-terrorism is a sub-element of crime-related terrorism, it is significant
enough to be considered in its own right. Narco-terrorism can be described as:

??terrorism conducted to further the aims of drug traffickers (Chouvy,
2004: 3).

Narco-terrorism includes narcotics trafficking by terrorist groups in return for the funds
with which to conduct terror. Narco-terrorism may occur in the form of assassination,
extortion, hijacking, bombing, and kidnapping. These may be directed at government
officials to disrupt government order and thereby divert interest from the drug operations
(Chouvy, 2004: 3).

In the Asia/Pacific region, narco-terrorism is linked to political terrorism. The objective is
to compel governments or their agencies (such as law enforcement agencies) to scale
down their activities against drug syndicates. Narco-terrorism, in this regard, will be the
use of extreme pressure and violence by the growers, producers, or distributors of
narcotics to force a government agency to modify its policies with regard to the
prohibited sale and the use of narcotics (Hanle, 1989: 127).


28


Colombia is one of the more pertinent examples of a state where narcotics introduced not
only terrorism, but also an illegal international arms-trade network. State-sponsored
terrorism also plays a role as a destabilisation factor. For example, all major terrorist
groups in Colombia – Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia; Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia; and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional - have received arms
and training from Cuba and aid from Libya. The involvement of Cuba and Libya
(although indirectly) supports the conclusion that an international network exists, linking
terrorist groups and individual role-players. Colombia has historical ties with Cuba,
organised crime organisations (which are active in drugs, guns and illegal alien
smuggling in Panama) and the Russian Mafia responsible for supplying weapons to
Colombian narco-terrorist forces (Ehrenfeld, 1987, Teicher 2005).

China??s flagship commercial shipping fleet, China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO),
is directly connected to the Chinese armed forces, the People??s Liberation Army, and the
Chinese government. COSCO ships have served as carriers for massive smuggling
operations of weapons, drugs and illegal aliens around the world. In addition, the Chinese
government has used COSCO in missions to ship missiles and components of weapons of
mass destruction to rogue nations such as Pakistan and Iran (American Defence Centre,
2003).

Narco-terrorism has included the assassination of political leaders; the bombing of
civilian aeroplanes; alliances between armed guerrillas and narco-traffickers; gunrunning
and may even involve attempts to overthrow a government that aims to curtail the drug
trade. As long as the drug trafficking is allowed to continue, terrorists will be able to
benefit from the positive spin offs from trade in illegal substances.
2.3.2.3 Pathological terrorism
Terrorism has to be executed by individuals: planners, trainers, actual bombers and
killers. In terms of this execution, individuals have to possess the requisite pathological,
disturbed emotional condition that would allow them to consciously engage in the killing
of innocent civilians. The Holocaust is considered one example of pathological terrorism.
The Holocaust leaders, who directed and participated in gross human rights abuses, were
inarguably possessing of some degree of pathological antisocial condition, however
enhanced by culture, background, education and training (White, 2001).

Another prime example of pathological terrorism is that of the 9/11. To fly a passenger
plane (United 91) into the Twin Towers, killing thousands of civilians, unquestionably
mandates a plane hijacker with a dysfunctional emotional composition. Although
political and religious factors provided these men with what they perceived as pragmatic
rationalisations for their actions, it was pathological terrorism that equipped them with
the will to commit the devastating mission (Martin, 2006: 21).


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2.3.3. Geographic specifications of terrorism
The above typologies of terrorism operate within the following spheres of geographic
specifications:
2.3.3.1. International acts of terrorism

This involves types of terrorism which occur beyond the jurisdiction of a country.
Alexander and Gleason (1981: 16) define international acts of terrorism as:

Terrorist activities may be regarded as international when the interests of
more than one state are involved, for example, when the perpetrator or
the victim is a foreigner in the country where the act is done or the
perpetrator has fled to another country.

International acts of terrorism have clear international consequences. These acts include
incidents where terrorists cross national borders to strike foreign targets, select victims or
targets because of their connections to a foreign country (for example, diplomats, local
executives), attack airliners on international flights, or force airliners to fly to other
countries (Wilkinson, 2006:16). International acts of terrorism would include all three
typologies with exception to State terrorism (see Section 2.3.2).
2.3.3.2. Trans-national acts of terrorism

Anderson (1998: 282) and Mickolus (1985: 35) define trans-national acts of terrorism
as:
... the use, or threat of use, of anxiety — including, extra normal
violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether
acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when
such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a
target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the
nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, through its location,
through the nature of its institutional or human victims, or through the
mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national
boundaries.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) distinguishes trans-national acts of terrorism
as:
??carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not
they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states??,
(http://www.zundelsite.org/english/advanced_articles/alert.G-7.html)

In other words, perpetrators of trans-national terrorism generally overcome traditional
national differences by concentrating on a common goal of achieving social change,
under the banner of personal beliefs, through violence. These individuals may not
consider themselves to be citizens of any particular country, but instead seek common
political, social, economic or personal objectives that transcend nation or state
boundaries. The World Trade Centre bombing may be considered as an act of trans-


30

national terrorism, because of the different nationalities of the terrorists involved. The
suspected bombers included Egyptians, Iraqis, Jordanians, Palestinians and US citizens
(Botha, 2001). Within the typologies of terrorism, trans-national crime would
encompass the following typologies – Political (in all subsets except State terrorism),
Crime related and Pathological (see Section 2.3.2.).
2.3.3.3. Domestic acts of terrorism

Domestic acts of terrorism are restricted to the borders of one country and occurs when
the violence and terror associated with it are confined to national territories and do not
involve targets abroad. However, this is very difficult to find since any intensive terrorist
campaign cannot remain purely internal and are bound traverse the national borders for
support, weapons, financial assistance and a safe haven (Botha, 2001). The Memorial
Institure for the Prevention of Terorism defines domestic acts of terrorism as:
Incidents perpetrated by local nationals against a purely domestic target
(http://www.tkb.org/Glossary.jsp)

Groups that can be cited as domestic terrorists include, ??The Basque ??(Spain), PAGAD
(South Africa), as well as the ??Boeremag?? (South Africa). Basque terrorists operate in
Northern Spain. Hoping to convince the Spanish government to create an independent
Basque homeland, Basque terrorists carry out domestic acts of terrorism. The largest
Basque terror group is Basque Fatherland and Liberty, or Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).
Because their goal is to separate the Basque people from Spain, ETA is also commonly
referred to as the Basque Separatists (http://law.jrank.org/pages/11981/Terrorism.html).

Within the South African context, PAGAD carried out acts of terrorism within the
Western Cape as a result of its lack of faith in country??s criminal justice system. Another
domestic terrorist group within South Africa was the Boeremag which was an extreme
right wing terrorist group that sought to overthrow the ruling ANC.
2.3.4. Summation of Terrorist Typologies

Typologies as conceptualised in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 contribute to an analysis tool to
aid the response to terrorism due to the subjective interpretation to defining the concept
(Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 39). Typologies of terrorism are ideal classifications and
not a true reflection of nature of the terrorism. A pertinent example may be the diverse
analysis of Usama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. The group can be classified as a religious
group with psychopathic megalomania attributes which emanates from the objective of
realizing a caliphate that is devoid of existing patterns of societal norms. What this
example illustrates is the inter-linkages between the types of typologies that exist within
Schmid??s conceptualisation of terrorism.

Nevertheless, by grouping acts and motivations of terrorism within their respective
typologies, effective measures to counter such acts become manageable.



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2.4. Terrorists Modus Operandi (method of operation)

The contemporary period has witnessed a paradigm shift in the modus operandi that
terrorists utilise to achieve set objectives. Modus operandi is defined as ??a distinct pattern
or manner of working that is associated with a particular crime?? (Bolz et al, 2002: 3).
Terrorism??s modus was in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s rooted in gaining publicity and
public attention for groups undertaking attacks. Largely, innocent civilians were not
targeted. Terrorists of the 1990s and especially the 21st century no longer seem concerned
about public opinion, rather the goal is ??increasing the number of body counts of the
perceived enemy?? (Staten, 2002).

Tactics have become far more pronounced and methods that were previously thought to
be unimaginable have now become a reality, a case in point being the skyjacking of two
airplanes by Al-Qaeda suicide attackers and the crashing of these planes into the Twin
Towers in New York.

Tactics utilised by terrorists as well as the targets that have become the central focus in
the 21st century. In order for any counter terrorism strategy to be effective, it is
imperative that questions around the ??who?? (target) and ??how?? (modus operandi) are
essentially highlighted.
2.4.1. The Target

Illustrative of terrorists who seek to weaken a hated political authority that is responsible
for illegitimate policies/rule; a terrorist??s focus tends not only to be restricted to political
authorities but includes victims, which are innocent civilians (Berry, 2003).

The desired effect of terrorism is not only the physical hurt to the victim, but also the
psychological impact on the target. Consequently, the terrorist??s victims are carefully
selected to ensure the maximum possible psychological impact on the target. The subjects
of terrorist attacks generally have little intrinsic value to the terrorist group but represent
a larger human audience whose reaction is sought by terrorists. The most basic reason for
terrorism is to gain recognition or attention. Violence and bloodshed always excite
human curiosity, and the theatricality, suspense and threat of danger inherent in terrorism
enhance its attention-drawing qualities (Crenshaw, 1981: 387).

Terrorism is also used to disrupt and discredit the processes of government. Terrorism as
a direct attack on a regime aims to highlight the incompetence of the political authority to
safeguard its citizens and inevitably promotes the insecurity and demoralisation of
government officials. Terrorists produce these effects by attacking the following targets:

• Government buildings, military bases, weapons, ships, airplanes, trains, brigades
and tunnels;
• Government officials, soldiers, police and diplomats;
• Banks and the security and electronic transmission of currency;
• Symbolic public monuments;
• Business headquarters, personnel and factories;
• Civilian crowds, modes of transport and transportation facilities;


32

• Electric power plants, dams and grids;
• Communications stations; and
• Computers and their networks (Berry, 2003).

Graph 2.2 below illustrates that from the period 2001 – August 2007; three main target
groups remain extremely vulnerable to terrorist threats, these being: the Police; Private
Citizens/Properties and Governments. If anything, this Graph indicates the importance of
being proactive in developing counter terrorism mechanisms that protect these vulnerable
groups.

Graph 2.2: Terrorist Incidences by Target Group 2001-2007

Targets of Terrorism 2001-2007
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Pr
iva
te
Ci
tiz
en
s
Po
lic
e
Go
ve
rn
me
nt
Bu
sin
es
s
Re
lig
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s I
ns
t
Tr
an
sp
ort
ati
on
Ut
ilit
ies
Ed
uc
ati
on
al
Ins
t
Me
dia
Di
plo
ma
tic
NG
O
Te
lec
om
s
Mi
lita
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Fo
rm
er
Te
rro
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ts
Ai
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&
A
irli
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s
Target
In
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de
n
ts

Statistics adapted from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT): Terrorism
knowledge database

Police seem to be one of the prime targets for terrorists in the period specified above. One
of the main reasons for this trend may be attributed to creating a sense of false security
within a targeted country. If the police are unable to protect citizens, then the state is seen
as incapable of providing safety and security. As such, citizens begin to question the
governments in power; this may also result in the rise of vigilantism, disorder and
mayhem, three preconditions wherein terrorists may flourish without being singled out.
(Table 2.1 may provide substantiation for this argument).

If patterns of terrorism are increasing and tactics becoming more innovative, there is
concern that innocent civilians as the new focus of terrorists are becoming more
vulnerable. As such, counter terrorism strategies being adopted should be weary of this
factor and should consider mechanisms and methods that safeguard this vulnerable group.



33

2.4.2. Terrorist Tactics

According to Hunsicker (2006:85), the most important tactical operations involving
terrorists are, in order of relative frequency:

• Bombing
• Assassination and Assault
• Hostage-taking/Kidnapping/Skyjacking/Barricade Situation

From 1968 and 1999, more than 7 000 terrorist bombings were recorded. The trend is a
shift away from attacking specific targets towards indiscriminate killings. The most
serious concern is that terrorists are seeking to kill and injure more innocent civilians
(Botha, 2001).

2.4.2.1 Bombing

This has been the most common tactic used by terrorists since the manifestation of
international terrorism in the 1960s. The objectives have changed from symbolic
bombings not intended to produce casualties (especially in the 1970s), to incidents where
the ultimate objective is to cause as many casualties as possible.

The latter objective emerged in the 1980s, especially with the suicide bombings used by
religious extremists in the Middle East and North Africa. The most obvious reason for the
popularity of bombing as a modus operandi is that explosives can be easily purchased,
stolen or manufactured from commercially available materials. Knowledge of how to
build bombs and explosives can be obtained from books and the internet. Individuals
have access to conventional as well as unconventional bomb-building material through
mail order catalogues. Former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani refers to
this access as ??the poor man??s nuclear bomb?? (Laquer, 1997).

Currently, terrorist groups are able to harvest the necessary data on weaponry and
techniques using the internet (Laquer, 1997). Terrorists are further exploring advanced
technologies and are utilising more imaginative ways of operating explosives, detonators,
communications, and concealed devices. Terrorists rely upon computers, cellular phones
and encryption software to aid in their terrorist exploits. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and his
gang, were convicted of a plot to blow up 12 US airliners over the Pacific in 1995, used
these methods of evading detection, as well as, the forging of documents and passports,
extensively. Yousef was arrested in Islamabad, Pakistan, in February 1995, after fleeing
from the United States and was sentenced to 240 years imprisonment in November 1997.
Yousef was convicted of the explosion at the World Trade Centre in New York in which
six people died and more than 1 000 were injured, and of planting a bomb that killed one
person on a Philippines Airlines flight to Tokyo in 1994 (Wilcox, 1997).

Usama Bin Laden, who uses computers and cellular phones to co-ordinate the activities
of his international network of operatives, illustrates another example of technology in
planning terrorism. After the Afghan war, Usama Bin Laden emerged as one of the


34

primary role-players in exporting trans-national terrorism. During the Afghan war, close
co-operation was established with Muslims from different nationalities that form part of
the current network of Islamic extremist elements. Bin Laden heads the large Islamic
organisation Al-Qaeda. Most of the groups that participate in his front remain
independent, although the organisational barriers between them are fluid. In the centre of
Al-Qaeda is Bin Laden??s own inner group, which conducts missions on its own. The best-
known terrorist act with which Usama Bin Laden is connected is the bombing of the US
embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, in August 1998, which killed more than 200 people. Ten
minutes after the Nairobi blast, a bomb placed in a refrigerator truck exploded outside the
US embassy in suburban Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 11 people (Terrorism Update,
1998).

Professional terrorists have become increasingly ruthless, sophisticated and operationally
more competent. Although most terrorist groups remain technologically conservative,
using off-the-shelf weaponry, some groups adapt or improvise their weaponry. For
example, terrorists used readily available fertiliser as the main component of their device
to bomb the World Trade Centre in New York in February 1993. Although the modus
operandi of international terrorist groups is to a large extent static, the first use of
chemical weapons by terrorists occurred in March 1995 when members of the Japanese
cult, Aum Shinrikyo, placed sarin gas on five trains in Tokyo. Bombings still characterise
most international terrorist incidents (Karim, 2005).

The above is illustrative of the fact that terrorists use whatever means available to further
their objectives. Furthermore, the technological advances of the modern era have made
this possible and have created opportunities and vulnerabilities.


Table 2.2: The 15 worst bombing attacks since 1983, in terms of casualties

Date Location Event Fatalities Injuries
07 Aug 98 Nairobi, Kenya Bomb attacks on U.S. embassy complex 253 5,075
11 Sep 01 New York, Virginia, and
Pennsylvania, USA
Terrorist attacks using aircraft 3,000 2,250
11 Mar 04 Madrid, Spain Bomb attacks on trains 192 1,500
31 Jan 96 Colombo, Sri Lanka Bomb attack on Ceylinco House 100 1,500
12 Mar 93 Bombay, India Series of 13 bomb attacks 300 1,100
26 Feb 93 New York, USA Bomb attack in the World Trade Center 6 1,000
7 July 05 London, UK Bomb attacks in trains and bus 57 700


35

19 Apr 95 Oklahoma City, USA Truck bomb attack on government
building
166 467
12 Oct 02 Bali, Indonesia Bomb attack in a nightclub 190 300
23 Oct 83 Beirut, Lebanon Bomb attack on U.S. Marine barracks and
French paratrooper base
300 100
03 Sept 04 Beslan, Russia Hostages killed 360 NA
21 Dec 88 Lockerbie, UK Explosion of U.S. PanAm B-747 270 NA
18 Jul 94 Buenos Aires, Argentina Bomb attack 95 147
23 Nov 96 Comoros, Indian Ocean Hijacked Ethiopian aircraft ditched at sea 127 NA
13 Sep 99 Moscow, Russia Bomb destroys apartment building 118 NA
Source: Auerswald, 2006: 8

Information Box 2.1: Illustrative example of a terrorist bombing: PAN AM 103



In December 1988, a bomb exploded on flight Pan Am 103. Pieces of the plane fell
onto the Scottish town of Lockerbie, killing 259 people on the plane and 11 people on
the ground. This incident is regarded as the worst air-disaster of the 20th century. The
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) was
suspected of being responsible for planting the bomb. Despite the threat of economic
sanctions, Libya initially refused to deliver two of its nationals, who were the main
suspects of the bombing: Abdel Basset al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah, after
they were charged with murder, conspiracy to murder and contravention of airline
security. In April 1999, with the contribution of former South African president
Nelson Mandela, Libya extradited the two suspects to stand trial in the Netherlands
according to Scottish law. The trial commenced in May 2000. Al-Amin Khalifa
Fhimah was alleged to belong to Libyan intelligence and to have been the station
officer of Libyan Arab Airlines in Malta at the time of the bombing. In January 2001,
Fhimah was acquitted of the charges against him. Abdel Basset al-Megrahi was
alleged to have been a senior officer of the Libyan Intelligence Services and head of
Libyan Arab Airlines security in Malta in December 1988. Al-Megrahi bought clothes
from a Maltese store that were contained in the suitcase bomb on board flight Pan Am
103. Al-Megrahi was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment (Emerson and
Duffy, 1990: 12-18).


36

Bombings require little organization and can easily be one-man operations. As diplomatic
and military targets have become more protected, terrorists have focussed their attacks on
soft targets. Terrorists are also exhibiting a lack of discrimination in target selection, with
the trend towards huge truck bombs in urban centres such as, for example, Buenos Aires
and Moscow (Auerswald, 2006:8).

It can be reasonably envisaged that the reliance of terrorists on bombings as a modus
operandi will increase in the future; primarily due to the ease at which it can be procured,
developed and the after effects of the hype created after an explosion.
2.4.2.2 Assassinations

In modern times, types of assassinations have included:

• diplomatic assassination (group or state);
• murder involving religious issues (individual, group or state);
• murder where the driving motive is nationalism (individual, group or
state);
• murder where the driving motive is class struggle (individual or group);
and
• murder committed for reasons of state (state).

A recent example of this type of terrorism took place in June 1995, when gunmen
attempted to assassinate Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during a visit to Ethiopia.
Ethiopian counter terrorist forces and Egyptian security forces foiled the attempt. Al-
Gama??a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or IG), masterminded by Egyptian citizen Mustafa
Hamza, claimed responsibility. According to Egypt??s security forces, Khartoum??s
Islamist junta was involved in the attack. Hamza took refuge in Khartoum since he
possesses a Sudanese diplomatic passport (Reeves, 2001).

In the United States, during the early part of the 20th century, anarchists operating under
the banner of the Black Hand preyed on newly arriving immigrants in New York City.
Their tactics of selective assassinations with guns and bombs proved extremely effective
during that period (Hunsicker, 2006: 85).

In South Africa, the most prominent examples of assassinations were those of Captain
Bennie Lategan and Magistrate Piet Theron. Captain Bennie Lategan, a member of the
SAPS?? PAGAD Investigation Team, was killed in January 1999. Captain Lategan was
investigating cases of terrorism in the Western Cape. Ismail Edwards and Ebrahim
Jeneker, both members of PAGAD??s G-Force, were implicated in this assassination.
Furthermore, Magistrate Piet Theron, who was presiding over urban terrorism cases, was
also assassinated in front of his house in September 2000 (Botha, 2001).

2.4.2.3. Hostage taking

Hostage taking, whether by kidnapping individuals, hijacking airlines or storming
buildings, has always been a popular tactic due to its demonstrated effectiveness.


37

Although Jenkins of Rand Corporation argued in 1987 that the seizing of embassies
would decrease because of an increase in their security measures, the left-wing Tupac
Amaru Revolutionary Movement seized the Japanese embassy in Peru in 1997. Hostage
situations have also been on the increase among desperate groups in many developing
and less developing countries. In fact, there was a 33% rise in the kidnapping of
foreigners in the 1990s (Wilkinson, 1996: 18).

Hostages are selected by criteria of the terrorist; essentially the objective is to exert
influence to acquire a desired effect. It is for this reason that the selection of targets for
hostages is wide and incumbent upon the subjective interpretation of the hostage.
Hostages may include:

• Political figures and figures of authority; such has presidents and other
government officials (for example, hostages captured in the Japanese embassy,
supra, included high profiled Peruvian government officials).
• Schoolchildren held hostage during the Chechnyan siege at Beslan
(http://www.keystosaferschools.com/russiashoolhostages.htm).
• Journalists such as the recently renowned Daniel Pearl hostage taking incident is
an exemplar of such (www.pbs.org/newshour/media/response/pearl.html)
• Tourist as well are victims to hostage taking, a recent example included the
capture of South African citizens whilst visiting the Philippines by terrorist group
Abu Sayyaf. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/763512.stm).

The list of individuals that can be selected as hostages are endless and in essence, any
individual can be a target for a terrorist. The taking of hostages is often complimented by
attention from the media and the public. These commodities of a modern era either
wittingly or unwittingly provide amplification for the need of the terrorist. At times, this
in itself, was also an essential desired effect of the terrorist action; the objective may be
to receive attention to the plight of the terrorist. The media unequivocally essentially
contributes to most hostage takings.

The desired effects of terrorism like the selection of hostages also seem endless. These
may include the following:

• Abu Sayyaf was known to take hostages for financial gain. The cumulative
benefit of the hostages also provided incite of the international community into
the purpose of the terrorist group (Niksch, 2002).
• The release of counter parts of terrorist groups arrested in other countries may
also be included in the common list of desired effects. The capturing of
passengers on flights and the demanding for the release of arrested terrorists by
the PLO may provide an exemplar of such (Suro, 1988).
• Terrorists may further resort to hostage taking by mere default as a medium to
achieve a short-term objective. Terrorists may also resort to hostages for
protection and safe transit if aggressively pursued by enforcement agencies.
David Kohesh tried to use his victims as leverage when pursued by enforcement
agencies (Docherty, 2001).



38

Essentially hostage taking is also a common modus operandi of terrorist and like other
terrorist activity; it requires a concerted response to effectively, reduce the activity.
2.5. Terrorist Support Base

In effect, individuals who vent their ??grievances?? through terrorist activity commit
terrorism. Individuals who become terrorists are often unemployed, socially alienated
individuals. For example, those with little education, such as youths in Algerian ghettos
or the Gaza Strip, may try to join a terrorist group out of boredom and a desire to have an
action-packed adventure in pursuit of a cause they regard as just (Hudson, 1999: 37-38).

In contrast, individuals from Western countries who become terrorists are generally both
intellectual and idealistic. Usually, these disenchanted youths, educated or uneducated,
engage in occasional protest and dissidence. Potential terrorist group members
commence as sympathizers of the group. Recruits may often come from support
organizations, such as prisoner support groups or student activist groups. From a
sympathizer, an individual may become a passive supporter. Often, violent encounters
with police or other security forces further motivates an already socially alienated
individual to join a terrorist group. However, membership in a terrorist group is highly
selective. Over a period of a year or more, a recruit generally moves in a slow, gradual
fashion toward full membership in a terrorist group. Therefore, recruits would not only
need to have a personality that would allow them to fit into the group, but ideally a
certain skill needed by the group, such as weapons or communications skills (Hunsicker,
2006: 21).

In addition, Oots (1989: 146) considers that terrorists support includes a whole spectrum
of organisational requirements related to terrorist activity such as:

• financial support;
• training;
• weapons;
• organisational support: groups and friendly regimes supply terrorists with
passports, documents or propaganda support, social support; and
• operational support.

To surmise, to effectively counter terrorism it is of fundamental importance that a
frequent and effective risk analysis is conducted. Risk analysis is a survey to ascertain
how high the probability is of one of these dangers occurring, how well the organization
can respond should the threat become a reality, and how well the organization can carry
on once that reality materializes. Inherent in the analysis is the identification of the
vulnerabilities and threats that go along with the risk. Therefore, as an example, a branch
office or non-essential satellite facility may be more susceptible to attack than the central
office. In the course of the analysis, one of the things to be determined is the extent of the
organization??s exposure, which could materially contribute to loss or damage in the event
of a terrorist attack (Hunsicker, 2006: 85).


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2.6. Summary

Although not all of the above-mentioned categories of terrorism exist in South Africa,
terrorism is an international phenomenon. The implication for South Africa is that trans-
national terrorism, in association with trans-national crime, presents a real threat to
national, regional and international security. South Africa is an open society with a large
number of illegal immigrants and a well-established infrastructure. This presents a fertile
ground for individuals and groups who want to engage in terrorist activities.

South Africa is regarded as the gateway to the rest of Africa, especially to southern
Africa. However, as with other African countries, the threat presented by terrorism is on
the increase. The threat can be seen to exist on two levels, namely as an external threat
and as an internal threat. Given these dynamics, it is imperative that South Africa seeks to
put in place an effective counter terrorism strategy that will be proactive in countering
existing and potential terrorist threats. The next chapter of the study will seek to identify
appropriate mechanisms for counter terrorism. This will be done by engaging in a
comparative analysis of counter terrorism approaches in selected developed and
developing countries to ascertain appropriate methodologies that can be associated in
conceptualising South Africa??s approach to counter terrorism.


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CHAPTER 3
COUNTER TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE: INTERNATIONAL OVERVIEW
OF MECHANISMS IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

3.1. Introduction

The study aims to outline aspects of counter terrorism approaches in differing countries
that have proven to be effective and that may impact positively if applied to the South
African context. The section is initiated by considering the various interpretations in
defining the concept of ??counter terrorism??. Moreover a comparative analysis of counter
terrorism approaches at the multilateral as well as country levels - United States (US),
United Kingdom (UK), Russia, India, and Algeria - will be undertaken to ascertain
appropriate mechanisms for counter terrorism. This analysis will at most highlight best
practice case studies to aid in developing a suitable counter terrorism approach for South
Africa.
3.2. Multilateral Entities and their approach to counter terrorism

Terrorism, according to some South African academics and interviewees of this study -
Boyane Tshelhla, Hussein Solomon, Kurt Shillinger and Andre Thomashausen - has had
a profound impact on the global security matrix, of which a major consequence has been
the inculcation of a ??state of paranoia?? within global security measures. This according to
the afore-mentioned academics is amplified by the conduct of officials at ports of entries
into specific countries (like the US and the UK). Within this context, other international
academics believe that the threats of terrorism are not over-rated and global initiatives are
imperative to curb impending threats.

Global initiatives for counter terrorism serve as examples of best-case scenarios that filter
into national strategies to counter terrorism. Counter terrorism has been approached in a
militaristic format and at times considering a policing approach. Both approaches are
hailed to be custodians to the UN Counter Terrorism Strategy. Unequivocal attention also
has to be paid to the respect for human rights. This section will provide an overview of
multilateral entities and their current approaches to counter terrorism. Entities that will be
included are the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), the European Union (EU)
and the International Police (INTERPOL). Multilateral institutions offer international
standards of counter terrorism that countries may refer to as yardsticks against which they
can measure appropriate national strategies to counter terrorism.
3.2.1. United Nations (UN)

The UN council??s response after 9/11 was the ratification of Resolution 1373, which
requires countries to evoke defensive measures if global peace and security is threatened.
In terms of Resolution 1373, member states are obligated to provide measures to suppress
terror financing; ensure proper border control including effective procedures to check
travel documentation; and possess a national criminal code to prosecute acts of terrorism.


41

If UN Member States fail to comply with the above-mentioned regulations, they will be
subjected to sanctions. In addition to the Resolution, the UN also has in existence 12
international conventions or instruments on terrorism, a number of which South Africa
still has to accede to, sign or ratify (See Annexure 3).

The overseeing authority for Resolution 1373 is the Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC).
The centre monitors Member States compliance with the regulations contained within
Resolution 1373 (Wilkinson, 2006:169). The CTC is also effectively the de facto
coordinator of counter terrorism technical assistance by supporting States to adopt new,
or improve on, existing counter-terrorism related laws and accede as well as implement
the 12 international conventions and protocols related to terrorism. Further to the CTC,
other supporting bodies of UN measures to counter terrorism include: The Counter
Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), the 1540 Committee, the Al-Qaida/Taliban
Sanctions Committee, and the 1566 Working Group (Millar and Benjamin, 2005: 5-7).

Another important UN measure in the process of combating global terrorism is General
Kofi Annan??s five-pillar strategy to counter terrorism as advocated for in 2005.
Enunciated in the report entitled ??In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and
human rights for all (A/59/2005), the strategy as duly endorsed by the United Nations
2005 Summit of Heads of State on 8 September 2006, seeks to:

• Dissuade people from resorting to terrorism and supporting it;
• Deny terrorists access to funds and materials;
• Deter States from Sponsoring terrorism;
• Develop State capacity to defeat terrorism; and
• Defend human rights.

At the UN multilateral level, it seems that all attempts are being made to strengthen
global efforts towards eradicating threats of terrorism. The UN not only has appropriate
conventions in place, but the institution has supplemented these legislative efforts with a
global strategy. In terms of this global strategy, South Africa is working towards the first,
second, fourth and fifth aspects. The fourth aspect is however, the most pertinent to this
study in terms of strengthening the capacity of both SAPS and the relevant intelligence
agencies as well as facilitating coordination between the relevant institutions.
3.2.2. African Union (AU) (formerly the Organization of African Unity - OAU)
The US State Department??s annual country assessments of global terrorism stated in
April 2006:
Though it is unclear to what extent terrorist groups were present and
operating in west and central Africa, the fundraising, terrorist
recruiting, and other support activities of al-Qaeda and affiliated
persons and groups in SA, Nigeria, and across the trans-Sahara region
remained a serious concern.
It lists incidents of either concern or co-operation in 16 African countries ranging from
arrests of terrorist suspects and disruption of alleged terrorist operations in Kenya to


42

recruitment activities by known al-Qaeda affiliates in Nigeria, to the abuse of South
African travel documentation by foreigners, on US and UK terrorist alert lists. Essentially,
these trends highlight the fact that terrorism is not just a western concern. It is an
international issue requiring a coherent international response. Africa has a vital role to
play in ensuring security within and beyond its shores. Building counter terrorism
capacity requires moving beyond broad pledges to a systematic, incremental approach
that recognises both the threat and required resources. As such, the Bush administrations??
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism highlights the African Union (AU) as one of
the ??essential elements?? in a common front against transnational terrorism (Shillinger,
2006b).
In 1999, in the wake of the devastating attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted its Convention on the
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The convention defines a terrorist act as any act
which is in violation of the criminal laws of a state party (that is a member state of the
OAU that has ratified or acceded to the convention) and that may endanger the life,
physical integrity or freedom of — or cause serious injury or death to — any person(s),
or causes damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or
cultural heritage, and is intended to:
• intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, institution, the
general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to
adopt or abandon a particular standpoint;
• disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to
create a public emergency; or
• create general insurrection in a state (www.africa-union.org)
In this regard, 36 of the 53 AU Member States ratified the Convention on the
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Furthermore, according to the convention,
state parties are forbidden from any activities aimed at organizing, supporting,
financing, committing or inciting to commit terrorist acts, or providing havens for
terrorists, including the provision of weapons and their stockpiling in their countries
and the issuing of travel documents (www.africa-union.org/conventions).
In the case of the African Union (AU), the African Union Non-Aggression and Common
Defence Pact supplements the framework provided by the OAU Convention of 1999, as
established in Abuja, Nigeria on 31 January 2001. The Pact specifically declares that, ??the
encouragement, support, harbouring or provision of any assistance for the commission of
terrorist acts and other violent trans-national organized crimes against a member state??,
constitutes an act of aggression (Art 1(d) (xi)). Member states are prohibited from using
their territory: ??for the stationing, transit, withdrawal or incursions of irregular armed
groups, mercenaries and terrorist organizations operating in the territory of another
member state??, (Art 5(c)). The member states are obliged to ??extend mutual, legal and all
other assistance in the event of threats of terrorist attack or other organized international
crimes?? and to ??arrest and prosecute any irregular armed group(s), mercenaries or
terrorist(s) that pose a threat to any member state??, (Art 6) (Hough et al, 2005:93).


43

Moreover, in 2002, at a meeting in Algiers, the AU adopted a plan to bring states in line
with the Convention of 1999. The plan called for the creation of an African Centre for the
Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) to co-ordinate the analyses of terrorism and
counter terrorism activities on the continent with AU member states and the regional
economic communities. The ACSRT is tasked to centralise, collect and disseminate
studies and analysis on terrorism and terrorist groups. The states and regional economic
communities are required to designate focal points to liaise with the centre. While this
counter terrorism mechanism in Algiers envisions a highly integrated network of regional
and state focal points co-ordinated centrally through the centre in Algiers, the probability
of the Centre functioning effectively is constrained by funding commitments and the lack
of human resource capacity of the regional economic communities. Thus far, only 20 of
53 states and 3 of 8 regional organisations have designated focal points. South Africa is
among those states that has not identified a focal point (Shillinger, 2006b).
Given the above situation, the immediate strategy should be to build Africa??s capacity
based on a blunt and practical division of labour among states and regional organisations
according to their strengths. That means building strong co-operative ties between the
centre in Algiers and the key states where concerns about terrorism and capacity to
respond converge. This would include Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, Mali, South Africa and
Mozambique. Critically, it also requires resolving the conflict over Western Sahara in
order to integrate Morocco — the only African state which is not an AU Member State
(www.africa-union.org/Terrorism/terrorism2.htm). These measures will inherently aid
in coordinated efforts on the continent to combat terrorism.
Nonetheless, while African governments and regional institutions are gradually
strengthening their counter terrorism capacities through improved intelligence services,
legislation and international co-operation, many African leaders remain deeply
ambivalent about terrorism as a security priority. For most African states, urgent
development issues rightly trump concerns about terrorism. In addition, former liberation
movements as well as the AU, meanwhile, dispute where to draw the line between
??terrorists?? and ??freedom fighters?? (Vaknin, 2004). Yet, the AU Convention on
preventing and combating terrorism as well as the establishment of the ACSRT illustrates
Africa??s commitment in dealing with threats of terrorism.
3.2.3. The European Union (EU)

The European Union??s (EU) counter terrorism approach is aimed at developing a
common approach to counter terrorism. The EU Counter terrorism strategy was adopted
in December 2005 and was laid down in an action in February 2006. It structures more
than 160 separate measures horizontally and according to sector along four critical
strands, namely: prevent, protect, pursue and respond (Bendiek, 2006: 11).


44

The strategy is illustrated as follows:

Figure 3.1: EU Counter Terrorism Strategy 2005


Source: adapted from Bendiek, 2006


EU Member States support the strategy in four critical ways:

• Strengthening national capabilities: by using best practices; sharing knowledge
and experiences to improve national capabilities. This is done by improved
collection and analysis of information and intelligence;
• Facilitating European cooperation: establishing and evaluating mechanisms to
facilitate cooperation including between police and judicial authorities, and
through legislation;
• Developing collective capability: ensuring EU capacity to understand and make
collective policy responses to terrorist threats, and making use of EU bodies
including Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, the MIC and SitCen;
• Promoting international partnership: working with others beyond the EU,
particularly the UN, and other international bodies to deepen international
consensus on counter terrorism.

Inherent in the four critical elements of the EU Strategy – Prevent, Protect, Pursue and
Respond – is the elements ??cooperation, collective capability and international
partnership??. These elements are regarded as key in attempting to safeguard the European
Union.
Strategic Commitment

To combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and
make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of
freedom security and justice
Prevent

To prevent
people from
turning to
terrorism by
tackling the root
causes which can
lead to
radicalisation and
recruitment
Protect

To protect
citizens and
infrastructure
and reduce the
vulnerability of
attacks
Pursue

To pursue and
investigate
terrorists; disrupt
support
networks, cut off
funding and
access to attack
materials and
bring terrorists to
justice
Respond

To manage
and minimise
consequences
of terrorist
attacks, by
improving
capabilities to
deal with: the
aftermath, the
coordination
and the
response


45

3.2.4. International Police (INTERPOL)

Interpol is an organization that aims to provide and promote mutual assistance between
criminal police authorities within the limits of national laws and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Originally formed in Vienna in 1923, the organization has
steadily grown in membership but never substantially changed in form or objectives.
Interpol is not a supranational police agency with investigative powers, but a cooperative
network intended to foster collaboration and to provide assistance in police work among
law enforcement agencies in many nations (Deflem and Maybin, 2005: 178).
There have been trends of structural reorganisations within Interpol to deal effectively
with existing and potential terrorist threats. In the aftermath of September 11, Interpol
reorganized in several key respects. Most concretely, during a press conference in Madrid
on September 14, 2001, Secretary General Noble announced the creation of ??11
September Task Force?? at Interpol??s Headquarters in Lyon, France. The objective of this
special task force is to coordinate international criminal police intelligence received at
Interpol??s Headquarters. The creation of the task force is meant to ensure that information
received is processed as quickly as possible for immediate forwarding to the Interpol
National Central Bureau in Washington, DC, and, through it, to the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) (www.interpol.int/public/ICPO/pressreleases/pr2002/pr200209.asp).
Also instituted following the September 11 attacks was a General Secretariat Command
and Co-ordination Center which is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. A new
Financial and High Tech Crimes Sub-Directorate tasked with monitoring money
laundering was also created. In April 2002, Interpol announced the creation of an Interpol
Terrorism Watch List, which provides direct access by police agencies to information on
fugitive and suspected terrorists who are subject to red (arrest), blue (location) and green
(information) notices (Deflem and Maybin, 2005: 178).
On June 22, 2001, Interpol established a system for member agencies to automatically
upload and retrieve information from a database encompassing cases on stolen travel
documents. Further to this, at a Cameroon meeting of 2002, the establishment of a new
global communications project was announced as Interpol??s highest priority. This project
involved the launching of a new internet-based Global Communications System, called
??I-24/7,?? to provide for a rapid and secure exchange of data among Interpol??s member
agencies. Now operational, the I-24/7 system allows for the searching and cross-checking
of data submitted to Interpol by the organization??s members over a virtual private
network system that transmits encrypted information over the internet (Deflem and
Maybin, 2005: 180-183).
Clearly, Interpol has undergone significant changes since September 11 as part of a
renewed and vigorous effort to more efficiently; organize international police cooperation
against the terrorist threat. As illustrated above, new systems of information exchange
among police across the world have also been instituted. As such, formal policy
resolutions have been developed to offer a foundation to these new counter-terrorist
arrangements.


46

3.2.5. Measuring the effectiveness of Multilateral Entities approach to counter
terrorism

Multilateral initiatives have, at best, been effective in increasing the awareness of the
global nature of terrorist threats. It has facilitated a sense of common purpose, motivated
states to take precautionary measures against terrorist threats and expand their counter
terrorism capacities, and encouraged coordination efforts among states and regional
organisations. However, whilst the broader framework exists for conceptualising terrorist
threats, there are still a number of hurdles that impact on developing a fully functional
coherent and robust global approach to counter terrorism. Reflecting on Graph 2.1 of
terrorist incidences in Chapter 2, it is apparent that terrorist incidences have increased
seven-fold since 9/11. One argument for the increase in terrorist incidences rests on the
challenge that Al-Qaeda has transformed from a unitary entity into a movement or
something more akin to an ideology. As Al-Qaeda spreads, it becomes a more dispersed,
hidden and persistent target, which is more difficult to combat (Gambari, 2006). The lack
of a coherent multilateral approach to counter terrorism has been identified as the chasm
that enables terrorist groups like al-Qaeda to operate within the global realm.

The level of incoherency at the multilateral echelon is demonstrated by the inability of
the UN to charter a comprehensive convention on international terrorism and the failure
to enforce the UN counter terrorism strategy as proposed by Kofi Annan in 2005 and
duly adopted in September 2006. In totality, the multilateral has promoted and adopted
12 international conventions (see Annexure 3) that criminalize specific acts of terrorism,
however, UN authority on terrorism would be greatly enhanced by a comprehensive
convention which would establish a definition for terrorism and outlaw terrorism in all its
forms. Currently, UN Member States still remain ambivalent on the core elements that
define terrorism. At the heart of much debate, UN Member States still remain divided
over the same critical questions – whether the activities of armed forces should be
exempted from the scope of a common convention since they are governed by
international humanitarian law; and whether that exemption should also cover armed
resistance groups involved in struggles against colonial domination and foreign
occupation (Gambari, 2006).

Despite theoretical challenges of defining terrorism, the UN also faces human,
administrative and institutional capacity deficiencies. A proliferation of counter
terrorism programs and initiatives (as illustrated in the section above) has led to
overlapping mandates, lack of consensus over reporting requirements on counter
terrorism by States and a duplication of work. Moreover, because of administrative and
other limitations experienced by operating in a highly politicized multilateral institution,
the UN has been unable to effectively fulfil their mission of analysis, coordination, and
information sharing on impending threats of terrorism (Millar and Benjamin, 2005).
Interviewee Andre Thomashausen (2007) also considers the global initiatives on
terrorism to be ineffective and also contributory factors to social and political tensions.
The ??global initiatives as propagated and coordinated by the UNSC Terrorism Committee
are rejected universally but have been grudgingly and without enthusiasm implemented
wherever the dependence on goodwill by the US government is perceived to be too
strong to allow for outright rejection?? (Thomashausen, 2007). Developing countries,
especially the vast majority of African nations (49 of the 53) have managed since 2002 to


47

avoid implementing the measures that the CTC is trying to impose, offering various
excuses, in particular the lack of capacity or need.

At the regional level, functional organisations like the AU, EU and Interpol, whilst
improving efforts to address threats in the last four to seven years, have likewise been
faced with the similar stumbling blocks as the UN. The AU in particular has had
difficulty engaging with classification of rebel movements within Africa as terrorists.
Whilst some clarification has been given on groups such as the PALIPHEHUTU-FNL in
Burundi and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur, other groups like the
Forces Nouvelle (FN) in Cote d??Ivoire still remain unclassified. The inability of the AU??s
Peace and Security Council (PSC) to function at full capacity as demonstrated by the
dissolution of AMIS and the evolution of the UN/AU hybrid force attests to the lack of
financial capacity within Africa??s multilateral body to effectively deal with issues of
peace and security. If Africa??s multilateral is currently submerged in difficulties related to
peace support operations, prospects for dealing with issues of terrorism become even
more complex.

In terms of measuring effectiveness, the development of appropriate global initiatives to
counter terrorism is still undergoing fundamental theoretical and practical
transformations. Multilateral initiatives remain at the level of infancy and a good deal has
to be done to facilitate the transition from theoretical debate to practical application. As a
result, the room and gap exists for terrorist organisations to monopolize on inherent
weaknesses to further their own strategic objectives. In the interim, and given existing
impediments, it is deemed vital that States work towards strengthening their counter
terrorism capabilities and capacities. Working from a bottom-up approach of solidifying
the base of counter terrorism from the state level will assist in enhancing the overall
global response to terrorism. As such, the proceeding section provides an analysis of
current counter terrorism measures pursued at country levels.
3.3. Counter Terrorism in Developed Countries

This section provides an overview of counter terrorism approaches in developed
countries. The countries identified are the United States of America (US), the United
Kingdom (UK) and Russia. Their approach to terrorism will be analysed with the
underlying aim of determining aspects that have been successful in countering terrorism.
These three countries are considered superpowers within the international arena, as they
command enormous political and economic influence within the multilateral fora. Both
the US and the UK have been victims of recent devastating acts of terrorism on their
home soil. Russia, as well, has a persistent history of terrorism originating from the
Chechnyan struggle. The experiences of the above-mentioned countries, which have both
the resources and the expertise to counter the terrorist threat, may provide valuable
insights on ascertaining relevant and appropriate counter terrorism strategies.



48

3.3.1. United States of America (US)

The United States is situated in North America between the North Atlantic Ocean and
North Pacific Ocean. The land boundaries are Canada, Mexico and Cuba. (www.cia.gov).

3.3.1.1. Extent of Terrorism

No group or nation should mistake America??s intentions: We will not
rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been
stopped, and have been defeated -
President George W. Bush, November 6, 2001

While all democracies may be particularly good targets for attacks by terrorists, the US is
particularly appealing to a wide variety of dissidents. The US has the dubious distinction
of being the most favoured target of international attacks as it remains symbolic of the
??West, modernization, democracy, capitalism, and multinational corporations??; key
elements which often form the focus of terrorist organisations. The biggest threat to the
US is Al-Qaeda. Most of its attacks have been undertaken outside the US since they are
easier to undertake in those locations, but there is no doubt that the US and its national
interest as encapsulated in its foreign policy objectives are the targets. However, apart
from international threats, the US is also prone to acts of domestic terror (Wilkinson,
2003: 110).

In the domestic sphere, the extreme right wing in the US has become important in recent
years as a political influence in the country. Extreme right wing groups include a variety
of racist organizations such as the surviving elements of the Klu Klux Klan (KKK); the
Aryan Nations; other dissident groups that have a more obvious religious orientation; tax
resistors; those who fear a take over of the US by traitors who favour a one world
government; and some elements of the American militia movement and associated patriot
groups. The KKK is by far the most well known secular terrorist organization in the US
(Rapoport, 1984:51). The KKK in its second manifestation in the United States in the
1920s (the first being in late 1860s) represented a right wing movement that fought
against anything approximating to equal rights for black Americans, but it was also
opposed to increasing patterns of immigration, particularly when the migrants were
Oriental, Jewish or Catholic. The KKK utilised terror as part of its tactics, targeting
minorities. The lynching of black Americans, for instance, sent a clear message to other
black Americans of the consequences of seeking greater equality (Lutz and Lutz, 2004:
147).



49

Information Box 3.1 provides an illustration of the trends of domestic and international
terrorist activities pertaining to the US since the 1900??s.

Information Box 3.1: A list of terrorist attacks against the US

1901 Assassination of President William McKinley (US DOS National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism, 2003).

1915 Senate reception room in the US bombed by Erich Muenter, who was upset over
the sales of ammunition to allies at war.

1920 Anarchists bombed a horse cart filled with dynamite near the intersections of all
and Broad Streets, taking 40 lives and wounding about 300 others (US DOS
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003).

1968 Senator Robert F. Kennedy, senior policy adviser to President John F. Kennedy
was assassinated.

1971 Bomb explodes in US senate room opposition to US policies in Vietnam.

1983 Hezbollah suicide truck bomber destroyed the US Marine barracks in Beirut,
killing 290 and wounding 200.

1993 World Trade Centre bombing, Ramzi Yousef, leader wished to punish the US for
its policies in the Middle East.

1997 Ali Hassan Abu Kamal a Palestinian fired at tourists at the Empire State building,
allegedly with the objective of revenge for Palestinian treatment.

1998 Simultaneous car bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania linked to Al-
Qaeda and Usama Bin Laden.

1998 Planet Hollywood restaurant in Cape Town, South Africa in retaliation for attacks
by US in Afghanistan and Sudan.

2000 The bombing of the USS Cole (US warship) in Yemen in 2000 (US DOS National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003).

2001 Bombing of the World Trade Organization Twin Towers by Al-Qaeda

Source: Pena, 2006: 175



50

3.3.1.2. US Counter Terrorism Strategic Approach

The approaches to the phenomenon of counter terrorism are as many and as diverse as
they are definitions of the problem of terrorism. For academics such as Wilkinson (2006:
6), a counter terrorism strategy is a multi pronged approach for a ??liberal state?? (otherwise
herein referred to as democratic states), which does not undermine or seriously damage
the democratic process and the rule of law, while providing sufficient flexibility to cope
with a whole range of threats. Intrinsically, there are three responses to counter terrorism
in developed democratic states, these being, the use of politics, law enforcement and the
military. Lutz and Lutz (2004), on the other hand expands on the approaches to counter
terrorism. The following are considered as key elements in the US approach to counter
terrorism:
a) Increased security

Increasing security, especially around critical targets or personnel is one solution to
counteract the threat of terrorism as it reduces the appeal of vulnerable targets. Potential
targets may include any government or party official or any member of the security
services. In most cases, no defence system is completely effective; however, it does not
imply that improved security is not important. For instance, targeted persons can vary
their routines or take suitable precautions to prevent kidnappings or assaults. While such
actions are eminently wise, they cannot grant immunity. Any measure ??that would
preclude every possible terrorist group for every possible motive is not even theoretically
conceivable?? (Hoffman, 1997: 10).

Whilst enhanced security and prevention can limit the damage that attacks will generate;
the possibility still exists that enhanced security will only have temporary effects in
reducing attacks as terrorist groups will limit their activities until such time that security
is relaxed (Gurr, 2003: 212). In addition, Enders and Sandler (2002: 152) argue that
increased security can have negative ramifications, for instance, the widespread use of
metal detectors in airports led to more deadly attacks with bombs against airlines. Greater
security can help but there are far too many targets for security measures to be effective.

b) Intelligence gathering-detection and prevention

Prevention through intelligence gathering and infiltration of dissident groups is another
possible measure in the battle against terrorism. The role of counter terrorism intelligence
is to retrieve timely and credible information on details of a terrorist attack and prevent
such attacks. Intelligence, which identifies terrorist targets, the securing of these targets,
preventing of the terrorist attack and or locating and prosecuting of perpetrators, is
extremely valued. Such details have proven to be central in disrupting terrorist attacks.
Intelligence that disrupts successive terrorist cells and terrorists is regarded as the most
fruitful counter terrorism exercise. Intelligence obtained regarding a target of terrorism
can ensure that the target is secured. Disrupting a terror cell is considered fundamentally
more effective in countering terrorism. However, obtaining intelligence to achieve these
objectives remains difficult. (Pillar, 2004: 116-119).


51


Major components of intelligence are collection, analysis, and dissemination to relevant
parties. Intelligence can be collected in diverse ways, from old-fashioned legwork to
sophisticated electronic voice and data capture. In addition to the gathering of
intelligence, effective intelligence analysis provides either a warning of terrorist attacks
or an assessment of terrorists. The assessments of terrorism by analysis may be either of a
strategic or tactical nature. The tactical assessment considers the collection of information
and trying to establish the identity of terrorists. The process also guides further collection
of intelligence to fill gaps in the assessment. Intelligence analysis may determine the
intentions, capabilities and the threat of terrorist organizations (Hunsicker, 2006: 73-74;
Johnson, 2003).

Strategic Intelligence analysis provides information on trends and patterns in
international terrorism. Strategic intelligence is also able to contribute to changes in
foreign policy and the amount of resources that are allocated to terrorism. Strategic
intelligence, in the US, is used as an instrument to highlight foreign organisations and
countries, which sponsor terrorism. In many respects, the US classification of State
sponsored terrorism is considered as subjective. The US lists of states, which support
terrorism, include Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan. The US
ignores allies, potential allies, and countries, which are not a concern for the US. It may
be of relevance to note that the South African government pre-1994 aided terror groups in
Mozambique and Angola but was never included in the list. Similarly, the former Soviet
Union never did make the list since including them would have resulted in serious
implications to diplomatic relations with countries (Lutz and Lutz, 2004: 9).

Counter intelligence information can also be utilised to plot possible future actions of
terrorists. Information is obtained and possible scenarios of terror implications are
considered. This will provide early warning and possible target areas, which can be
secured. To be able to accurately, predict future terrorist acts is dependent on the need to
obtain ??plot specific information?? (Pillar, 2004: 116-119). Hunsicker (2006: 80-81)
provides the following general assessment categories, which may be utilised for a
defensive strategy for targets of terrorism:

• Targets: Information on targets can be subdivided into two categories. The first
concerns the types of targets that may be attacked; the other includes information
on contingency plans. Target identification should also be rated according to
vulnerabilities.
• Target Profile: This refers to subjective information of identified potential targets.
If the potential identified target is for example a corporate entity then it must be
analysed considering the perception of the company??s image in the local
community, the country, and perhaps even the world. Individuals within the
company should be evaluated as symbolic or of strategic importance to terrorist
operatives.
• Terrorists: Information on future terrorist targets can be primarily gleaned from
professional security publications and their archives and databases, newsletters
and even well circulated publications. The Internet allows access to a variety of
governmental and private resources, including the FBI, Department of State
(DoS), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Terrorist groups also maintain


52

websites providing clues to current activities and specific references to enemies of
their cause.
• The Target Analysis: Target or threat analysis considers the likelihood of
becoming a target. It analyses whether defences are sufficient to discourage
potential attacks or to protect individuals and organizations.

c) Finances

A special area where intelligence can be combined with other initiatives involves
attempts to limit or eliminate the flow of financial support to terrorist organizations.
Financial support has been important for many terrorist groups. Some financial aid has
been through direct avenues and in other cases it has been channelled through institutions.
Money can come from foreign governments, but it can also come from private sources.
Usama bin Laden??s wealth and support from other Muslim contributors have helped
mould Al-Qaeda (Comras, 2005).

Money has been important for either maintaining the dissident groups or making them
more precarious. When the financial sources of these groups are curtailed their ability to
mount attacks is reduced even if not eliminated, and groups become less dangerous. The
initial efforts of either accountants or intelligence operatives to find or track the funding
sources for Al-Qaeda have not been successful. Al-Qaeda has apparently been able to
move some of its financial resources into commodities like precious stones and gold,
hence making it more difficult to trace (Schultz and Vogt, 2002:379).

Money laundering can lead to financial terrorism and many well known financial
institutions have either intentionally or unintentionally been involved in the movement of
funds in and out of offshore banks. An alternative to that would be the so-called Hawala
(remittance) system, also known as ??Hundi??, an ancient system originating in South Asia.
Today it is used around the world to conduct legitimate (untraceable) remittances. Like
any other remittance system Hawala plays an extremely vital role in money laundering
(Hunsicker, 2006: 62).
d) Repression

Powerful authoritarian or totalitarian states, due to their repressive nature may eliminate
terrorism (Heymann, 2002:34). Democratic states on the other hand are more vulnerable
to attacks by domestic dissident groups or foreign terrorist groups (Lutz and Lutz, 2004:
228).
e) Retaliation or Punishment

Retaliation by the State is an obvious counter terrorism option and one that is often
popular, but it is a choice filled with difficulties. Countries retaliate where there is
evidence of support by another country for domestic terrorists. Retaliations can take on a
form other than military action. Economic sanctions can be applied against the country
suspected of encouraging terrorism (Chellaney, 2001: 99).


53

f) Pre-emptive action

A country has the option of a pre-emptive strike when the threat of retaliation has no
deterrent effect. However, pre-emptive action may have an adverse effect and stimulate
the uprising of new dissident groups. Even if there are no immediate negative political
military or diplomatic consequences, the seeds may be sown for the formation of new
groups willing to use violence in the future (Richelson, 2002: 246; Posen, 2002: 54).
g) Special Counter terrorism Units (SCUs)

Most countries have trained Special Forces to deal with terrorist situations. These forces
may aid in rescue missions, however, they could also be utilised for the purposes of
retaliation and pre-emptive action. Successful operations by SCU??s may deter at least
some terrorist attacks; however, the absence of such units can encourage hostage taking
or actions (Lutz and Lutz, 2004: 234-235).
h) Concessions and reform

Instead of using repression or security measures to deal with dissidents, governments
may decide to change some of its policies in order to address the issues that led to
dissident violence. Nevertheless, concessions are not always a realistic option for a
government. Democracies, for example, cannot banish racial minorities targeted by right
wing terrorists. Another type of reform could include government programs to address
the concerns of the population group that supports dissidents. Socio-economic reform
programs have been considered the best antidote against terrorism (Crenshaw, 1995:23;
Wilkinson, 2000: 82; Lutz and Lutz, 2004: 235).
i) Diplomatic Efforts

International agreements achieved through diplomacy are an additional possibility to
complement efforts in dealing with terrorism. Cooperation among nations in terms of
dealing with terrorism has increased, providing prospects that this approach may be
beneficial in countering terrorism (Jenkins, 2001: 323). International conventions and
diplomatic approaches will be constrained by the failure of the international community
to arrive at a common definition of terrorism and the failure to guarantee that persons
identified as terrorists are prosecuted (Dartnell, 2000:203-4).

3.3.1.3. Specific Counter Terrorism Strategies

All of the above-mentioned components are encapsulated in two crucial US counter
terrorism strategies, these being, the US Department of State??s National Counter
Terrorism Strategy and the US National Counter Intelligence Strategy. These are
discussed below.




54

a) The US Department of State (DoS) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

This strategy was developed in 2003 adopts a four dimension strategy (4D strategy)
which seeks to ??defeat, deny, diminish and defend??. The first tenet of the strategy is
aimed at the ??Defeat of Terrorists and their Organizations??. This tenet calls for defeating
terrorist organizations with a global reach through the direct or indirect use of diplomatic,
economic, information, law enforcement, military, financial, intelligence, and other
instruments of power. This tenet seeks to:

• Identify terrorists and terrorist organizations: The Intelligence Community
and law enforcement agencies continue their aggressive efforts to identify
terrorist and their organizations, map their command and control and support
infrastructure, and then ensure appropriate distribution of the intelligence to
federal, state, and local agencies as well as to international US allies.
• Locate terrorists and their organizations: For intelligence to succeed the US
relies on technical intelligence and other types of intelligence needed to get
inside terrorist organizations, locate their sanctuaries, and disrupt their plans
and operations. The law enforcement community, using the advantage
provided by the US criminal justice system, identifies and locates terrorist
organizations operating in the US and abroad.
• Destroy terrorist and their organizations: The US and its allies aim to utilize
available mechanisms to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy terrorists?? capacity to
conduct acts of terror. In collaboration with its partners and appropriate
international organizations, the US aims to eliminate the sources of terrorist
financing. To synchronize these efforts, the Department of State takes the lead
in developing specific regional strategies for defeating terrorism.

The second tenet seeks to ??Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists??. The
goal of this tenet is to eliminate terrorist groups – their access to territory, funds,
equipment, training, technology, and unimpeded transit. The objectives are to:

• End the state sponsorship of terrorism: The US assumes a pragmatic approach
in prosecuting the campaign against terrorism. This includes incentives for
ending state sponsorship.
• Establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with
regard to combating terrorism: UNSCR 1373 clearly establishes states??
obligations for combating terrorism. Additionally, the 12 international counter
terrorism conventions and protocols, together with UNSCR 1373, set forth a
compelling body of international obligations relating to counter terrorism.
The US aims to encourage all states to become parties to and fully implement
these conventions and protocols.
• Strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism: Through a
??coalition of the willing?? the US will aim for a united international front to
fight terrorism.
• Implement the National Strategy for Homeland Security: The establishment of
the US Department of Homeland Security will help mobilize and organize the
US??s ability to secure the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks. The
recommendations of the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the


55

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism compliment and reinforce each
other. From enhancing the analytical capabilities of the FBI and recapitalizing
the U.S. Coast Guard, to preventing terrorist use of WMD through better
sensors and procedures and integrating information sharing across the federal
government, the objectives in these national strategies are vital to the US??s
future success in the war on terrorism.

The third tenet is aimed at ??Diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to
exploit??. Two objectives underlie this tenet:

• Partnering with the international community to strengthen weak states: The
US State will ensure that efforts are designed to identify and diminish
conditions contributing to state weakness and failure are a central US foreign
policy goal.
• Winning the war of ideas: The US government will use the political influence
of its State to delegitimise terrorism.

The fourth tenet of the strategy is to ??Defend US Citizens interests within the US and
abroad??. Four objectives underpin this tenet:

• Attaining domain awareness: the key element within this objective is the need
to attain effective knowledge of all activities, events and trends within the
specified domain.
• Enhance measures to ensure the integrity, reliability, and availability of
critical physical and information-based infrastructure in the US and abroad:
Emphasis within this element is placed on the protection of vital systems
within the US.
• Integrate measures to protect US citizens abroad: Emphasis is placed on the
protection of citizenry abroad as a mechanism to secure economic vitality
abroad.
• Ensure an integrated incident management capability: Solid plans,
preparations, and immediate response are key to mitigating acts of terrorism.

b) The US National Counter Intelligence Strategy, 2005

Counterintelligence, as defined in the National Security Act of 1947, is ??information
gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence
activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments
or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorist
activities.?? The National Security Strategy of the United States seeks to defend the peace
by fighting terrorists and tyrants, to preserve the peace by building good relations among
the great powers, and to extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on
every continent.

The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States has four essential
objectives: Identify, assess, neutralize, and exploit the intelligence activities of foreign
powers, terrorist groups, international criminal organizations, and other entities. The US


56

faces substantial challenges to its security, freedom and prosperity. The US aims to
defeat global terrorism, counter weapons of mass destruction, ensure the security of the
homeland, transform defence capabilities, foster cooperation with other global powers,
and promote global economic growth. As such, the US will utilise and extend the
safeguards of strategic counterintelligence to the counter the Global War on Terrorism.

The new concept of ??national intelligence?? codified by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act passed by Congress in 2004 has its origins in the tragedy of
September 11, 2001 and President Bush??s National Security Strategy of the United States
of America. The strategy seeks to integrate the domestic and foreign dimensions of US
intelligence so that there are no gaps in our understanding of threats to our national
security. It also adds more depth and accuracy to intelligence analysis as well as ensuring
that US intelligence resources generate future capabilities as well as present results.
Furthermore, it deploys effective counterintelligence measures that enhance and protect
US activities to ensure the integrity of the US intelligence system, technology, armed
forces, and the government??s decision processes.

In essence, four major points encapsulate the current U.S. Counter Terrorism policy.
Firstly, the policy makes no concessions to terrorists and strikes no deals. Secondly, it
results in terrorists being brought to justice for their crimes. Thirdly, it isolates and
applies pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behaviour,
and lastly, it bolsters the Counter Terrorism capabilities of those countries that work with
the U.S. and that require assistance (Hunsicker, 2006: 58). Yet, within the key elements
encapsulated in US Department of State??s National Counter Terrorism Strategy and the
US National Counter Intelligence Strategy, an important feature is the proactive nature of
these strategies and their prospective applications to acts of terrorism.
3.3.1.4. The Counter Terrorism Operational Approach
The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism works with all appropriate elements
of the U.S. Government to ensure integrated and effective counterterrorism efforts. The
US key element of its counter terrorism operational approach is inter-agency operations
which plan, conduct and structure operations, from the very outset, as part of an
intimately connected ??whole-of-government?? approach. The U.S. Government
Counterterrorism Team includes:


57

Information Box 3.2: List of US Departments involved in the US Counter Terrorism
Approach

The White House
• Homeland Security
• National Security


Department of State
• Bureau of Diplomatic Security
o Anti-Terrorist Assistance Program
o Overseas Advisory Council
o Rewards for Justice Program
• Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
o Counterterrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy
• Bureau of Intelligence and Research
• Bureau of International Narcotics and Law enforcement Affairs
• Foreign Service Institute
• U.S. Mission to the United Nations
o Terrorism Information

Department of Defense
• Defense Intelligence Agency
• The War on Terrorism

Department of the Treasury
• Office of Terrorist and Financial Intelligence

Department of Justice
• Counterterrorism Training and Resources for law Enforcement
• Federal Bureau of Investigation--Counterterrorism
• FBI--Most Wanted Terrorists

Department of Homeland Security
• Coast Guard
• Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
• U.S. Secret Service

Central Intelligence Agency
• The War on Terrorism



58


Office of the Director for National Intelligence

National Counterterrorism Center

Agency for International Development
Source: United States Department of State, 2007

Despite an integrated approach to counter terrorism, at the heart of such efforts lies three
main entities of an operational approach, those being the FBI, CIA and homeland security.
They all interact through the Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) and the Counter
Terrorism Centre (CTC). The JTTF exists locally in all states in America and enhances
the synergy amongst law enforcement agencies by coordinating the efforts of
investigators, analysts, linguists, intelligence operatives, and reaction unit members. The
CTC, on the other hand, has a broader mandate and brings all disciplines relating to
counter terrorism together thereby increasing the synergy amongst them. These various
disciplines include operational officers; analysts; reporting officers; technical experts and
other experts. (Brennan, 2004; Pillar, 2004:131). Prior to 9/11, efforts to counter
terrorism was considered ??FBI-centric and that the Bureau remained dismissive of
terrorism-related information supplied by state and local law enforcement agencies??
(Jenkins, 2003). However, post-2001, there has been in a shift in the mindset of the US
government in its efforts to curb terrorism. The US recognises that the integration of law
enforcement into national counter terrorism responses is imperative, given that it is
usually at that level that ??indications of impending attacks first occur or decisive breaks in
on-going cases eventuate?? (Chalk and Rosenau, 2003).

One of the success stories of the integrated approach to counter terrorism and the
incorporation of local law enforcement is the Joint New York Police Department
(NYPD)/FBI Joint Task Team. The joint initiative comprises 180 FBI members and 125
NYPD police members. The biggest achievement of the NYPD/FBI??s joint initiative
came in June 2007, when the alliance foiled a new Islamic plot against New York, which
entailed the bombing of fuel tank farms at John F. Kennedy International Airport. The
NYPD had penetrated the plot from inception and their ability to curb the threat revealed
that both Trinidad and other Caribbean ports had become furtile ground for Islamic
militancy. Nevertheless, the joint task team has foiled at least seven terror plots since
9/11 (Miller, 2007). The joint task force is illustrative of the importance of law
enforcement in any national counter terrorism strategy.
3.3.1.5. Measuring the effectiveness of US Counter terrorism measures

If statistics are a measure of effectiveness, the Graph 3.1 below indicates important
dynamics regarding the US??s measures to counter terrorism:


59

Graph 3.1: Terrorists incidents in the US

Terrorist incidents in the US 2000-Oct 2007
0
10
20
30
40
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Oct -07
Ye a r

Source: MIPT Terrorism Database

Since 2001, there has been a decrease in the number of terrorist incidents in the US. It
took the catastrophe of 9/11 to make the US aware of the gaps that exist in their counter
terrorism mechanisms. Yet, what is intriguing is the extent to which the US integrated
counter terrorism approach has assisted in curbing potential terrorist threats. It seems that
increasingly, the US realises that the only avenue to deal with the common threat is
through coordinated efforts. In this regard both the intelligence community and law
enforcement seem to be working in tandem to eliminate threats. Reviewing the graph (3.1
above), from January 2006 – October 2007, terrorists?? ability to infiltrate US targets has
been difficult. However, to believe that threats are not imminent would be a fatal mistake.
The current measures may be dealing with the current manifestations of terrorism; but,
terrorism has the ability to evolve and terrorist attacks may become more innovative and
sophisticated. Nevertheless, for the time being, the US counter terrorism strategy and
operational approach seems to be of relevance for the global superpower.

3.3.2. United Kingdom (UK)

The United Kingdom is located in the Western part of Europe and includes a sixth of the
island of Ireland between the North Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea. Its bordering
country is Ireland (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uk.html).

3.3.2.1. Extent of Terrorism

The UK??s armed forces and police have gained invaluable experience and expertise in
counter terrorism through decades of involvement in efforts to suppress terrorism in
Northern Island and its spill over effects into the British mainland (Gregory and
Wilkinson, 2005: 2). Irish dissidents have a long history of opposing the British presence
on the Island. In the years after World War I, the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
successfully used guerrilla attacks and terrorism to convince the British to negotiate the
peaceful separation of most of Ireland from the United Kingdom (Lutz and Lutz, 2004:
175).



60

In Northern Ireland, the Protestants were in a majority but felt that their position was
insecure since there was a substantial Irish minority in Ulster and the overwhelming
Catholic Majority across the border. Any unification of the Catholics would have resulted
in the Protestants becoming a clear minority. The lines of division included religion
although both groups were not active church goers; Protestants were descendents of the
Scottish and considered themselves British; the Catholic Irish considered themselves
more Irish; Protestants were dominant in the economic situation in the country and
dominated the political system. Repression led to confrontation and this led to violence
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2005).

The official IRA decided not to adopt a strategy of violence against the British, whilst the
unofficial IRA considered it necessary to protect the Catholics from oppression and
increased confrontation with the British. Over time, the IRA carried its campaign of
violence outside the territory of Northern Ireland. There were planned attacks on British
soldiers in England, Germany and Gibraltar as early as 1938 (Bell, 1975:30). Since the
1960??s, it is estimated that the IRA has killed at least 1 800 people. The primary targets
were British troops, police officers, prison guards, paramilitary militants, drug dealers
and informers in Ulster. Major terrorist attacks by the IRA include:

• The July 1972 bombing spree known as Bloody Friday in downtown Belfast that
left 9 dead and 130 injured;
• The 1979 assassination of Lord Mountbatten;
• The 1984 bombing of a Brighton hotel where Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet
were meeting;
• A 1993 car bombing in London??s financial district that caused US$ 1 billion
damage; and
• Mortar attacks on British Prime Minister Major??s 10 Downing Street residence
and London??s Heathrow Airport in the 1990s (Council on Foreign Relations,
2005).

The struggle in Northern Ireland has been going on for over thirty years. While there are
prospects of peace, the presence of extreme groups that have not given up on the idea of
severing the tie between Ulster and Great Britain, further complicates the domestic
situation in the UK (Dingley, 2001: 63). The violence may continue as many in the IRA
argue that violence has worked since it was able to bring the British to the negotiating
table (Alonso, 2001:142).

Apart from domestic dissidents, international terrorism is another serious national
security threat facing the UK. Until 7 July 2005, the only significant international
terrorist attack that the UK had to deal with was the Lockerbie case of December 1988.
Yet, with the indictment of the Libyan agents responsible for the Lockerbie case in 1991,
British authorities continued to concentrate on the IRA and opponents of the 1998 Good
Friday Agreement who continued to employ terrorism. While by the mid-1990s the UK
Intelligence agencies and police were aware that London was being utilized as a base by
individuals to promote, fund and plan terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere, these
individuals were not viewed as a high priority and instead were left to continue their
activities with relative impunity. Yet with the afore-mentioned dynamics within the UK
and the fact that the UK emerged as an important ally for the US in the ??War on terror??, it


61

was bound to be the case that the UK would become a target for terrorist groups like Al-
Qaeda (Gregory and Wilkinson, 2005: 2).


Information Box 3.3: List of terrorist attacks in UK and on UK citizens

List of terrorist attacks in UK and on UK citizens abroad: 2001 to present

March 2001 A car bomb explodes outside the BBC??s main news centre in
London.

May 2001 The Real IRA detonates a bomb in a London postal sorting office.

August 2001 IRA detonates bomb in Ealing, West London

November 2003 Al-Qaeda attacked the British Consulate and HSBC building in
Istanbul, killing 27 people including three British citizens;

September 2004 Al-Qaeda gunmen killed a British national residing in Saudi
Arabia in a Riyadh shopping centre;

October 2004 The Al-Qaeda in Iraq group murdered British engineer Kenneth
Bigley in Iraq;

July 2005 London Bombings: four suicide bombers attacked the London
transport system, killing themselves and 52 other passengers. A
subsequent attempted attack failed, with no casualties being
caused.

June 2007 The Glasgow international airport attack
Source: www.press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releases/Tackling_Terrorism-behaviours_Un?version

The London terrorist attacks in July 2005 attest to the nature of the international terrorist
threats facing the UK. On 7 July 2005, there was a series of co-ordinated suicide
bombings that struck London??s public transport system during the morning rush hour. At
8:50 am, three bombs exploded within 50 seconds of each other on three London
Underground trains. A fourth bomb exploded in a bush at 9:47 a.m. in Tailstock Square.
The bombings led to a severe, day-long disruption of the city??s transport and mobile
telecommunications infrastructure (See Annexure 4 on further details of London
Bombings).

Fifty-six people were killed in the attacks, including 4 bombers, and about 700 people
were injured. The incident was the deadliest single act of terrorism in the United
Kingdom since Lockerbie (the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 which killed 270),
and the deadliest bombing in London since World War II. Police investigators identified
four men whom they believed to be suicide bombers. These are the first suicide
bombings in Western Europe. As of April 2006, it is believed that the bombers acted
alone on a shoestring budget. On 21 July 2005, a second series of four explosions took


62

place on the London Underground and a London bus. The detonators of all four bombs
exploded, but none of the main explosive charges detonated, and there were no casualties.
All suspected bombers from this failed attack escaped from the scenes but were later
arrested (http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7_July_2005_London_bombings).

On 9 April 2006, the Observer newspaper published leaked details of the first draft of a
forthcoming Home Office report on the bombings. The article reported that four men,
using information from the Internet, planned the attack, probably with a budget of only a
few hundred pounds sterling. While they had visited Pakistan, there was no direct
support or planning by Al-Qaeda; meetings in Pakistan were ideological, rather than
practical. All four bombers died in the suicide bombings. While the videotape of
Mohammed Siddique Khan released after the attacks had footage of Usama bin Laden??s
deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the UK Home Office believes the tape was edited after the
suicide attacks and dismissed it as evidence of al-Qaeda??s involvement in the attacks
(Quinn, 2006).

Khan was the alleged ringleader of the ??London Bombings??. The attacks were largely
motivated by concerns over British foreign policy, which was seen as deliberately anti-
Muslim. The report does not say why no action was taken against the suspect bombers
beforehand, although Mohammed Siddique Khan was identified by intelligence officer??s
months before the attack. A separate report into the attacks by the Commons intelligence
and security committee will ask why MI5 did not maintain surveillance of Khan (Quinn,
2006).

There has been speculation regarding links between the bombers and another alleged al-
Qaeda cell in Luton, which was broken up in August 2004. That group was uncovered
after al-Qaeda operative Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan was arrested in Lahore, Pakistan.
His laptop computer was said to contain plans for tube attacks in London, as well as
attacks on financial buildings in New York and Washington. The group was placed
under surveillance, but on 2 August 2004, the New York Times published his name, citing
Pakistani sources. The leak caused police in Britain and Canada to make arrests before
their investigations were complete (Chossudovsky, 2005).

The 2005 attack featured the most explosions in a single terrorist incident in a UK city
since Bloody Friday in Belfast in July 1972 (22 bombs planted). They were the world??s
deadliest attack on a public transport system since the Madrid train bombings of 11
March 2004 (191 dead), although the March 1995 Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway
injured more people (http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/london_bombs2.html).

3.2.2.2. Counter Terrorism Strategic Approach

The UK defines terrorism as ??the use of threat, for the purpose of advancing a political,
religious, ideological course of action, of serious violence against any person or property??
(Townshend, 2002:3). The UK??s statutory definition is contained in the Terrorism Act
2000 and reads as follows:

(1) In this Act ??terrorism?? means the use or threat of action where:


63

(a) The action falls within subsection (2);
(b) The use or threat is designed to influence the government or intimidate
the public, and
(c) The use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political,
religious, or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person??s life other than that of the person committing the
action,
(d) Creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of
the public, or
(e) Is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic
system.
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use
of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1) (b) is satisfied
(Terrorism Act 2000, Part 1, (1)-(3)).

Essentially, anti-terrorism legislation is designated as an important strategy towards
increasing the level of protection of life and property by providing law enforcement
authorities with the powers needed to assist them in apprehension and conviction.
Legislation serves as a symbolic or psychological function expressing public revulsion by
reassuring the public that something is being done, such as, Britain??s prevention of
terrorism act was meant to give legislative expression to public revulsion against the
threats of terrorism. However, if key legislation becomes outdated then it will hamper
anti terrorism efforts. In 1990, the UK??s prevention of terrorism act was rendered
outdated. It was felt that anti-terrorism legislation needed to incorporate the safeguards of
the European convention on human rights (introduced in the UK by the Human rights act)
as well as the Police Criminal Evidence Act. Lord Lloyds Legislation against terrorism
proposed much needed measures to deal with international terrorism and the Terrorism
Act of 2000 was based on these proposals. After 9/11, the Home secretary David
Blunkett introduced the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, which enables detention
without trial in section 4 of the Act permitting confinement of a small number of
foreigners (Blunkett, 2003).

The legislation broadly focuses on three levels:

• Specific crimes that are associated with terrorists, have been targeted by
specific legislation, both to prevent them from occurring and to subject the
perpetrators to increased penalties if they are committed e.g. the hijacking of
commercial aircraft.
• An increasingly diverse number of activities that terrorists need to engage in if
they are too function, have been newly criminalised e.g. engaging in money
raising, eliciting support or openly recruiting.
• Extraordinary investigative powers have been given to the numerous law
enforcement and other investigative agencies whose responsibility it is to deal
with crime committed by terrorists (Clutterbuck, 2004:144).



64

The experiences of the UK in counter terrorism and counter insurgency over the past
century, both in the UK itself and abroad, have determined its current holistic approach to
counter terrorism. The UK has three foremost strategies which were developed and
refined in the context of terrorism in Northern Ireland and, since 1972, has affected the
British mainland (Clutterbuck, 2004:142).

The first of these strategic concepts is the need for sustainability in the response. The
people of Northern Ireland have been subjected to terrorist attacks and political violence
on an almost daily basis over the past forty years. The death toll has been significant with
3 601 fatalities between 1969 and 1998. The IRA detonated the first improvised
explosive device on the British mainland in 1972. Today there is still a real and
continuing terrorist attack not only from the IRA but also from international terrorism.
The UK had to devise counter terrorism systems and structures that can operate over this
time scale and are generic in their applicability whatever the ultimate source of the
terrorist threat (Faye, Morrissey and Smyth, 1998).

The second concept is the need for the coordination and cooperation, though not
necessarily through central control, in devising and implementing counter terrorism
policy, strategy, operations and tactics. Without it organizational gaps, duplication of
effort and over lapping responsibilities are inevitable. Terrorists can then exploit these
weaknesses. Finally, there is a need to foster, promulgate and sustain the concept of
individual and community responsibility in the overall counter terrorism effort
(Clutterbuck, 2004:143).

Whilst the above approach has been imperative in curbing domestic terrorism, in April
2004, the British government accepted the proposal that the UK??s international counter
terrorism strategy should encompass four key mission areas:

• Prevention: addressing the underlying causes of terrorism within the country
and abroad;
• Pursuit: using intelligence effectively to disrupt and apprehend terrorists;
• Protection: ensuring that reasonable security precautions, including those
needed to meet a CRBN threat are in place, ranging from physical measures at
airports to establishing Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA??s) in
each police force; and
• Preparedness: making sure that Britain has the people and resources in place
to respond effectively to the consequences of a terrorist attack (Gregory and
Wilkinson, 2005: 3).

Legislation as well as the policy approaches to domestic and international terrorism
outlined above plays an important role in defining the key institutions that will inform the
UK??s counter terrorism approach.



65

3.3.2.3. Counter Terrorism Operational Approach

A key element in the prevention of terrorism strand is counter terrorism operations. Here
there is a nuance of activity, ranging from purely intelligence gathering operations, in
which the primary objective is to gather evidence to put before court or the eventual
arrest of perpetrators (Clutterbuck, 2004:152). The UK already has in place an impressive
national structure of coordination to deal with terrorism, which includes the following
institutions:

• MI5 and MI6: The United Kingdom, according to Lutz and Lutz (2004:42), the
MI5 (Ministry of Intelligence) deals with domestic threats while MI6, undertakes
foreign operations. In this case, however, while the two sections may disagree and
have different agendas, there is some central control.

• New Scotland Yard: The police carry the main burden of containing and defeating
terrorism in democratic States. Fighting terrorism is similar to combating serious
violent crimes. The task requires extensive knowledge of modus operandi;
weaponry; tactics of terrorist groups and specialised knowledge such as the crime
scene investigation in a bomb scenario may require more specialised units.
Scotland Yard in particular has as one of its specialized units, the Anti-terrorist
Unit which falls under the Metropolitan Police Service??s (MPS) Special
Operations (SO) Counter Terrorism Command (Wilkinson, 2006:68).
• EUROPOL: The next major step in enhancing police cooperation in the EU and
probably the most significant and far-reaching came with the establishment of
EUROPOL. The initial role was to assist in improving effectiveness in combating
drug trafficking and organized crime. After sustained pressure from Spain, the
remit of Europol was expanded to include terrorism from 1 January 1999. Article
29 of the Treaty on the European Union specifically refers to terrorism as one of
the serious forms of crime to be subject to common action by closer cooperation
between police, customs and other authorities. On 22 June 2002, a Framework
Decision on Combating Terrorism came into force throughout the EU and is
currently binding on member states. The framework indicates which crimes are
terrorist offences; penalties and the authority to investigate. After September 11, a
Counter Terrorist Task Force was established. The objective was to research and
refine threats to the EU (Clutterbuck, 2004:155).

• Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC): JTAC provides threat assessments for
all departments and agencies concerned with preventing and combating terrorism.
Since 11 September 2001, more than ten planned terrorist attacks has been
thwarted in the UK with the assistance of JTAC
(http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/agencies/jtac.aspx)

• Metropolitan Police Services (MPS) (Counter Terrorism Command): Prior to the
establishment of the Counter Terrorism Command, the MPS undertook counter
terrorism operations through its Anti Terrorism Branch and the Special Branch.
Post- July 2005, the MPS had started to review how these commands operated


66

and interacted with one another to deliver a counter terrorist response. Thereafter,
it was agreed to create a new multi-faceted, single counter terrorism command
with better capability and capacity to meet ongoing and future threats. As a result,
the new Counter Terrorism Command was created. The new command brings
together intelligence analysis and development with investigations and
operational support activity. It is also known as ??SO15??, an internal police service
designation reflecting the fact that it is one of fifteen Specialist Operations
branches within the MPS (Metropolitan Police Services, 2006).

Figure 3.2: MPS Counter Terrorism Command


Source: (Metropolitan Police Services, 2006).

The nature of terrorism is continually changing and evolving and therefore, the threat
response should be innovative, flexible and utilize all resources. The primary response to
terrorism by democratic states must be the criminal justice system, supported by
intelligence and military. These responses must operate within the ambits of the rule of
law. Democracies have well developed legislation, systems and structures to deal with
crime, and consequently the criminal justice system should be at the ??heart?? of counter
terrorism efforts. The experience of UK has led to the current concept of operations
where policy, strategy, operation and tactics are anchored in the criminal justice system
and the implementation includes all organs of state (Clutterbuck, 2004:155).





67

3.3.2.4. Measuring the effectiveness of UK Counter terrorism measures

In relation to terrorist incidences cited in the US graph, the UK too has been able to
effectively minimise terrorist incidences post-2005. Similar to 9/11, the London
Bombings also highlighted the gaps that existed in the UK??s approach to terrorism.


Graph 3.2: Terrorist incidents in the UK

Source: MIPT Terrorism Database

However, in comparison to the US??s integrated approach of intelligence and local law
enforcement, the UK strategy is spearheaded by local law enforcement Post-2005. Thus
far, the approach seems to be of significance and the UK has kept terrorist threats to a
minimum of five incidences from January – October 2007. With the Olympics scheduled
to take place in 2008, the UK??s counter terrorism strategy will be challenged to the
extreme given the global nature of the event.
3.3.3. Russia

Russia is situated in Northern Asia, bordered by the Arctic Ocean between the North
Pacific Ocean and Europe. The bordering countries are Azerbaijan, Belarus, China,
Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia,
Norway, Poland and Ukraine (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rs.html).

3.3.3.1. Extent of Terrorism

Much of the terrorist activity in Russia has been home-grown and linked to both the
Chechen separatist and the North Caucasus-wide extremism. The Russians have a decade
long experience of dealing with terrorism emanating from the Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan – terrorism that has received strong support from Pakistan. After seizing
power in 1991, Chechen leader Jokhar Dudaev gave a call for Jihad in 1993. Volunteers
from Pakistan and Afghanistan heeded this call. Even after President Yeltsin signed a
peace deal with Chechen leader Aslan Mashkadov in 1997, Shamil Basaev, a Chechen
field commander led a rebel force into neighbouring Dagestan. This force is known to
have included volunteers from Afghanistan, Pakistan and some Arab countries. There are
Terrorist incidents in the UK 2000-Oct 2007
0
5
10
15
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Oct-07
Year


68

reports that Bin Laden contributed $30 million for this adventure. Driven by extremist
Wahabi (orthodox Sunni Muslim sect) ideological inclinations and funding from charities
in Saudi Arabia, the aim of Basayev and his cohorts was to establish an Islamic Caliphate
in the Caucasian region. Even before his foray into Dagestan in 1999, Shamil Basayev
had visited Pakistan and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in 1994 (Parthasarathy, 2002).

Chechen terrorists are known to have received ideological indoctrination and military
training in Akhora Khattak in Pakistan??s North-West Frontier Province. In 1999, the Naib
Amir of the Jamiat-e-Islami in Pakistan, Gafoor Ahmed, gave a call for jihad in
Chechnya. Shortly thereafter, the so-called President of Chechnya, Zelmikhan Andarbaev,
visited Pakistan, met terrorist leaders and raised funds for Chechen terrorists in the name
of jihad. Wakil Ahmed Mutawakkil, the Foreign Minister of the Taliban regime,
proclaimed, ??It is the Muslim world??s shame that it does not support the Chechens??
(Parthasarathy, 2002). Mutawakkil, a known prot??g?? of the ISI represented the only
regime in the world to accord diplomatic recognition to Chechen terrorists (Parthasarathy,
2002).

The Russians also have no illusions about the mutually reinforcing nexus that exists
between the ISI, the Pakistani religious political parties and the jihadi groups like the
Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Lashkar-e-Toiba on the one hand and Bin Laden??s Al-Qaeda,
the Taliban and their associates in Central Asia, Philippines, Indonesia and Chechnya on
the other. It is in this context, that President Putin made it clear that Russia would not
hesitate to strike against those set to promote terrorism on its soil. The Russians are
keeping their options of dealing with and persuading Pakistan to change its course of
action (Parthasarathy, 2002).

Therefore, nothing shapes Putin??s thinking about terrorism and the Middle East more
than Chechnya. While Islamist terrorism threatens US security, the Chechen conflict
threatens both Russian security and its territorial integrity. The conflict in Russia??s
Chechnya province has claimed over 100 thousand lives since President Boris Yeltsin
ordered military in Chechnya in 1994. After the 1996 cease-fire, Chechnya dissolved into
anarchy and foreign Jihadists infiltrated the Chechen leadership. In 1999, Putin, as the
newly elected Prime Minister, ordered Russian troops to reassert order; a stance, which
got him the Presidency.

Putin??s domestic war on terror enjoyed only limited success. Russian security forces did
impose some order in Chechnya, but the Kremlin was unable to stem Chechen and
Islamist terrorism on Russian soil. In 2002, 120 people died in a rescue attempt after
Chechen rebels took 800 people hostage in a Moscow theatre. Two years later, several
hundred children died after terrorists took control of a school in Beslan. Even after the
subsequent crackdown, Russian forces have not been able to stop Chechen Islamist raids
into neighbouring provinces as they seek to build an Islamic Republic of the North
Caucasus. Terrorists continue to take advantage of endemic Russian corruption (Khrestin
and Elliot, 2007).

Faced with only marginal gains at home, Putin changed his approach to curbing terrorism
in 2003. Rather than continue cooperation with Washington on the broader war on terror,
he sought to cut a deal and join the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). With only


69

20 million Muslims, - about 15% of the population- Russia lacked the required 50%
minimum Muslim population to become a member of the OIC. While the OIC did not
grant Russia full membership, it granted Moscow observer status. After sending
representatives to a number of OIC summits and ministerial meetings, Russia obtained
formal OIC observer status in 2005 (Jane??s Weekly, 2007).

The relationship between Moscow and the OIC was symbiotic: the OIC saw Moscow as a
patron that could offset the US pressure while Moscow received de facto immunity from
criticism of Russian policy in Chechnya because of the OIC reluctance to interfere in the
internal affairs of member-states, even honorary ones. Putin further outlined his vision of
alliance with the Islamic world when addressing the newly elected Chechen parliament in
December 2005; Putin called Russia a ??faithful, reliable, dedicated promoter of the
interests of the Islamic World?? and ??its best and most reliable partner and friend??
(Khrestin and Elliot, 2007).

Perhaps nothing underlined the relativity of Moscow??s fight against terror as much as
Kremlins 2006 invitation for Moscow to host a Hamas delegation. In February 2006,
Putin announced, ??we are willing in the near future to invite the authorities of Hamas to
Moscow to carry out talks?? (Khrestin and Elliot, 2007). How wise was Putin??s change of
policy? Not all Russian analysts are convinced it will further Russian interests. Dmitri
Suslov, an expert with Moscow??s Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, explained that:
??there is a big risk that by providing greater legitimacy for Islamists, Russia could invite
greater instability in the Middle East and at home??. Prominent Russian columnist, Yulia
Latynina argued that ??by holding talks with rogue states, Russia comes perilously close to
being perceived as a rogue state in its own right?? (Khrestin and Elliot, 2007).
Nevertheless, the Kremlin has continued with its fight against domestic terrorism in
Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus and in 2006, Russian security forces carried out
operations that led to the deaths of two significant terrorist leaders. In July 2006, Russia's
most wanted terrorist, Chechen separatist Shamil Basayev, was killed in the North
Caucasus. Russian officials claim he was targeted by security forces but there were
reports he was killed accidentally by his own explosives. In November 2006, Abu Hafs
al-Urdani, the Al-Qaeda-linked, Jordanian-born commander of foreign separatist forces
in Chechnya, was killed by security forces. In June 2006, Russian security forces killed
Chechen separatist leader Abdul Khalim Sadulayev, whom the Russian government
considered a terrorist, and who was the nominal head of the Chechen separatist
"government" to which Basayev belonged (US Department of State, 2007).
Information Box 3.4: Terrorist attacks in Russia since 1999
23 October 2002 About 50 Chechen rebels seize a Moscow theater and take about
800 hostages. After a three-day siege Russian forces storm the
building using gas, killing most of the rebels and 120 hostages.
27 December 2002 Chechen suicide bombers ram vehicles into the local government
headquarters in Grozny, bringing down the roof and floors of the
four-story building. Chechen officials say about 80 people killed.


70

12 May 2003 Two suicide bombers drive a truck full of explosives into a
government administration and security complex in Znamenskoye,
in northern Chechnya. Fifty-nine people are killed, and scores hurt.
14 May 2003 At least 16 people are killed in a suicide bomb attack during a
religious festival in the town of Iliskhan-Yurt, east of Grozny. 145
are wounded.
5 June 2003 A woman bomber ambushes a bus carrying Russian air force pilots
near Chechnya, blowing it up and killing herself and 18 other
people.
5 July 2003 Two women suicide bombers kill 15 other people when they blow
themselves apart at an open-air rock festival at Moscow's Tushino
airfield. 60 are injured.
1 August 2003 A suicide bomber kills at least 50 people at a military hospital in
the town of Mozdok in North Ossetia bordering Chechnya.
3 September 2003 Six people are killed in an explosion on board a commuter train
near the Northern Caucasus spa town of Pyatigorsk
5 December 2003 An explosion on a commuter train in the Stavropol region north of
Chechnya kills at least 36 people and injures more than 150.
9 December 2003 A suicide bomber in central Moscow kills at least five people.
6 February 2004 A rush-hour blast kills at least 30 people and injures 70 on a metro
train in Moscow.
Source: http://www.moscow.usembassy.gov/embassy/section.php?record_id=report_terrorism

3.3.3.2. Counter Terrorism Strategic Approach
The Russian government continues to take steps to improve coordination of counter
terrorism activities and expand law enforcement responsibilities domestically. In
February 2006, President Putin signed a decree creating the National Counter terrorism
Committee (NCC), headed by the Federal Security Service (FSB). The NCC was an
effort to rationalize the decision-making process following the 2004 Beslan school siege,
and was designed to establish a single chain of command and centralize the decision-
making process at the national level, subordinating the Regional Counter terrorism
Committees headed by governors (Yasmann, 2006).
In March 2006, the Russian legislature approved the law ??On Counteracting Terrorism??,
which further defined the role of the NCC. The legislation expanded the concept of
terrorism under Russian law, going beyond physical involvement in planning or carrying
out terrorist attacks. Under the law, terrorism also included promotion of ??terrorist ideas??


71

and distributing materials or information to encourage terrorist activity or inciting
individuals to commit a terrorist act (US Department of State, 2007).
3.3.3.3. Counter Terrorism Operational approach

As stated above, at the helm of Russia??s counter terrorism approach is the Federal
Security Service (FSB). The afore-mentioned law also reiterates President Putin??s decree
of February 2006, which calls for the establishment of the National Counter Terrorism
Committee (NCTC), and replaces the Federal Counter Terrorism Commission. The new
NCTC falls under the leadership of FSB??s director Nikolai Patrushev (Luchterhandt,
2006: 2). The NCTC will serve as an organization that coordinates the activities of
federal, regional and municipal agencies in the counter terrorism field. The President??s
decision to establish such a committee was based on the need to build a strictly organized
vertical system of operation to prevent counter terrorism and deal with the aftermath of
terrorist attacks (http://xinhua.net/200602/17/eng2006021.html).
The Russian government provided further transparency to its counterterrorist approach in
July 2007 by releasing, for the first time, a list of 17 organizations it designated as
terrorist entities. All entries to the list are subject to approval by the Supreme Court, and
must meet the following criteria:
• Activities aimed at changing Russia's constitutional system through violence,
including terrorism;
• Links to illegal armed groups and other extremist organizations operating in the
North Caucasus; and
• Association with, or links to, groups regarded as terrorists by the international
community.
The list includes the following organizations: Al-Qaeda; Supreme Military Majlisul
Shura of the Caucasus Mujahedin United Forces; Ichkeria and Dagestan People's
Congress; Asbat al-Ansar; Holy War (Al Jihad or Egyptian Islamic Jihad); Islamic Group
(Al-Gamaa al Islamia); Moslem Brothers (Al-Ikhvan al-Muslimun); Party of Islamic
Liberation (Hiz'but-Tahrir al-Islami); Lashkar-I-Taiba; Islamic Group (Jamaat-i-Islami);
Taliban Movement; Islamic Party of Turkestan (former Islamic movement of
Uzbekistan); Social Reform Society (Jamiyat Ikhya al-Islakh al-Ijtimai); Islamic Heritage
Renaissance Society (Jamiyat Ikhya at-Turaz al-Islami); Two Holies' House (Al
Kharamein); Islamic Jihad-Mujahidin Jammat; and Jund ash-Sham (US Department of
State, 2007).
There were three known organizations operating within the Russian Federation that the
United States designated terrorist entities in February 2003, under Executive Order
13224. These include:
• The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR). The SPIR was one of three
Chechen-affiliated terrorist groups that furnished personnel to carry out the
seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in October 2003.
• Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs.
The group uses terrorism as part of an effort to secure an independent Muslim


72

state in the North Caucasus. The group has not mounted a terrorist attack since the
Beslan school attack in September 2004.
• Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB). The IIPB is a terrorist group
affiliated with the Chechen separatist movement demanding a single Islamic state
in the North Caucasus. The IIPB and its Arab leaders appear to be a primary
conduit for Islamic funding of the Chechen guerrillas, in part through links to Al-
Qaeda-related financiers on the Arabian Peninsula. The IIPB was also listed under
UNSCR 1267 for its associations with Al-Qaeda, and the Terrorist Exclusion List
(US Department of State, 2007).
In addition to listing terrorist organizations, the Russian criminal justice system has also
proved effective. Noteworthy court cases involving terrorist suspects included:
• In May, Nurpashi Kulayev was found guilty of all charges for his role in the 2004
Beslan school siege and was sentenced to life in prison.
• In December, Spanish police arrested suspected Chechen terrorist Murat Gasayev
in Mislata, Valencia. Russian authorities were preparing an extradition request.
Under Spanish law, Gasayev would first have to be found guilty in a Spanish
court (US Department of State, 2007).
Apart from the above-mentioned approaches of listing and criminal justice, international
cooperation on combating terrorism has also been a strong pillar in Russia??s counter
terrorism approach. Russia used its position in international fora to build cooperative
mechanisms and programs to counter terrorism. Russia has also promoted counter
terrorism within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the G8, and the United Nations (http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-102-
42.cfm). Thus far, the following cooperation agreements are in place:
• The United States and Russia continue to cooperate on a broad range of counter
terrorism issues, including efforts to destroy, safeguard, and prevent the
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The U.S- Russian Counter
terrorism Working Group (CTWG) met for its fifteenth session September 13-14
2006 in Washington where it fostered cooperative, operational links between
numerous U.S. and Russian agencies. Law enforcement, intelligence, and policy
cooperation have increased as a result of the work of the CTWG. At the St.
Petersburg G8 Summit in July, the United States and Russia jointly announced the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (US Department of State, 2007).
• Russia is an active member of the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (FATF). Russia fulfilled its pledge to create a
Eurasian FATF-style regional body (FSRB) in 2004, known as the Eurasia Group
on Money Laundering (EAG), and as the group's leading force remained its chair.
The EAG, whose members also include Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan, made significant progress toward building Financial Intelligence
Units (FIUs) and established the necessary legislative and regulatory frameworks
in member states to help those states improve their compliance with international
standards (US Department of State, 2007).
• The Conference of Heads of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Security
and Special Services is one of the most productive organizations in combating


73

terrorism in CIS member-countries. Russia??s FSB came up with an initiative in
1995 to set up a conference of heads of CIS member-nations security and special
services. The fight against the smuggling of weapons, military hardware,
radioactive, explosive and toxic substances and drug trafficking, as well as
measures to ensure information security are high on the organizations agenda
(www.militarynews.ru).
• India and Russia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which
establishes and inter-Agency Joint Working Group on terrorism. This will
supplement the existing arrangements between the National Security Councils of
the two countries. In terms of the agreement, India and Russia agreed to cooperate
in taking preventative and deterrent measures against common terrorist threats
(such as those posed by Al-Qaida, the ISI, etc) (Parthasarathy, 2002).

3.3.3.4. Measuring the effectiveness of Russia??s Counter terrorism measures

In contrast to the US and UK scenarios, the terrorist incidents in Russia seem to be on the
increase.

Graph 3.3: Terrorist incidents in Russia



Source: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base

The first important dynamic of note in relation to Graph 3.3, is that the economic status
of a country does not necessarily influence a reduction in terrorist threats. Russia is a
developed country with a vast amount of state resources and commendable intelligence
capacity. However, as the graph indicates, terrorism has been on the rise since 2002. Yet,
it should be noted that it is only in 2006 that Russia has began to restructure and
reconceptualise its approach to terrorism. Since February 2006, Russia has opted for an
integrated approach incorporating the federal, regional and municipal agencies in the
counter terrorism field instead of relying solely on the FSB. Looking at Graph 3.3, from
January – October 2007, the MIPT has only recorded twenty incidents as compared to
2006, which recorded more than 80 incidents. This reinforces the argument, and as noted
in the US and UK examples, that integration and coordination and a greater role for local
law enforcement in counter terrorist measures is an important measure to consider.
Terrorist incidents in Russia 2000-Oct 2007
0
50
100
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Oct-07
Year


74

3.4. Counter Terrorism in Developing countries

This section provides an overview of counter terrorism approaches in two developing
countries – India and Algeria. Overall, developing countries find themselves consumed
with major developmental priorities that they believe require more attention than counter
terrorism. As such, a country, which is threatened by poverty and famine, may
realistically concentrate its efforts on circumventing such obstacles. This prioritization of
developing countries contributes to a limited amount of resources and expertise being
deployed to address threats of terrorism. It is essential therefore to consider how
developing countries like India and Algeria address counter terrorism in the face of such
challenges.

In the same regard, South Africa holds a similar status of a developing country in the
global arena. In this instance, counter terrorism considered within the paradigm of
countries of equitable status such as India and Algeria may be relevant to the case of
South Africa. Their approaches to terrorism will be analysed with the aim to determine
aspects that have been successful in countering terrorism.
3.4.1. India

The Republic of India, commonly known as India, is a sovereign country in South Asia.
It is the seventh-largest country by geographical area and is considered the most populous
liberal democracy in the world. Bounded by the Indian Ocean on the south, the Arabian
Sea on the west, and the Bay of Bengal on the east, India has a coastline of over 7000
kilometres. It borders Pakistan to the west; China, Nepal, and Bhutan to the north-east;
and Bangladesh and Myanmar to the east. In the Indian Ocean, India is near Sri Lanka,
Maldives, and Indonesia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India).

3.4.1.1. Extent of Terrorism

Internal security management has been an important component of India??s national
security management ever since India??s independence in 1947. The Ministry of Home
Affairs of the Government of India is the kingpin of India??s internal security management
mechanism. Initially it focused mainly on the maintenance of law and order and inter-
communal peace, crime control and counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency became an
important component of internal security management from 1956, following the launch
of terrorist attacks from a group of communist insurgents (Raman, 2003).

Terrorist threats became more pronounced in 1981. A group of Sikhs living in the State
of Punjab in India as well as the UK, the then West Germany, Canada and the US took
terrorism in emulation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in order to
pressurize the Government of India to concede their demand for an Independent State for
the Sikhs to be called Khalistan. The Khalistani terrorist organizations were largely
funded by some members of the Sikh Diasporas abroad and by the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. They were trained and armed by the ISI camps in Pakistani
territory. The Khalistani terrorists used four modus operandi. Firstly, hand held weapons
against selected leaders, officials, and other perceived as enemies of the Sikh religion;


75

hijacking of planes of the Indian Airlines (they hijacked 5 planes between 1981 and
1984); blowing up of Air India planes in mid-air; and lastly, indiscriminate planting of
explosive devices (IEDs) in public places killing a large number of innocent civilians
(Raman, 2003).

In response to their modus operandi, the first bricks of India??s counter terrorism
architecture came into being in the 1980s. These related to civil aviation security,
personal security of very important persons and anti-explosives security. This period saw
the birth of the National Security Guards (NSGs). These guards were specially trained to
intervene to terminate incidents of hijacking and hostage taking. This period also saw
increased importance attached to strengthening the crisis management capabilities of the
concerned Ministries and departments of the Governments at the Centre and in the states.
The period between 1989 and 2001, saw eight new challenges confronting the Indian
counter terrorism managers and policymakers, which influenced a new counter terrorism
strategy (http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1993/terrorism_press.html) (See Annexure 5 for
further details).

India has been facing the problem of Pakistani state-sponsored terrorism for over 40
years and nearly 40 000 civilians and 3 500 members of the various security services
have been killed. India has little over 140 million Muslims – the second largest Muslim
Community in the world after Indonesia. Only a very small section of the community has
taken to terrorism due to various grievances and instigation by the ISI and religious,
fundamentalist and jihadi organizations. The overwhelming majority of Indian Muslims
are loyal, law-abiding citizens. India has the most modern, peaceful and forward looking
Muslim Community in the World (McCarthy, 2002).
3.4.1.2. India??s Counter Terrorism Strategic Approach

To meet these above challenges, India??s counter terrorism capabilities have been further
strengthened in the following ways:

• The establishment of an erection of a fence along the Line of Control (LOC) and
the international border with Bangladesh;
• Strengthening the counter-infiltration capabilities of the Border Security Force
(BSF) and the Indian Army;
• A greater role for the army in counter terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in order
to deal with infiltration and cross-border terrorism;
• Raising of village defence forces in remote villages;
• Strengthening physical security for sensitive places of worship;
• Upgrade of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) in order to enable it to
protect the economic infrastructure, including the oil infrastructure, ports and
airports, nuclear establishments etc from possible terrorist attacks;
• Strengthening the maritime counter terrorism capability, with the Coast guard;
• Raising a pool of officers specially trained in hostage negotiation techniques;
• Strengthening narcotics control; and
• Strengthening measures against money-laundering (Raman, 2003a).



76

The Indo-Pakistan military conflict of 1999 led to the appointment by the Government of
India in 2000 of a Special Task Force for the revamping of the Intelligence apparatus.
This task force recommended measures not only for strengthening capability for the
collection, analysis and assessment of human and technical intelligence relating to
conventional threats, but also for strengthening India??s capability for the collection of
terrorism related intelligence. One of its most important recommendations led to the
creation of a Multi-Disciplinary Centre in the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is
equivalent of the UK??s Security Services (MI5), to coordinate the intelligence and follow
up action processes in all the central agencies having a role in counter terrorism. Counter
terrorism experts from all the agencies are to work in this centre under a common
umbrella under the leadership of the IB, which is the operational nodal agency for
counter terrorism.

Essentially, counter terrorism in India has the following aspects – prevention through
timely intelligence, physical security to thwart terrorist attacks if intelligence fails, crisis
management if physical security fails, and deterrence through investigation and
prosecution. India??s preventative physical security including their crisis management
capabilities are above average, and have produced good results (McCarthy, 2002).

In India, the Police are a weapon of first resort in counter terrorism and the Army is the
last resort. In Jammu and Kashmir and in the bordering areas of the North-East, the Army
plays a role in assisting or even leading the police because of the problem of trans-border
infiltration and cross-border terrorism. In the rest of India, it is the Police, which is in the
frontline of the fight against terrorism. Even though India records the largest number of
terrorist strikes and deaths due to terrorism in the world every year, India has never used
its air force or heavy artillery against terrorists in any part of India. India utilizes weapons
that will not lead to the disproportionate use of force and result in collateral damage.
India has a long history of counter terrorism cooperation with other countries, particularly
with the UK, Canada and the US (Raman, 2003b).

3.4.1.3. India??s Counter Terrorism Operational Approach

India??s counter terrorism set-up consists of the following components (Raman, 2006):
• The State Police and its intelligence set-up: Under India??s federal
Constitution, the responsibility for policing and maintenance of the law and
order is that of individual states. The central government in New Delhi can
only give them advice, financial help, training and other assistance to
strengthen their professional capabilities and share with them the intelligence
collected by it. The responsibility for follow-up action lies with the state
police.
• The National Intelligence Community: This consists of the internal
intelligence agency (the ministry of home affairs intelligence bureau), the
external intelligence agency (the Cabinet secretariats Research and Analysis
Wing), the Defence Intelligence Agency that was set up in 2002, and the
intelligence directorates general of armed forces. The IB collects terrorism-


77

related intelligence inside the country and RAW does the external collection.
The DIA and the intelligence directorates general of the armed forces
essentially collect tactical intelligence during their counter terrorism
operations in areas such as Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, etc, where they
are deployed.
• Physical Security Agencies: These include the Central Industrial Security
Force, responsible for physical security at airports and sensitive
establishments, the National Security Guards, a specially trained intervention
force to terminate terrorist situations such as hijackings, hostage taking, etc,
and the Special Protection Group, responsible for the security of the Prime
Minister and former Prime Ministers.
• Paramilitary Forces: These include the Central Reserve Police Force, which
assists the police in counter terrorism operations when called upon to do so.
• The Army: Their assistance is sought as a last resort when police and
paramilitary forces are not able to cope with the terrorist situation.
Nevertheless, in view of Pakistan??s large-scale infiltration in Jammu and
Kashmir and the presence and activities of a large number of Pakistani
mercenaries, many of them ex-servicemen, the army has more active,
permanent and leadership role in counter terrorism operations. What India is
facing in Jammu and Kashmir is not just terrorism but also a proxy war.

• A Multi-disciplinary centre on counter terrorism (2004 initiative): headed by
a senior IB officer, within the IB, expected to emulate the US??s counter
terrorism centre. Officers of various agencies responsible for intelligence
collection and counter terrorism operations will work under a common
umbrella and be responsible for joint analysis of the intelligence flowing in
from different agencies and co-ordinated follow-up action.

• A counter terrorism division in the Ministry of External Affairs (2004
initiative): expected to emulate the counter terrorism division of the US State
Department. It will be responsible for coordinating the diplomatic aspects of
counter terrorism, such as briefing other countries on Pakistani??s sponsorship
of terrorism against India, processing requests for extradition and mutual legal
assistance, servicing the work of various working groups on counter terrorism,
which India has set up in a number of countries.

The weakest link of India??s counter terrorism capability is deterrence through legal action
against terrorists and their organizations. India??s investigative and prosecution agencies
have to fight against terrorism with the normal laws of the land, which were enacted long
before terrorism emerged as a major threat to national security. Certain other powers have
been given to the Police under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, but this Act
relates to all crime and is not terrorism focused. The repeated pleas of counter terrorism
professionals that India should emulate the example of other democracies like the UK
and US and enact terrorism-focused legislations have ??fallen on deaf ears??. The
Government of India did give special powers to the Police under the Prevention of


78

Terrorism Act (POTA), but this Act was repealed in 2004 in response to criticism from
the religious and ethnic minorities. They alleged that the special powers in respect of
detention given under this Act were being misused by the Police to harass the minorities
(Raman, 2003a).

The Indian judicial process against terrorism is very slow. Trials take a long time. The
defence lawyers representing the terrorists manage to get frequent adjournments of the
trial under some pretext or the other. India does not have the adequate legal provisions to
prevent intimidation of the witnesses testifying against the terrorists. The judiciary tends
to avoid convicting terrorists purely based on circumstantial evidence. The result is a very
low conviction rate of less than 10% in terrorism related cases as compared to 80% plus
in Western countries (Raman, 2003a).
3.4.1.4. Measuring the effectiveness of India??s Counter Terrorism Measures

In terms of statistics, India has had difficulty dealing with terrorism. Prior to 2006,
India??s approach to terrorism has been a paramilitary approach, with key elements being
the military and the police. However, this approach has not been effective as all security
entities worked independent of each other.

Graph 3.4: Terrorist incidents in India


Source: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base

With the establishment of the Center on Counter Terrorism, it was envisaged that efforts
would be more streamlined and entities would cooperate with each other. However, the
2005 and 2006 statistics still indicate the seriousness and reality of terrorism. In its
integrated approach to terrorism, the US took three years to ensure the smooth running of
its integrated approach. In India, it has only been two years since its adoption of an
alternate approach from that of a military stance to counter terrorism. In this regard, it is
hoped that coordination and cooperation will be enhanced.
3.4.2. Algeria

Algeria is a country in Northern Africa and has the Mediterranean Sea as the Northern
border. The bordering neighbours to Algeria include Morocco and Tunisia, Mauritania,
Mali and Niger (http://www.algeria-un.org/default,asp?doc=-mono).
Terrorist incidents in India 2000-Oct 2007
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Oct-07
Year


79


3.4.2.1. Extent of Terrorism

Algeria has suffered from both political violence and terrorism on two distinct occasions
in its recent history. During the struggle for independence from France in the 1950s and
1960s, the Algerian National Liberation Front (ANLF) engaged in both guerrilla warfare
and terrorism in its efforts to become independent. By 1962, independence was achieved
in Algeria and a civilian government was established. In 1965, the military intervened to
establish an authoritarian system of government that continued to be dominated by the
junta (Lutz and Lutz, 2004:78).

In the late 1980s, economic problems led to increasing domestic unrest and Islamic
movements appeared to gain support amongst the groups left behind by modernization.
Declining prices for petroleum products led to an economic slump, and there were
problems associated with corruption and inadequate provision of services for the
population. One of the more important opposition parties created to contest the election
was the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS mobilized support on the basis of
structuring the legal system on Islamic principles and promoting Islamism in government
as a contrast to the clearly secular regime of the military and the dominant government
party (Fuller 1996: 24).

Faced with government repression and the refusal of the ruling party to abide by the
election results, the supporters of the FIS and others resorted to violence. While the MIA
(Islamic Movement Army) and later successor groups were linked with the FIS, the FIS
did not control the violent dissidents. The MIA shared the Islamic view of the FIS but
was an independent organization, and at times came into direct conflict with the FIS
(Lutz and Lutz, 2004:79).

The terrorist attacks in Algeria included the general population as targets. Car bombs and
other attacks took place in a number of Algeria??s cities. Rebel groups attacked villages
with same regularity, massacring the inhabitants. These attacks executed with extreme
brutality, involving torture, rape, and death. Frequently, women and children were the
most vulnerable in these attacks. The victims were seen as an offering to God (Chalk
1999: 160). However, the rationale for the villages that were chosen is often obscure. At
times, the attacks appeared to be designed to draw military units into ambushes. In other
cases, there was the possibility that the village was regarded as being pro-government.
More generally, the attacks seem to have been designed to indicate to the population at
large that the government could offer no protection to its citizenry. It is possible that the
tactics, which involved such extreme violence, were due to a mixture of a conscious
desire to spread fear among the general population and the effects of religious zeal. The
only choices for the population were death or active co-operation with the insurgents
(Stone 1997: 191; Laqueur 1999: 130).

One factor that makes it difficult to discern the particular goals of any one set of attackers
is the fact that the opposition forces were not a single unified group, and different groups
were following different strategies. Particularly violent attacks were orchestrated, at times,
to sabotage any chance of negotiations between the government and some of the rebel


80

groups. However, negotiations between the government and the FIS Leadership reduced
the violence and Islamic parties won seats in the national legislature. Nevertheless,
continuing economic difficulties made the achievement of lasting peace unlikely (Roberts
1995: 242).

In 1996, the Groupe Salafist pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC) dissident group
was born. The GSPC is an heir to one of the most violent terrorist legacies in modern
history and the group is believed to be an offshoot of the MIA. In late November 2006,
following increased pressure from the Algerian security forces; the GSPC initiated formal
links with Al-Qaeda and renamed itself the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It
currently provides Al-Qaeda with trained militants in Iraq (Tefft, 2006; Janes Intelligence
Review, 18 May 2006).

The AQIM??s funding methods are primitive compared to European terrorist cells, which
are better placed to exploit banking and modern technology. Kidnapping, and ransom
rewards have been the key funding methods for AQIM. The Groups most famous and
lucrative endeavour as the GSPC was the 2003 kidnapping of European tourists in
southern Algeria by Amari Saifi (also known as El Para), the former leader of one of the
cell groups of the AQIM. This venture provided the cell with funds of US$ 6 million in
ransom money. The group, as the GSPC, favoured ??kidnap-for-ransom??, and abducting
locals in the northern part of the country for smaller payouts. However, since their
transformation into AQIM, suicide bombers have become an important trademark as it is
one of the more prominent methods used by Al-Qaeda (Janes Intelligence Review, 18
May 2006).

The AQIM funding is also derived from smuggling profits. The smuggling of cigarettes,
cannabis and household goods occur in certain regions of Algeria. Items such as milk and
cooking oil can be purchased at subsidized prices in Algeria and traded for cigarettes as
far south as Nigeria (Janes Intelligence Review, 18 May 2006). Funds are also obtained
by terrorist organizations in Algeria from foreign powers, which wish to destabilize the
country (Taheri, 2004).

Furthermore, the conflicts in western and southern Africa provide a robust market for the
procurement of automatic weapons, grenades and rockets. Weapons caches are
consistently sent to dissident groups blending with an enormous flow of goods, both
stolen and legitimate. This presents a serious challenge to Algerian security forces, which
are willing to ignore the smuggling of ??innocent?? goods but find it almost impossible to
sift out the few trucks that may be trafficking weapons. The AQIM has relied heavily on
traditional weapons and guerrilla tactics, including attacks on unarmed civilians, but
events suggest the group may be attempting to develop a more sophisticated improvised
explosive devise (IED) capability, such as mobile phone detectors. Over the past year, the
AQIM has actively sought to reverse the GSPC??s international reputation as insular and
xenophobic, by building connections with western and central Africa and attempting to
reinvigorate connections to Europe (Janes Intelligence Review, 18 May 2006).


81

3.4.1.2. Counter Terrorism Strategic Approach

Algeria??s Penal Code provides for UN Conventions to be incorporated into national
legislation automatically, once the international instrument is ratified. The Algerian
Constitution places international treaties and conventions on a higher legal status than
national law; for instance, Algeria submits fully to UN Resolution 1373.

Algeria has moved away from having dedicated legislation to address terrorism, to
treating terrorism as a criminal act within the Penal Code. The reason for this is that
during 1992 Algeria was accused of being too harsh in its fight against terrorism, often in
violation of human rights. Legislative Decree No 92–03 of 30 September 1992 on
combating subversion and terrorism, amended and supplemented by Legislative Decree
No 93–05 of 9 April 1993, defines the remit of the public authorities with regard to the
sanctioning of terrorist acts.

The Penal Code and the Code of Penal Procedure have been amended to strengthen the
national legislation in countering terrorism. Algeria has focused its definition on domestic
terrorism and the threat of terrorism against state security as the primary threat. Article 1
of Decree No 93–03 (reproduced in article 87 of Ordinance No 95.11 of 25 February
1995, amending and supplementing Ordinance No 66.156 of 8 June 1966 and enacting
the Penal Code) defines a subversive or terrorist act as ??any offence targeting state
security, territorial integrity or the stability or normal functioning of institutions through
any action seeking to support activities that:

• Spread panic among the public and create a climate of insecurity by causing
emotional or physical harm to people, jeopardizing their lives or freedom or
attacking their property;
• Disrupt traffic or freedom of movement on roads and obstruct public areas
with gatherings;
• Damage national or republican symbols and profane graves;
• Harm the environment, means of communication or means of transport;
• Impede the activities of public authorities and bodies serving the public, or
free exercise of religion and public freedoms;
• Impede the functioning of public institutions, endanger the lives or damage
property of their staff, or obstruct the implementation of laws and regulations
(Goredema and Botha, 2004).

In addition to legislative mechanisms, Algeria has also increased its research and
development capacity in counter terrorism through the African Centre for the Study and
Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). In 2004, at a meeting in Algiers, the AU adopted a plan
to bring states in line with the convention regarding terrorism. Among other things, the
plan called for the creation of the ACSRT to co-ordinate analyses of terrorism and
counter terrorism activities on the continent with AU member states and the regional
economic communities (Shillinger, 2006a). The Algerian government seconded some of
its senior civilian and military counter terrorism experts to establish the Centre. Algeria??s
total commitment thus far amounts to $6,2m.
(www.iss.co.za/static/templates/tmpl_html.php?node_id=2395andlink_id=3893).


82


Algeria also considers international cooperation to be an important element in its fight
against terrorism. The Algerians have forged close ties with the US in this respect.
Initiatives of note include the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative. Links have also
been forged with France, Spain and the UK to assist in derailing efforts towards
transnational terrorist networks (Janes Intelligence Review, June 2006).

3.4.2.3. Algeria??s Counter Terrorism Operational Approach
According to a report in an Algerian newspaper, the ??Asharq al-Awsat??, on 3 August
2007, Algeria's tactical approach to countering terrorism has shifted and security services
are currently pursuing a new strategy to weaken the AQIM (cited in Economist, 2007).
Instead of focusing exclusively on ??launching military operations with heavy weapons
against the terrorists?? strongholds, Algeria??s security services are placing suspected
terrorist leaders under heavy surveillance, pursuing every movement and gathering
information about their movements (Economist, 2007; Tefft, 2006). The Algerians since
the evolution of the GSPC into AQIM have opted for a militaristic style approach against
suspected terrorists.
Counter terrorist operations mainly function through the:
• Department for Information and Security (DRS): It is widely known as Military
Security, an intelligence agency within the military that specializes in counter-
terrorism and operates with great secrecy. No civilian institution exercises
effective oversight over the practices of the DRS. Prosecutors do not enforce
safeguards under Algerian law and are apparently not informed of arrests carried
out by the DRS. The DRS specializes in detaining and interrogating people who
are believed to have information about terrorist activities, due to their alleged
links either with armed groups in Algeria or with international terrorist networks
abroad. In the past two years, the DRS has come under immense scrutiny for
human rights abuses in its quest to clamp down on terrorism. The DRS also
possess policing powers to arrest and detain at will (Amnesty International, 2006).

• Algerian Police - Sûret?? nationale (national security): Complimenting the DRS is
the Sûret?? Nationale, which is the primary policing authority in Algeria??s
principal cities and other urban areas. Subordinated administratively to the
Ministry of Interior, the Sûret?? is charged with maintaining law and order,
protecting life and property, investigating crimes, and apprehending offenders.
The policing force comprises 30 000 police officers and one of their there primary
tactics against terrorism is the establishment of mobile brigades in sensitive areas
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/8005.htm).

The synergy between the Algerians strategic and operational components of its counter
terrorism measures serve well in negating possible terrorist threats to state security.


83

3.4.2.4. Measuring the effectiveness of Algeria??s Counter Terrorism Measures

In contrast to India, Algeria??s military intelligence agency DRS seems to be the driving
force of counter terrorism. However, as illustrated in the Graph 3.5, this approach has not
been very effective.

Graph 3.5: Terrorist incidents in Algeria


Source: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base

Looking at the Graph, terrorist incidences have increased drastically between 2004 to
October 2007. The rise in incidents in 2006 could be attributed to the fortification of links
between the GSPC and Al-Qaeda. The threat in Algeria has superseded the domestic
sphere and has become transnational in nature. Military intelligence alone is not enough
to contain the growing threat of AQIM. The fact that the DRS has been in the spotlight
regarding its human rights abuses to infiltrate terrorists cells, also indicate that the
country has opposed international norms in its quest to counter terrorism and more likely,
it does not have the support of the majority of its population in gaining effective
intelligence on terrorist whereabouts. Essentially, no effective relationship is visible
between the community and military intelligence and even more troubling is the fact that
the national police take a back seat to the DRS in terms of counter terrorism.
3.5 Synthesis of policing mechanisms utilised in counter terrorism approaches in the
specified countries
The overall analysis of counter terrorism strategies within the specified country illustrate
that in addition to legislation and appropriate frameworks, policing constitutes a pivotal
element in the fight against terrorism. Given the centrality of policing to the hypothesis of
this study, the Table 3.1 below reflects on appropriate policing roles adopted to counter
terrorism:

Terrorist incidents in Algeria 2000-Oct 2007
0
10
20
30
40
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Oct-07
Year
N
o
of
in
ci
de
nt
s


84

Table 3.1: Level of involvement of Police in the specified countries

Countries Level of police involvement Effectiveness
United States Pre-9/11: Federal centric: approach
driven by FBI and CIA.

Post 9/11: Integrated: an approach
driven by intelligence (FBI) and
Police Departments. The resultant
is Joint task teams.
Pre- 9/11: ineffective – the
terrorist incidences of 9/11
attest to ineffectiveness.

Post-9/11: momentarily
effective. Number of
incidents reduced from 36 in
2001 to 1 in 2006.

United Kingdom Integrated: police driven (MPS) Momentarily effective:
incidents reduced from 12 in
2005 to 0 in 2006.
Russia Pre-2006: Para-Military

Post-2006: Integrated. Headed by
Federal Agency but larger law
enforcement responsibilities.
Pre-2006: not effective.
Incidents registered for 2005
stood at 80. Post-2006,
incidents registered from
January to October 2007 was
19.
India Pre-2004: Para-Military

Post-2004: Integrated: emulation of
elements of US??s counter terrorism
strategy. Process driven by police,
intelligence and army.
Pre-2004: ineffective.
Incidents registered at 38 in
2004.

Pre-2004: still remains
ineffective. Levels of
interaction between relevant
stakeholders remain low.
Approach is not coordinated
effectively.
Algeria Militaristic: Process still driven by
military intelligence, limited role
for state police.
Approach is ineffective. The
number of incidents
registered for 2007 at 38
attests to its ineffectiveness
and incidents are said to be
increasing with the
transformation of GSPC into
AQIM.


If one has to interpret the table, is seems that at the heart of a counter terrorism strategy is
and integrated approach to dealing with imminent threats and an increased role for
policing in such strategies. Deputy Chief, Michael Downing of the Los Angeles Police's
Counter Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau, aptly argues that:

Local law enforcement is the first defense against violent
domestic??extremism. No agency knows their landscape better than


85

local law enforcement; we were designed and built to be the eyes and
ears of communities—the First Preventers of terrorism (Harwood, 2007).

Within this context, it is evident that law enforcement should have a larger role in counter
terrorism efforts and the strategies highlighted in the Table attest to this assertion.
3.6. Summary

The comparative analysis of counter terrorism strategies and approaches in both the
selected developed and developing countries outline the common elements that are
proving to be necessary in developing effective counter terrorism mechanisms and should
be considered in South Africa??s approach to counter terrorism:

• Enabling Legislation: Most of the countries analyzed have in place enabling
counter terrorism legislation which gives law enforcement agencies the necessary
authority to neutralize current and prospective terrorist threats;
• A common institution to integrate the efforts of varying state agencies, which are
responsible for counter terrorism: Realising the importance of coordination after
the 9/11 fiasco amongst state agencies, the US established the Counter Terrorism
Centre (CTC) to coordinate efforts of all national security agencies. Elements of
integrated efforts and coordination are also illustrated in the UK??s Joint Terrorism
Analysis Centre (JTAC) and the Metropolitan Police Services (MPS) Counter
Terrorism Command (CTC). Moreover, in 2006, the Russians established the
National Counter Terrorism Committee (NCC) designed to establish a single
chain of command and centralize the decision-making process at the national
level. These trends by the developed countries signify the importance of
instituting a common mechanism to rationalise and integrate efforts at the national
level.
• International Cooperation: All countries analyzed attached significant importance
towards working with other countries to combat the threat of terrorism. Terrorism
is not approached as a national phenomenon and does not remain strictly within
the confines of a particular border. In many instances, terrorism has grown to
become a transnational threat with networks and cells in many countries across
the globe. As such, to counteract the threat of terrorism requires an international
commitment.
• A larger role for local law enforcement: Table 3.1 above is illustrative of the
importance of law enforcement as a first defence against terrorism.




86

CHAPTER 4
SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTER TERRORISM

4.1. Introduction

The use of violent tactics and the term ??terrorism?? is not unfamiliar to South African
history. South Africa emerged from an era where violence was utilised both by the
government to maintain the status quo and by forces antagonistic to the government to
end apartheid.

South Africa??s history demonstrates the problems associated with the term ??terrorism??.
Back in the 1980s, the African National Congress (ANC) was regarded as a terrorist
organisation and now they form the government of the day (Matthews, 2004). As such,
South Africa??s history informs the way that contemporary South African politicians
respond to so-called terrorist activities. Many of South Africa??s contemporary politicians
are members of political organisations, which were described by the apartheid
government as being ??terrorist?? organisations. This will justify why such politicians will
be cautious with regard to the labelling of groups or activities as ??terrorist?? (Matthews,
2004).

4.2. Historical conceptualisation of counter terrorism in South Africa
The research domain, regarding policing and counter terrorism approaches post-2001
remain fairly new. Policing of terrorism in the apartheid era was a well-known
phenomenon, given the emerging threats of freedom fighters, to the oppressive apartheid
government pre-1994. Yet, with the advent of democracy in 1994, newly elected leaders
sought to move away from the policing State to one that pronounced the civil liberties of
citizens. As such, in many ways, this drew attention away from the South African Police
Services (SAPS) as the key department in counter-insurgency. This is not to say, however,
that SAPS has not been instrumental in responding to terrorist attacks. The crackdown of
both PAGAD and the Boeremag are indicative of its effective operational and reactive
response to terrorist threats.
This study locates itself in arguing that given emerging dynamics of growing terrorist
threats within South Africa??s borders, the country has to be more strategically proactive
in its response to terrorism. The study highlights the ambivalence of a counter terrorism
approach within SAPS structures and argues for a more concrete and more methodical
proactive approach to counter terrorism from South Africa??s national enforcement agency.
Yet, to understand this argument, a survey of literature on counter terrorism approaches
within SAPS is presented below.
During the apartheid regime, newsreaders frequently reported on the activities of
??terrorists??, government officials defended their actions as necessary to combat
??terrorists??, and divergently the so-called ??terrorists?? fought to have their activities
recognised as guerrilla warfare and freedom fighting rather than terrorism. Under the


87

apartheid regime several anti-apartheid movements, including the African National
Congress (ANC), its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the Pan Africanist
Congress (PAC), and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were banned. The
government frequently described the subsequent underground activities of these parties as
??terrorist activities??. When on trial for sabotage in 1964, Nelson Mandela (1964)
repeatedly emphasised that the members of the ANC did not use terrorism in order to try
to achieve their goals. Furthermore, Mandela (1964) argued that the adoption of such
strategies was a result of the apartheid government??s frustration of all legitimate peaceful
protest, and was in fact an attempt to prevent terrorism, rather than to organise it
(Matthews, 2004).
Establishing an effective counter terrorism strategy is always a challenge. In the case of
South Africa, the challenge is of an atypical nature. Not only is the government forced to
invest resources and cope with problems of intelligence, enforcement and other
operational difficulties, it must also work to maintain the image of a stable democracy,
and prevent the vision of the post-apartheid era from collapsing. On the one hand, South
Africa must ensure the safety and security of its citizens as well as its tourists. On the
other hand, it is limited in the measures which it may adopt to counter the terrorism in its
midst. Attempting to achieve a sense of security by a purely policing and military policy
results in reminiscence of the apartheid era. Essentially, South Africa??s history informs
the way that contemporary South African politicians respond to emerging terrorist
activities (Kritzman, 2000).
The creation of a specialised riot control function pre-1994 within South Africa??s
policing agencies was essentially a reaction to the disorder and political unrest associated
with resistance to apartheid. Although the name and structures of the units tasked with
this specialist function changed a number of times. The functions of the unit were
devolved to various other policing agencies in homeland and self-governing territories.
Essentially their roles remained the same – the enforcement of apartheid laws, the
suppression of political protest and the prevention of ??unrest, intimidation and unrest-
related crimes?? (Kritzman, 2000).

Since the nature of their task was inherently public, the police units tasked with riot
control played a prominent role as frontline ??enforcers?? of apartheid policies, and were
viewed with a mixture of fear and loathing by the communities in which they served.
Although accurate figures are not available, it is likely that the riot control (and similar)
units were responsible for a majority of police killings during the apartheid years (Scharf,
2000).

The police units were para-military in nature (by way of training, operational
understanding and culture), and brutal in the enforcement of bans on political protest.
They operated within a policy paradigm that accepted and supported the lethal use of
force. This, combined with the authorities?? complete intolerance of protest action, meant
that they frequently relied upon maximum force. As the external environment in which
they operated took on the character of a low-intensity civil war, their training, equipment
and methodology became increasingly militarised. The South African police agencies
became isolated from the international progression that were being made in the field of


88

public order with effect that they were unaware of the new strategies and techniques that
other police services were implementing (Rauch, 1991).

In the period 1980 to 1990, Maleoskop provided Counter-Insurgency training to police
officers deployed in the specialised riot control units. The name of this training course
later changed to ??Internal Security?? training. During the 1980s, all SAP recruits attended
internal security training for two weeks after completing their basic training. The 1980s
also saw the introduction of a seven-hour module (of an eight-week training course) in
??unrest duty?? for the Special Constables (known as Kitskonstabels) at the Koeberg
training centre. The content of the training course was broad, including everything from
??tracking terrorists?? to sniper training. It focussed almost exclusively on the use of force,
and the majority of training time was concentrated on training police officers in the use of
the weapons training. In addition, trainees were given lessons on the legal framework
related to gatherings and the enforcement provisions of these laws (Rauch and Storey,
1998).

In 1990, following the inquiry into the Sebokeng shootings of March that year, the period
of training at Maleoskop was increased from three to six weeks and an improved system
of local in-service training was introduced. In 1991, coinciding with the formation of the
Internal Stability Division and the relatively more relaxed approach adopted by the De
Klerk government to gatherings, a slightly more sophisticated version of the training
courses (now called ??Internal Stability??) was introduced. This course focussed more on
crowd control and began to introduce some ??soft skills?? such as negotiation and crowd
psychology. Unfortunately, the political biasness contained in the content of these ??soft
skills?? detracted from any value they may have added. Various specialised courses such
as video operation were also introduced for selected members. The focus of the training,
however, remained the use of force and a limited interpretation of the applicable
legislation contrary to the interpretation of the government during the political transition
(Omar, 2006).

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, policing of areas where violence had become endemic
attracted great controversy and numerous allegations of bias and brutality. This reputation
and their inability to comprehensively adjust to the demands of the new political
environment led to calls from numerous communities and political movements for the
total disbandment of the riot police or Internal Stability Units. In 1994, the Government
of National Unity (GNU) inherited a riot control capacity of approximately seventy two
(72) units. The inherited Units according to Rauch (1991) were illegitimate, over-
centralised, fragmented (into SAP and homeland forces), unaccountable, incident driven,
ill-equipped and not trained for the public order challenges which would face them
during South Africa??s transition to democracy (Rauch, 1991; and Rauch and Storey 1998;
Omar, 2006).

After 1994, the Goldstone Commission proposed a Draft Bill to address the civil liability
of organisers of gatherings, the prevention and prohibition of gatherings, and
demonstrations near courts, Parliament and the Union Buildings. The Commission said
that legislation was desirable even before the elections, because mass demonstrations and
marches were matters of urgency. Passed in 1993, the Goldstone Bill became the


89

Regulation of Gatherings Act, but it was only enacted after the 1994 election on the 15
November 1996 (www.hurisa.org.za/Goldstone/Goldstone_Reports.htm).

The first Minister of Safety and Security in the new political dispensation, Steve Tswete,
faced a Constitutional requirement to create a national Public Order Policing unit as part
of a new, integrated South African Police Service. The new policy moved away from
??crowd control?? to ??crowd management?? as a conceptual framework for the role of the
police with respect to public gatherings. It was designed to complement the new legal
framework, and to take into account the rights of all citizens. The new crowd
management policy:

• developed a clear set of Public Order Policing (POP) goals applicable to public
order situations;
• established a clear set of principles pertaining to the management of crowds
including –
™ the legal aspects of crowd management,
™ the situational appropriateness of public order strategies and tactics,
™ the optimum utilisation of suitable means and available resources, and
™ the proportionality of the response to actions taken by participants of
public collective actions,
™ emphasised the importance of preparation for crowd management
operations,
• clarified levels of responsibility, command and control;
• spelt out detailed pre-planning steps;
• introduced planning and operational committees;
• outlined the appropriate manner by which operations should be executed
(including methods, use of force, media relations, and SANDF liaison); and
• expanded on the role and functions of debriefing (Rauch and Storey, 1998).

The National Commissioner, George Fivaz, and Minister Tswete approved the new
crowd management policy in September of 1995. Implementation of the new policy
approach, and the accompanying structural reforms, began immediately. During
November 1995, the Internal Stability Division (ISD) was amalgamated with the Riot
Control Units of the homeland police agencies as part of the amalgamation of the police
agencies and the creation of the new South African Police Service (Omar, 2006).

The newly reformed SAPS were again put to the test in dealing with terrorism from the
period 1994 to 2000. During this period, South Africa's legislative capital, Cape Town,
was plagued by numerous bombings, drive-by shootings and assassinations. Initially,
most of this violence occurred in the context of gang warfare and vigilante action against
criminal gangs and suspected drug dealers. However, after mid-1996, the motive for
some of the violence changed from gangs battling for territory and vigilantism to new
violence, which sought to create a climate of fear and terror among the citizens of Cape
Town. In early 1996, the SAPS and the SANDF jointly responded to the terrorist threat in
the greater Cape Town area through the National Operational Co-ordinating Committee
(NOCOC) mechanism to execute special counter terrorism operations (Boshoff, Botha
and Schönteich, 2001).



90

History and current events indicate that SAPS has the capacity and capability to
successfully deal with threats of terrorism. What is lacking is a concrete strategic
proactive counter terrorism approach, which makes SAPS stand out as the lead
department in countering terrorism. Yet, it should be borne in mind that the most
important principle of an anti-terrorism operational concept is to co-ordinate an operation
with an integrated approach. This can be done within a National counter terrorism Co-
ordinating Mechanism, which includes the disciplines of the SAPS (Crime Intelligence),
SANDF (Defence Intelligence), National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South
African Secret Service (SASS), as well as any other government department that needs to
be involved.
4.3. Manifestations of Terrorism in South Africa

South Africa is an open society with porous borders and a well-established infrastructure.
This in itself presents a fertile ground for individuals and groups who want to either
engage in terrorist activities or utilise the country as training grounds or hideouts. Over
the past year (2007), there have been reports of extremist activities, paramilitary camps
and extraordinary renditions of jihadi suspects in South Africa. This raises concern that
the country is being used for terrorist support activities (Terrorism Monitor, March 15).

In mid-March, Barry Gilder, coordinator of South Africa's National Intelligence
Coordinating Committee, indicated that terrorists with links to Afghanistan, Iraq and
Pakistan were increasingly spending time in the country (South African Press Association,
March 13). Gilder??s remarks made it clear that South Africa, due to political and
historical reasons, may be an unlikely target for attacks, but rather a safe haven where
support infrastructures might be available. Gilder also cited the terrorist use of the
country??s banks and a pattern of illegally obtained South African passports, which were
discovered on al-Qaeda suspects or their associates in Europe (South African Press
Association, March 13; Associated Press, July 27, 2004). In addition, Gilder indicated
that the government was aware of the possible existence of small-scale training grounds,
within the country, used by terrorists (Solomon, 2007).

Coinciding with Gilder??s official remarks, a Johannesburg magazine featured an expose
of an alleged jihadi training facility outside Port Elizabeth (Molotov Cocktail, March
2007). James Sanders, who published a history of South Africa's Secret Service under
apartheid, wrote the feature and provided photographs of the property—including images
of a rudimentary shooting range and makeshift mosque. Sanders claimed that members of
the Port Elizabeth-based Desai family operated the facility, which became functional in
the mid-1990s (Solomon, 2007).

The training facility is known as ??Greenbushes?? and is said to be situated approximately
25 miles outside Port Elizabeth on the Old Cape Road. Rumours persist that there are also
camps based at Vaal Dam in Gauteng, Camperdown in KwaZulu Natal and Schaap Kraal
in the Western Cape. The family associated with Greenbushes are the Desai??s of Port
Elizabeth. Nazier Desai is the head trainer and his cousin Ahmed Seddick Desai is the
financial manager. In particular, Moulana Nazier Desai is described in the Internet NIA
report as the ??Amir of South African Mujahideen??. The Desai??s, although wealthy in


91

their own right, also receive funding from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan. The
Desai family is in the process of building an Islamic Centre, Daru-Uloom in Malabar.

A substantial number of youths are recruited at the training camp are taught combat skills
and handling of firearms. The weapons employed are high-calibre handguns, R1 rifles
and AK 47s, all of which are illegal in South Africa. It is critical to recognise that the
existence of these training camps have not yet progressed to the level of terrorist activity
within South Africa??s borders. Nevertheless, sources report that trainees who have
attended training sessions at Greenbushes have been utilised as terrorist recruits in
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq (Solomon , 2007a).

There are also other reports of a terrorist presence in South Africa. A report dated 24
September 2001, less than two weeks after 9/11 reveals that Sheikh Abu Abdula[h], a
representative of Hamas visited South Africa in July 1996 and ??during a closed
meeting ?? stated that Hamas had decided to open an office in Port Elizabeth under the
cover of the ??Al-Aqsa International Foundation??. Abdula also paid a visit to the
paramilitary camp at Greenbushes, where he mentioned that the facility was too basic and
needed to be upgraded?? (Sanders, 2007). In addition, sources within the Tamil
community suggest that the Tamil Tigers also sponsor training within South Africa
(Solomon , 2007a).

In 2005, Minister Kasrils at a symposium also pointed out that:

There are groups in Africa that claim to be part of al-Qaeda and other
structures, and here in southern Africa they have been discovered
seeking refuge and quite possibly attempting to set up networks (Zavis,
2005).

In this regard, emerging reports suggest that Al-Qaeda cells are said to be in existence in
Cape Town and Durban. Al-Qaeda has been affiliated with two Cape Town movements,
People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and its associate, Qibla (Shillinger,
2006a).

There have also been a number of indications and incidences that highlight links between
South Africa and International terrorism:

• In 1998, The South African Government was asked to investigate reports that the
Sri Lankan Tamil Tiger rebels were setting up a base in Pretoria because their
London offices faced closure. The South African Department of Foreign Affairs,
through their investigations ascertained that there were support groups in Durban,
Johannesburg and Cape Town that offered support for the Tamil Tigers in Sri
Lanka (BBC, 1998). However, since 1998, allegations regarding developments of
the Tamil Tigers have subsided.

• In 1999, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, was arrested in Cape Town and deported to
the United States. Mohamed is now incarcerated for life due to the role he played
in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Mohamed


92

had entered South Africa under an alias, got a temporary residency permit, and
worked at a hamburger place for months until he tried to renew his permit and got
caught (Zavis, 2005).

• On April 25, 2001, Mohamed Suleman Vaid of Durban was arrested along with
his wife while attempting to smuggle $130,000 in local currency across the border
into Swaziland. The ensuing police investigation indicated ties to Al-Qaeda. Vaid,
who denied any connection with such groups, was carrying the funds to a
Lebanese businessperson in Mozambique who allegedly did have links with Al-
Qaeda. It was established that in the 18 months preceding his arrest, Vaid had
made 150 trips to Mozambique — roughly once every four days (Shillinger,
2006a).

• A South African businessperson, Johan Meyer, was charged with nuclear
trafficking in September 2004 as part of Pakistani scientist??s Abdul Qadeer
Khan??s secret network, which aided Libya in developing an atomic weapons
program. Johan Meyer appeared in a Johannesburg court on the charges of being
in possession of nuclear related material and of illegally importing and exporting
nuclear material.
(http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/09/04/1094234057171.html?from=storylhs).

• In 2004, two South Africans of Asian descent, Zoubair Ismail (a student) and
Feroze Ganchi (a doctor), were pinned down in a 12-hour gun battle between
Pakistani police and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a suspected al-Qaeda operative
wanted by the FBI for the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa. They were
arrested in the Pakistani city of Gujrat. The Pakistani police alleged that the two
men, who were found in possession of several South African maps, were plotting
a series of attacks on the U.S. Embassy and South Africa??s Union buildings in
Pretoria, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, a popular shopping district on the
Cape Town Waterfront, and the Queen Elizabeth 2 ocean liner. The South African
government deemed later that the evidence was insufficient (Shillinger, 2006a;
Zavis, 2005).

• In July 2005, authorities in Zambia captured and deported Haroon Rashid Aswat
to Britain. Aswat was accused of plotting to set up a camp in Bly, Oregon in 1999
to train militants to fight in Afghanistan. Aswat denied being a terrorist, but
Zambian investigators allege Aswat to be a bodyguard for al-Qaeda??s leader,
Usama bin Laden. Aswat was also questioned about the July 7 bombings in
London, but the London police have discounted any connection. Aswat, who has
family in Johannesburg, supported himself by selling Islamic CDs and DVDs at
flea markets (Zavis, 2005; Shillinger, 2006a).

• In January 2007, the United States and the United Nations moved to freeze the
assets of South African-based cousins Junaid and Farhad Dockrat for providing
material and financial support to Al-Qaeda. The cousins illustrate how jihadi
hubs—individuals with extensive social networks within the movement—can
become tentacles of support that facilitate the movement of human resources and


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capital to operationalise the organization. Junaid Dockrat allegedly transferred
US$ 120,000 to Hamza Rabia, the now deceased Al-Qaeda foreign operations
chief, in March and April 2004 to facilitate the movement of South Africans to
terrorist camps in Pakistan. The United States claims that he financed terrorism
through a US$ 62,900 gift he gave to the Taliban ambassador in Pakistan to be
forwarded to al-Akhtar Trust, an al-Qaeda charity front (Solomon, 2007b).

• The case of Abd al-Muhsin Al-Libi in 2004, further illustrates this trend of
prominent Al-Qaeda operatives using South Africa as a base for terrorist support
infrastructures. Al-Libi, also known as Ibrahim Tantouche, emerged in South
Africa in February 2004 when he was detained for holding a fake South African
passport. Later that year, British security agencies found boxes of South African
passports at the home of a suspected al-Qaeda member in Britain. The passports
were legitimate passports, not fakes, indicating that they were obtained illegally
through a South African government official (The Star [South Africa], July 28,
2004). There seems to be a good possibility that Al-Libi acquired the fake
passport through al-Qaeda support structures in South Africa (Solomon, 2007b).

• In November 2005, the mysterious deportation of Khalid Rashid (a Pakistani
national wanted by the British authorities for alleged links to terrorist activities)
brought South Africa into disrepute. It was alleged that the British and South
African governments were directly implicated in ??rendition??, a practice whereby
foreign nationals accused of terrorist involvement by a given government is
kidnapped and sent overseas to be interrogated, often tortured and sometimes
??disappeared.?? It was alleged that Rashid was deported to Pakistan, but his family
denied such statements (O?? Keefe, 2006)

• In addition, to allegations that South Africa supported acts of rendition, the case
of Saud Memon??s arrest on 7 March 2003, suggests that the South African
government gave United States intelligence agencies carte blanche to pursue their
??war on terror?? on South African soil. Memon was a lead suspect in the Daniel
Pearl murder (The Nation, 2007).

In essence, South Africa is regarded as the gateway to the rest of Africa, especially to
southern Africa (Zavis, 2005). However, as with other African countries, the threat
presented by terrorism is on the increase as evidenced by the situation of the GSPC
alliance with Al-Qaeda in Algeria and the situation in Somalia regarding the Supreme
Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) and their fight against Ethiopia and its ally the US. The
threat of terrorism in Africa can be seen to exist on two levels, namely as an external
threat and as an internal threat. While it is difficult to assess the extent to which Islamic
radicals may have penetrated southern Africa and particularly South Africa, the region is
attractive as a base and largely off the security radar as pressure mounts on Al-Qaeda and
its associates in northern and eastern Africa (Zavis, 2005).



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4.4. Domestic Terrorism in South Africa

Terrorism in South Africa is not a new phenomenon. Pre-1994, groups such as the ANC
and the SACP were pronounced terrorists by the Apartheid State. However, these groups,
post-1994, acclaimed their status as liberation groups aiming for a democratic
dispensation. These groups successfully transcended into the ruling parties of the new
democratic state. Again, in 1998, the country saw an upsurge in terrorist threats and
activities emanate from groups such as People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)
and the Boeremag. These two groups emerged as impending threats to the fledgling
democracy and demanded the attention of the South African government. This section
will provide a brief overview on these two indigenous terrorist groups, the extent of their
threats and activities, as well as the Republics response to these threats.
4.4.1. PAGAD
During the period 1998-2000, South Africa experienced a new wave of terrorism, centred
mostly in Southern Cape Town. No one claimed responsibility for the terrorist acts, but
government officials tended to ascribe them to a Muslim vigilante group, known as
PAGAD.
PAGAD was established in Cape Town in 1996 as a community anti-crime group. Its
official goals are propaganda-oriented and peaceful. The group saw the government as
unable to solve the crime problem, and regarded the police as a corrupt mechanism,
affiliated with gangsters. As a result, PAGAD members embarked on a course of
vigilantism. PAGAD??s national body approved the following aims and objectives for the
organisation:
• to propagate the eradication of drugs and gangsterism from society, in accordance
with the divine will of The Creator;
• to co-operate with and to co-ordinate the activities of people and people??s
organisations which have similar aims and objectives [to those of PAGAD];
• to make every effort to invite/motivate/activate and to include those people and
peoples?? organisations who are not yet part of PAGAD; and
• to raise funds for the aforementioned aims.
The group began by taking action against crime and drug trafficking in the form of mass
marches and by creating educational and rehabilitation programs (Roller, 2000).
4.4.1.1. Structure of PAGAD
PAGAD was composed of five regional branches and a number of central ??departments,??
or workgroups/forums. These include a forum for women, youth, and senior citizens, and
a security department. A central coordinating working team controlled all of these. The
organization had a very clear hierarchical structure that distributed authority and enabled
specialization (refer to Annexure 6 on an illustrative example of the structure of PAGAD)
(Botha, 2001).


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4.4.1.2. Profile of PAGAD Terrorist Activities

PAGAD??s most publicised attack was the bomb blast at the Planet Hollywood
restaurant on 25 August 1998, which killed two people. This attack prompted the U.S.
State Department to add the PAGAD group to its list of terrorist organizations; a step
that allows the US to prevent the group??s members from receiving visas, and enables
the deportation of the organizations?? activist from the US (Roller, 2000). An expose of
terrorist acts committed by PAGAD during the 1998 – 2000 period and exclusive to
Cape Town include:

Information Box 4.1 : List of PAGAD targets 1998-2000

25 August 1998 Bombing of Planet Hollywood.

1 January 1999 A car bomb exploded at the V and A Waterfront shopping
Complex.

8 January 1999 Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet was petrol-bombed in Athlone.

28 January 1999 A car bomb exploded outside Caledon Square police
headquarters.

9 May 1999 Car bomb exploded outside the Athlone police station.

28 November 1999 Bomb blast at St Elmo??s pizzeria.

4 May 2000 Assassination of a key witness.

22 May 2000 Police deactivated a pipe bomb outside the New York Bagels
restaurant in Sea Point.

10 June 2000 A car bomb was detonated outside the New York Bagels
restaurant, injuring three people.

11 August 2000 An explosive device in a motor vehicle detonated outside the
Zanzibar coffee shop.

19 August 2000 A car bomb exploded outside the Bronx nightclub.

29 August 2000 A car bomb was detonated near the United States consulate in
Cape Town.

7 September 2000 Regional court magistrate, Piet Theron, who was the presiding
officer in a number of PAGAD trials, was assassinated.

8 September 2000 A car bomb exploded outside the Obz Caf?? in the Cape Town
Source: Botha, 2001


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Despite PAGAD??s denial of not being involved in terrorist activities, the South African
security forces had evidence—even if some of it is circumstantial—linking PAGAD to
terrorism. For instance, the police considered the assassination of a Judge Pieter
Theron in September 2000 who was involved in cases dealing with PAGAD members
as a confirmation of the group??s sinister motives (Kritzman, 2000).
4.4.1.3. The Qibla Movement and its affiliation to PAGAD

It was the ideological and spiritual environment created by Qibla that led to the
emergence of PAGAD on 9 December 1995. Another major factor in the emergence of
this organization was the extraordinarily high crime rate in the Western Cape. Indeed
PAGAD??s initial primary objective was to serve as a broad anti-crime front (Botha, 2005).
The Qibla Movement was identified in South Africa in the early 1980s. The Movement
aimed to promote the ideals of the Iranian revolution in South Africa and transform South
Africa into an Islamic state, under the slogan ??One Solution, Islamic Revolution?? (Roller,
2000).

Qibla in South Africa, is affiliated to Iran and the Iranian Intelligence Agency. This
agency is able to manipulate the movement from a safe distance instilling Iranian
propaganda and facilitating espionage activities in SA. In order to broaden its support
base inside the South African Muslim community, Qibla allied itself with the following
tenets:

• Played a key role in the formation of the Western Cape-based Islamic Unity
Convention (IUC), which was formed in 1994 to serve as an umbrella
organization for more than 250 Muslim groups. The objective of the IUC is to
promote Islamic unity in South Africa, as a precursor for an Iranian-style Islamic
revolution in the country.
• Positioned itself as the driving force behind the militant components in PAGAD;
the G-Force.
• Assumed control over the IUC??s Radio 786. This medium proved to be useful in
mobilizing individuals within the Muslim community (Botha, 2001).

4.4.1.4. PAGAD??s modus operandi

Throughout its existence, PAGAD has adopted a militant approach to achieve its
objectives. This is evident from the organisation??s paramilitary style attacks on the homes
of suspected drug dealers — primarily by PAGAD G-force members, and mass marches
by PAGAD supporters. The marches were intended to serve as a popular show of force,
and to present suspected drug dealers with threatening ultimatums to cease their
??nefarious?? activities (Desai, 2004).

PAGAD employed a dual strategy. On the one hand, PAGAD engaged in a number of
??overt?? and largely legal activities. At the same time, some members of the organisation
engaged in ??covert?? activities that were violent and illegal. Such a dual strategy allowed
PAGAD??s overt leadership to publicly, dissociate itself from the illegal activities of its
??covert?? members. A danger inherent to this strategy was that the ??covert wing?? of the


97

organisation could attempt to operate independently and beyond the control of the
organisation??s formal and ??overt?? leadership. That is, individuals in the organisation??s
??covert wing?? could lose sight of the aims and objectives of the larger movement and
develop their own agenda for action (Botha, 2005).

PAGAD proved to be a formidable challenge for the South African government. Whilst
initially advocating a campaign against gangsterism and drugs, the group subtly evolved
to propagate its ideologies and disregard for certain structures and systems of the South
African government. This together with their association with international terrorist
organisations such as Qibla established PAGAD??s existence as a terrorist organisation
within the country.
4.4.2. The Boeremag

In 2002, the Republic found itself again facing the threat of domestic terrorism; only this
time, the threat stemmed from the extreme right wing known as the ??Boeremag??. The
Boeremag (Afrikaans for Boer Force) is allegedly a South African right-wing activism
group with white separatist aims and is accused of planning to overthrow the ruling
African National Congress government, reminiscent of the era when Boers administered
independent republics during the 19th century following the Great Trek
(http://boervolk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=316).

The objective of the Boeremag was to implement what they called the ??Contingency
Plan??, which refers to five phases culminating in the Boer forces taking over the country
by force and establishing a Boer Republic.

• Phase 1 - Organisational phase: During this phase the military wing of a new Boer
government is established. Information is gathered on; inter alia, military
installations, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), the cabinet
and parliament with a view of taking over or destroying these institutions and
other logistical and strategic key points. Boer personnel are identified to protect
the country??s towns and cities, and other important key points, which should not
be destroyed. During this phase, the Boers of the Western and Eastern Cape, and
KwaZulu-Natal are informed where they should report for duty.

• Phase 2 - Creating chaos to achieve freedom of movement: This phase is activated
by black attacks on the white community, or a Boer attack on the country??s
infrastructure to create widespread chaos (a Boer attack should appear to be the
work of Jews or Muslims). The resulting chaos will allow the Boer forces to move
freely and mobilise support without much government resistance.

• Phase 3 - Coup d????tat: During this phase the military wing of the Boer
government comes into operation, and some 4,000 men are mobilised
countrywide. The Odal rune—the battle insignia of the Boer forces—is displayed
openly. This phase includes: interrupting the electricity supply to the greater
Johannesburg area and Bloemfontein for ten days; the elimination of Boer traitors;
the takeover of Radio Pretoria, Radio Oranje and Radio Jakaranda; the takeover
or destruction of SANDF and SAPS aircrafts; the looting of military and police


98

ammunition stores; the takeover of all SANDF bases containing military vehicles;
the takeover of the National Intelligence Agency??s headquarters and fuel depots;
the freeing of incarcerated right wingers and convicted apartheid-era police
operatives and the safeguarding of the railway line between Prieska and L??deritz.

• Phase 4 - Occupation of secondary targets and expulsion of blacks: During this
phase the Boer forces take over secondary targets throughout the country, such as
harbours and commercial airports, all other radio stations, telephone exchanges,
water reservoirs, hospitals, engineering works, abattoirs and large shopping
centres and food depots. Blacks and Indians will be instructed to leave the country
or settle in KwaZulu-Natal. To entice blacks and Indians to do so, food will be
made available along roads leading out of the country and to KwaZulu-Natal. At
the same time, black and Indian residential areas outside of KwaZulu-Natal will
be bombarded to drive their inhabitants out of South Africa.

• Phase 5 - Implement a new government: This last phase comes into operation
once most black people have been expelled from the country outside of KwaZulu-
Natal and the security situation has been stabilised. The military wing of the new
government, in co-operation with the Boer president would appoint the political
arm of the new government which starts governing the newly established Boer
Republic (Schonteich and Boshoff, 2003)

The purpose of the Boeremag as an organization was to, among other things:

• Organize the community according to the contingency plan;
• Recruit, train and employ receptive Boers in military structures and commandos;
• Infiltrate military and police structures to obtain weapons, ammunition and
communication equipment;
• Attack selected targets according to the contingency plan; and
• Employ strict security measures to prevent infiltration of the Boeremag by state
security and intelligence agencies (Schonteich and Boshoff, 2003)

4.4.2.1. Structure of the Boeremag

Unlike the typical right wing saboteur of the early 1990s, the alleged Boeremag members
were not predominantly farmers, blue-collar mineworkers or socially marginal
individuals. Many of them were middle class family men, and some held senior positions
in the South African National Defence Force. From the information contained in the
confiscated documents, it is likely that the Boeremag adopted an organisational structure
used by successful guerrilla or terrorist organisations throughout the world to minimise
their risk of being infiltrated by state intelligence agents. It was therefore possible that the
Boeremag was organised into small cells consisting of three or four people, co-ordinated
into commandos and sectors (refer to Annexure 6 on structure of Boeremag) (Schonteich
and Boshoff, 2003).



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4.4.2.2. Profile of Boeremag Terrorist Activities

A few isolated but violent incidences after the advent of democracy in 1994, revealed the
possible existence of extreme right wing activists in the country:

• In early 1997, a dozen right-wingers attempted to steal weapons and military
equipment from the Pomfret military base in the Northern Cape Province;
• In May 1998, a group of men broke into the Tempe army base in Bloemfontein
and stole over 100 weapons including machine guns, rocket propellers, grenades,
mortars and night vision equipment;
• In March 2002, members of the Boeremag were arrested for allegedly trying to
blow up the Vaal dam;
• In late 2002, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) revealed that a group calling
itself the Boere Vryheids Aksie planned to bomb SA??s Parliament as well as
poison water reserves in Soweto, Atteridgeville, Soshanguve, and Laudium;
• On 30 October 2002, eight bomb blasts were set off in Soweto. Seven of the
blasts destroyed commuter railway lines inconveniencing 200 000 commuters and
the eighth blast occurred at a mosque forcing parts of the building to collapse
(Schonteich and Boshoff, 2003).

Nonetheless, during the latter part of 2002, almost two dozen alleged Boeremag members
were arrested and charged with terrorism-related offences, sabotage and high treason.
Commissioner Jackie Selebi revealed that there were 100 key Boeremag members in the
country, many of whom had access to defence weapons. During 2002, nearly 23
Boeremag members were detained for trial and as at September 2007, the defence has not
yet begun. It should be borne in mind that the threat of the extreme right wing has not
vanished and could re-emerge.
4.5. Operational Responses by the State to Domestic Terrorism since 1996

The state??s response to the right wing threat of the Boeremag differed from the way it
dealt with PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs). The operations against
PAGAD were co-ordinated within the National Operational Co-ordinating Committee
(NOCOC), involving the SAPS, SANDF, NIA and local security agencies. The aim of
the operations against PAGAD was to stabilise the urban terror situation in the Western
Cape and arrest the perpetrators. Five distinct operations were launched by the security
forces in response to the threats emanating from PAGAD: Operations Recoil, Saladin,
Good Hope, Crackdown and Lancer.

The operations against the Boeremag, on the other hand, were codenamed ??Operation
Zealot?? and ??Operation Hopper??. Given the sensitive nature of the right wing threat, and
the danger of isolated security force collusion with the white right, the operational aspects
of Operation Zealot and Hopper were co-ordinated and executed exclusively by SAPS at
national level. Co-ordination on the strategic level took place between the SAPS, Defence
Intelligence and the NIA, within the ambit of the National Intelligence Co-ordinating
Committee (NICOC).


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4.5.1. Operation Recoil

Operation Recoil was initiated in October 1997, to counter growing levels of insecurity
and inter-gang warfare in the greater Cape Town area. PAGAD attacks for the period
January to August 1997 accounted for 111 incidents, whereas gang-to-gang violence
accounted for 75. The operational concept that was decided upon during the joint
National Operating Coordinating Committee and Provincial Operating Coordinating
Committee (NOCOC/POCOC) Western Cape planning meeting included the following:
an intelligence-driven factor; a high-density crime prevention factor; investigating task
groups, and co-ordination and visible force levels. The co-ordination of Operation Recoil
was handled in the following way:

• Co-ordination of the operation was conducted through the NOCOC and POCOC
structures;
• Intelligence co-ordination was implemented by a Provincial Intelligence Co-
ordinating Committee (PICOC) to co-ordinate with the POCOC structure; and
• Members from NOCOC visited the POCOC for joint planning and evaluation
sessions on a regular basis (Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001).

The visible force levels required by Operation Recoil led to an integrated operational
capacity that was expanded to include more than 1,000 members of the SANDF and
SAPS. The concept of Operation Recoil was established on the principle of flooding
flashpoint areas with high-density security force deployment by way of mobile visible
patrols as well as cordon and search operations, in order to flush out criminals at such
flashpoint areas.

This strategy also improved the SAPS' ability to synchronise and focus high-density
deployment in flashpoint areas, as determined by weekly crime pattern analyses
submitted by crime information managers at SAPS station and area levels, as well as
strategic crime tendency analyses conducted by the intelligence co-ordinate structures.
From October 1997 to January 1998, the visible high-density contingent of Operation
Recoil resulted in 7,437 arrests, inclusive of certain serious crime categories (Boshoff,
Botha and Schonteich, 2001).
4.5.2. Operation Saladin

By early January 1998, it seemed that the specific focus of PAGAD had changed and that
pipe bomb attacks and drive-by shootings aimed at the police, drug dealers and Muslim
businesspersons were on the increase. The response of the state necessitated a more
intelligence-driven operation. Operation Saladin, which was formed within Operation
Recoil, was established and was aimed at detecting and monitoring the perpetrators of
acts of urban terrorism in both gangs and PAGAD (Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich,
2001).

Operation Saladin was triggered on 12 January 1998, to ensure a decrease in incidents of
urban terrorism in the Western Cape. The operation involved both operational and
intelligence members from the SAPS, SANDF and NIA (National Intelligence Agency).



101

Operation Saladin consisted of a detection and monitoring element made up mainly of
SAPS intelligence field workers and SANDF observation teams. The aim was to monitor
suspects and communicate possible attacks to the Joint Operational Centre (JOC) in Cape
Town, which would react by deploying forces in the area concerned. A quick reaction
force also intercepted suspected potential perpetrators prior or post interaction with the
target. A further element of the operation entailed the deployment of high-density forces
of Operational Recoil in the proximity of the intended target, to act as an additional
deterrent to would-be perpetrators (Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001).
Figure 4.1: Operational Concept - Operation Saladin



Source: Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001


The objectives of Operation Saladin were:

• To detect and monitor perpetrators of acts of urban terrorism in both gangs and
PAGAD;
• To provide early warning, on-the-spot operational intelligence, visible policing,
and to assist with POCOC operations;
• To frustrate the access of perpetrators of urban terrorism to their intended targets;
and
• To ensure the effective interception of perpetrators of acts of terrorism both
before and after attacks.

The success of Operation Saladin was that while it acted as a deterrent to prevent acts of
urban terrorism and gang-related violence, it also led to the arrest of people involved in
acts of terrorism. However, during December 1998 and January 1999, the nature of the
threat of urban terrorism changed in emphasis and target. The shift in emphasis by
perpetrators of urban terrorism resulted in the targeting of both the security forces and the
public. The rapid response by the security forces to this new threat resulted in a
modification of the operational concept, and was achieved by combining operations


102

Recoil and Saladin into one operation: Operation Good Hope (Boshoff, Botha and
Schonteich, 2001).

4.5.3. Operation Good Hope

The attacks during December 1998 and January 1999 aimed at the SAPS and at civilians
in the Western Cape resulted in a change of strategy to counter urban terrorism.
Operation Good Hope was initiated in January 1999. Operation Good Hope required an
immediate increase in security force levels that were extended to include more than 1,200
members, inclusive of SAPS/SANDF members, but excluding the local station police in
Cape Town (Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001).

The new operational concept was planned to be intelligence-driven in specifically
focused areas; investigative; protective of specific targets; in liaison with communities,
and co-ordinated by NOCOC/POCOC in Western Cape.

Figure 4.2: Operational Concept - Operation Good Hope


Source: Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001


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The intelligence-driven aspect of the operation focused on both tactical intelligence
gathering, and dedicated court-directed intelligence gathering. The operation was
executed by focusing on establishing operations regarding urban terrorism such as
tactical intervention, crowd management and high-risk operations (Boshoff, Botha and
Schonteich, 2001).

This strategy resulted in a major decline in acts of urban terrorism in the Western Cape
and the arrest of individuals involved in such acts.

Table 4.1: Success achieved by Operation Good Hope

Item Number
Arrests for various
crimes* 4,014
Firearms recovered 489
Vehicles recovered 327
Ammunition
recovered 5,803
Total
(Source: Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001)

There was a remarkable decline in acts of urban terrorism, as well as gang-related
incidents when comparing incidents in 1998, 1999, with that of 2000. It is thus clear that
the state's response to curb urban terrorism was successful (Boshoff, Botha and
Schonteich, 2001).

The biggest problem experienced during the start of Operation Good Hope was the co-
ordination of tactical intelligence between the role players, as well as those of the
investigation units. Although the strategic concept behind the operation depended on
intelligence-driven operations, the initial drive for Operation Good Hope was based on
intelligence generated by operational personnel. As the operation proceeded, the
intelligence flow also improved, resulting in positive arrests in connection with urban
terrorism and gang-related crime (Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001).
4.5.4. Operation Crackdown

In his speech at the opening of parliament in early 1999, President Thabo Mbeki stated
that ??multi-disciplinary?? interventions would be introduced in areas of high crime
concentrations, including all crimes of violence. POCOC??s response was the execution of
integrated high-density, intelligence-driven operations in the identified crime-combating
zones, from April 2000 to April 2001, in an operation known as Operation Crackdown.

The concept comprised two main strategies. These were the serious and violent crime
stabilisation or geographical approach, and the organised-crime strategy, both of which
were supported by multi-disciplinary interventions. Multi-disciplinary interventions


104

included an approach, which ensured socio-economic development and social crime
prevention efforts (Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001).

The Crime Combating zones consisted of Task Groups with the following elements:

• Stability component (public order police, crime prevention, air wing, special task
force);
• Intelligence component (crime intelligence with the support of other intelligence
agencies);
• Investigation component (detective services in co-operation with other agencies
such as the Scorpions);
• Crime prevention component;
• Communication component (SAPS Communication Services in co-operation with
other role players); and
• Legal component (SAPS legal officers).

The entire operation was co-ordinated by the NOCOC. During the first three months of
Operation Crackdown noticeable successes were achieved in the Western Cape (Table
4.2) (Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001).

Table 4.2: Successes of Operation Crackdown in the Western Cape

Item number
Vehicles recovered 621
Revolvers recovered 365
AK-47 assault rifles
recovered 2
R1/R4/R5s recovered 3
Shotguns recovered 11
Ammunition recovered 2,928
Total
(Source: Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001)

The recovery of stolen motor vehicles including arms and ammunition was indicative of
the police reducing the resources which PAGAD relied upon for their illegal activities.
4.5.5. Operation Lancer

On 15 September 2001, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States,
Operation Lancer was operationalised in the Western Cape as a precaution to any
potential terrorist??s attacks on United States interest in South Africa. The operation was
expanded to cover the whole of South Africa. The operational concept was based on:

• Intelligence gathering aimed at successfully prosecution in court;
• Investigation;
• Prevention of attack to terrorist Targets; and


105

• Common sense strategy to prevent urban terrorism.

Through theses concepts, Operation Lancer managed to reduce PAGAD related incidents
to only nine during 2001.
4.5.6. Operation Zealot and Hopper

On an operational level, a team of investigators were assembled from specialist police
units, including bomb disposal experts, crime intelligence, serious and violent crime
detectives, and forensic units. The SAPS?? operational co-ordination on Operation Zealot
and Hopper occurred through the following institutional components:

• Crime intelligence: This is the police??s Crimes against the State (CATS) Unit,
which is responsible for intelligence gathering and investigation of crimes against
the state, including illegal right wing activities. To deal with the Boeremag threat
the police??s CATS component was strengthened by police officers from provinces
where right wing activity was suspected.

• Serious and violent crimes: This is a component of the police??s detective services,
and includes the CATS Unit. The police??s serious and violent crimes component
is responsible for investigating serious crimes involving violence, including acts
of terrorism committed by the Boeremag.

• Operational response services: The Intervention Units of the Public Order Police
protect police investigators during arrests, engage in search operations and protect
crime scenes. Operational response services include the Special Task Force,
which provides armed backup to the regular police in high-risk operations
(Boshoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001).

The above-mentioned specialised police unit proved imperative in negating the threat
posed by the Boeremag. Critical within these elements was the elements of crime
intelligence and their collaboration and coordination with the latter two specialised units.
4.6. The South African Counter Terrorism Strategy

The South African counter terrorism strategy became prevalent upon reacting to
imminent threats of terrorism. The most popular and crucial counter terrorism response
was required against the threats posed by PAGAD and Boeremag. Both these terrorist
entities had the capability of destabilising the state of order in South Africa. The response
by the South Africa Government was the integrated approach by key departments such
SAPS, SANDF, and the intelligence community. Strategies were then bolstered to
respond to elements of terror. This section provides an overview of the response of these
agencies and the supplementation of other factors that aid in the contribution of
countering terrorism such as legislation.


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4.6.1. Enabling legislation

Taking into consideration the afore-mentioned domestic acts of terrorism and the rise of
international terrorism as witnessed by the attacks of 9/11, South Africa in 2002 began
considering the introduction of additional legislation to counter terrorism. However, the
tabling of the Anti-Terrorism Bill in 2002 was met with much public anger and
discontentment from civil society at large. The resistance stemmed primarily from the
fact that draconian powers would be given to South African law enforcement agencies to
investigate and deal with acts of terror (Buccas and Nadvi, 2005).

These powers would invoke reminiscence of a history of an era of apartheid policing
which the country has struggled against for liberation. The Bill and the Act, which was
adopted in 2004, will be reflected upon; however, any Bill or Act against terrorism will
be expected to be met with scepticism in a country, which once depended on terrorism as
a tool for its emancipation.
4.6.1.1 The Anti-Terrorism Bill

The Anti-Terrorism Bill (B12 of 2003) was destined for a contentious reception in the
South African community. Firstly, the concept of ??terrorism?? encapsulated in the Bill was
vague and further heightened fears that the Anti-Terrorism Bill would impact seriously
on civil liberties. For South African legislators, the Bill had to be seen in light of the
following sections enshrined in the Constitution Act 108 of 1996:

Those sections that were considered to support the Bill

Section 12(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which
includes the right – ??
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private
sources

Section 198 (a) National Security must reflect the resolve of Africans, as
individuals and as a Nation??to be free from fear

Those sections seen to oppose the Bill

Section 14: Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have
(a) their person or home searched;
(b) their property searched
(c) their possessions seized; or
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed

Section 16 (1) and (2): Everyone has the right to freedom of expression

Section 17: Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to
demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions.



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Section 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of association.

In light of these rights, academics and civil society organisations alike, argued that the
South African current statute books contained numerous laws that could be used to
combat terrorism and related criminal activities.

The State had at its dispense laws that protected the country??s internal security (much of
it remnants of legislation enacted before 1994); permitted the state to restrict gatherings
and demonstrations; enhanced the state's power to collect information on suspected
terrorist organisations; and targeted terrorism's foot soldiers and sources of money,
criminal gangs and organised criminal groups respectively (Refer to Annexure 7 on
additional legislation enacted to counter terrorism). Pertinent laws included the 1962
General Law Amendment Act, which criminalised sabotage to include tampering with
any property and the Terrorist Act of 1967, which rendered participation in terrorist
activities as a crime, and allowed detention of suspected criminals without a time limit
(Kritzman, 2002). Nevertheless, like illustrated in Chapter 3, varying pieces of legislation
on countering terrorism is not as effective as a comprehensive legislation on countering
terrorism.

In 1996, the new South African legislature passed the Safety Matters Rationalization Act
that repealed a number of the more problematic security statutes. A new policy was
devised shortly thereafter that promoted a strategy to uphold the rule of law, which does
not resort to any form of general and indiscriminate repression; defends and upholds the
freedom and security for all; and acknowledges and respects the country's obligations to
the international community. In 1998, the South African law Commission began
reviewing South African security legislation. In 1999, the South African Police Service
drafted an Anti-Terrorism Bill that was then submitted to the Law Commission for
review, which then emerged as the final draft of an Anti-Terrorism Bill in 2000. It
implemented into law the idea of ??terrorist acts?? and ??terrorist organizations??. It then
implemented powers to stop and search vehicles and person, detention for the purpose of
interrogation of individuals suspected of withholding information (Vadi, 2007).
The South African Human Rights Commission came out against the bill arguing that the
definition of terrorism was ??too wide?? and could be used against road blockades and trade
union activities. The Human Rights Commission also argued that the law involved
excessive powers and could infringe on civil liberties. One of the most controversial
powers in the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2000 was the detention clause, which allowed for
detention without trial for up to 14 days. According to the Minister of Safety and
Security, one of the larger problems with the state of South African law was the failure to
acknowledge terrorism as a crime (Human Rights Watch, 2003).
While the world unites to condemn those dastardly acts in the United
States, we have to skirt around the issue. We go around making
promises to cooperate with everyone but as our law stands, we cannot
deal with terrorism. We are the only country that refuses to look
terrorism in the face as a unique crime (Munusamy, 2001).??


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In early 2001, the then Minister of Safety and Security, the late Steve Tshwete, and the
then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Penuell Maduna, argued that
new anti-terrorism legislation was necessary to prevent South Africa becoming a ??safe
haven?? for international terrorists.
Despite the views of then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development Maduna,
between 2003 and 2004 a number of organizations and experts came forward with their
concerns regarding the proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill. In June 2003, Business Day
reported that veteran human rights lawyer George Bizos declared the bill vague and
unconstitutional (Kritzman, 2002). The Legal Resources Centre, on then other hand,
questioned the procedures behind declaring an organization ??a terrorist organization??.
According to the bill, an organisation can be proscribed by the Minister, but organisations
may then question that decision. The Centre argued that ??[t]his effectively shifts the onus
of the potentially proscribed organization and calls upon it to defend itself after it has
effectively already been found guilty.?? According to the Mail and Guardian, the LRC
argued: ??Vagueness and ambiguity in legislation is an invitation for abuse??
(www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml).
At this same time, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) submitted its
own comments on the draft bill:
If enacted in its current form the Bill is likely to make serious inroads
into Constitutional rights and freedoms. The broad definition of what
constitutes a ??terrorist act?? poses a serious threat to our hard won
democracy, allowing for legitimate mass action by workers or other
social movements at some time in the future to be demonised and
categorised as ??terrorist??. For example the bill defines any activity that
might result in the ??disruption of essential public services?? as a
??terrorist?? act. For unions in the public sector, this is a worryingly vague
clause. Would the threatened wildcat strike in Johannesburg??s
emergency services be classed as ??terrorism???
COSATU called for a parliamentary review and a review conducted by the South African
Human Rights Commission. COSATU also picked up on the question raised earlier about
the clause that allowed detention without trial, ??through the back door??. In the original bill
there were provisions for detention without trial but that was removed by the Law
Commission. And according to Business Day,
Justice Minister Penuell Maduna is on record as saying that SA's history
of detention without trial meant the new democratic order would never
countenance provisions allowing its practice (Kritzman, 2002).
But then during the hearings regarding the bill, the chairman of the Parliament's justice
committee told the committee that there was a little clause allowing detention without
trial. A professor of international law at the University of SA concurred.
Special bail procedures apply that in effect bring back detention without
trial through the back door, which is another instance of particularly


109

devious legislative drafting, especially because a lot of media hype was
created about the alleged dropping of detention without trial in the new
bill (www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml).
In this situation, the accused are required to provide exceptional circumstances for his or
her release on bail. ??The onus rests on the accused to prove a position rather than on the
state to prove bail should be denied.?? The Freedom of Expression Institute echoed these
concerns, claiming that this was again modeled from the Canadian statute, without regard
to the fact that this power was also modeled on Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure
Act, which was used repeatedly against journalists in the past. At the end of February
2004, the bill was temporarily set aside after strike threats from COSATU. The Bill was
later reintroduced in the latter part of 2004 with amendments and incorporation of the
above-mentioned concerns and passed in November 2004 by Parliament (Kritzman,
2002).
4.6.1.2. Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and Related
Activities Act
On 20 May 2005, President Mbeki by proclamation implemented the Protection of
Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and Related Activities Act, 2004 (Act No.
33 of 2004) (See Annexure 8).
The Act makes the Republic of South Africa fully compliant with UN Counter Terrorism
Conventions and Protocols, as well as the AU Convention on the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism (Thomashausen, 2007:22). It creates a general offence of
terrorism, and offences relating to terrorist activities, such as recruitment, assistance to
commit terrorist activities, and the facilitation of terrorist activities. Furthermore, it
provides for the specific offences required by the relevant international instruments to be
enacted by States, such as terrorist bombings, financing of terrorism, hijacking of
aeroplanes, fixed platforms, and ships, hostage- taking and offences related to protected
persons including diplomatic personnel. The Act therefore equips the law enforcement
agencies in the Republic to effectively deal with both international and domestic terrorist
activities (Simelane, 2007)

Incorporated within the Act further are provisions for investigative powers, similar to
those in respect of organized crime, powers of cordoning off, search and seizure, and the
surrendering of suspects in respect to other States with jurisdiction in cases where a
person is not prosecuted within the Republic. It removes the political exception in respect
of terrorist offences, in relation to extradition. The Act criminalises hoaxes, such as the
anthrax hoaxes, which were prevalent the world over, including South Africa, after the 11
September 2001 attacks on the United States of America. Any threat, attempt, conspiracy
and inducing another person to commit an offence, is deemed an offence in terms of the
Act. The Act provides the necessary framework and authority to combat terrorism
effectively (http://www.saps.gov.za/docspubls/publications/journal/aug05/terroristattacks.htm).





110

4.6.2. Curbing Money Laundering

On 28 September, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1373, requiring member
states to trace, freeze and confiscate funds destined to support terrorism. The resolution
echoed the International Convention for the Financing of Terrorism (1999), and
established a committee to oversee implementation. Member states are obligated to
report steps taken to ensure compliance with Resolution 1373. Money laundering,
customs abuse and trafficking in arms and narcotics are prevalent problems throughout
the Southern African region, all of which present terrorist groups with potential means of
raising funds. South African crime analyst Charles Goredema affirms that southern
Africa ??is equally attractive to legitimate entrepreneurs and terrorist groups and money
launderers. The contemporary reality is that the region is characterized by little policing,
inadequate legislation and understaffed and under-resourced law-enforcement agencies.??
(Shillinger, 2006a)

The trend to adopt a tough approach against money laundering appears to be
internationally well established. In 1999, the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money
Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) was founded as one of the African initiatives to
effectively deal with curbing money laundering and comprised of countries such as
Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The ultimate
objective of measures against money laundering is to curb the concealment of the
fruits/proceeds of illegitimate activity. At the same time, it is hoped that the instruments
by which such activity is carried out will also be identified, traced and confiscated. As
economies grow and commercial networks proliferate, the scope for their abuse by
criminals expands. In the long term, the goals are to prevent the abuse of ??corporate
vehicles?? such as trust funds, foundations or professional partnerships to deal in or
convert proceeds of crime. Invariably, this calls for informed regulation of corporate
financial entities. International treaty obligations may impose an additional duty to co-
operate with foreign entities in combating money laundering (Goredema, 2002).

In terms of International Treaties, Palermo requires states to facilitate international co-
operation and the exchange of information among the administrative, regulatory and law
enforcement authorities dedicated to combating money laundering. The Palermo
Convention requires each state to establish:

A comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks
and non-bank financial institutions and, where appropriate, other bodies
particularly susceptible to money-laundering, within its competence, in
order to deter and detect all forms of money-laundering
(www.unodc.org/palermo/)

The regulatory entity mentioned in the Palermo Convention must emphasise requirements
for customer identification, record keeping and the reporting of suspicious transactions
including licensing and operating rules. Government??s reactive entity must maintain
structures for the investigation and punishment of proscribed activities. Furthermore, it
entails the provision of adequate human, financial and technical resources to ensure
effective administrative and investigative functions (Goredema, 2002).


111


An integral part of the fight against money laundering is to have access to financial
information in order to assist in investigations. The primary goal of financial
investigations is to identify, trace and document the movement of funds; to identify and
locate assets that are subject to law enforcement measures; and to support the prosecution
of criminal activity. Financial intelligence units (FIUs) have an increasingly important
role to play in the international effort to detect and combat money laundering. They are
defined as agencies that receive reports of suspicious transactions from financial
institutions and other persons and entities, analyse them, and disseminate the resulting
intelligence to local law enforcement agencies and foreign FIUs to combat money
laundering (Gwintsa, 2005). In recent years, the functions of FIUs have been broadened
to cover the combating of terrorist financing. Their coverage has also widened from
covering financial institutions to encompassing other non-financial entities. These
additional responsibilities have resulted in FIUs facing new challenges in information
analysis and institutional capacity (Gwintsa, 2005).

In 2003, the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering (FATF), which is a
leading inter-governmental body in the development and promotion of policies to combat
money laundering and terrorist financing, revised its Forty Recommendations on Anti-
Money Laundering. The FATF adopted the revised Eight Special Recommendations on
combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The FATF recommends that
legal and practical limitations should not be avoided giving feedback to reporting
institutions. Agencies that receive suspicious transaction reports are urged to devise
appropriate feedback procedures, consider limitations but also facilitate feedback
(Gwintsa, 2005).

In terms of money laundering, the above is indicative of the global and state commitment
to curbing illicit transfer of money to facilitate terrorist activities.
4.7. South Africa??s counter terrorism operational approach

The strategy currently used in South Africa??s counter terrorism approach has been
operationalised in an anti-terrorism operational concept based on co-ordination and co-
operation between the following entities: intelligence, operations, investigations,
protection and communication. This is done within the disciplines of SAPS, SANDF,
NIA and the SASS, as well as any other government department that needs to be involved.
The intelligence community is responsible for gathering tactical and co-ordinated, court-
directed intelligence. Operations based on intelligence are executed to stabilise a focus
area, conduct tactical intervention regarding urban terrorism and crowd management, and
effectively control high-risk operations. Investigations are conducted with the specific
intention of ensuring successful prosecutions (Boschoff, Botha and Schonteich, 2001).

The only problem with this approach is that there is no co-ordination mechanism for the
integration of efforts with respect to counter terrorism in the various disciplines of SAPS,
NIA, SASS, NICOC, and Defence Intelligence (DI). It is almost reminiscent of the US
case in which each works independent of each other and feeds into the saying: ??at times
the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing?? This approach allows for
loopholes and duplication of work in most instances.


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4.8. Measuring the effectiveness of South Africa??s Counter Terrorism Approach

South Africa??s approach to urban terrorism as documented by both the PAGAD and
Boeremag cases has been valuable. The level of cooperation and interaction between the
intelligence agencies and SAPS proved to be corner stones in South Africa??s fight against
domestic terrorism. These responses were however, merely reactionary rather than
proactive. Post-the PAGAD and Boeremag threats, South Africa does not have in place a
structured counter terrorism strategy and approach.

Yet, as illustrated throughout this chapter, international terrorism is filtering into the
country. South Africa??s response as illustrated by the cases of Rashid Khalid and Saud
Memon illustrate that South Africa has not quite ascertained its response and such actions
by the international community is perceived as the inability of the country to determine
its stance and denotes ambivalence on its approach to international terrorism.

Despite such ambivalence, South Africa does have the necessary capacity and with the
enactment of POCDATARA, the essential legislative framework to counter terrorist
threats. All that remains is to pattern a common strategy and approach to counter
terrorism.
4.9. Summary

On the question of enabling legislation, numerous pieces of legislation designed to
combat terrorism, uphold internal security, and strengthen the hands of the security forces
against terror groups, are on the South African statute books. The enactment in 2005 of
the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act,
2004, further strengthens the legislative mechanisms to counter terrorism in South Africa.
However, while these laws are in existence, they might not be fully utilized by the
security forces because of an uncoordinated counter terrorism approach. In this regard,
this study argues that there is a need for a common mechanism to integrate, facilitate and
coordinate counter terrorism efforts at the national level. This study goes further and
argues that SAPS is the best discipline to house a centralized counter terrorism approach.
This argument is because it possesses elements of intelligence, has arresting powers
within the country as well as being endowed by the Constitution with the responsibility in
terms of Section 205 (3) ????to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public
order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to
uphold and enforce the law??.

With the impending global threat of terrorism, SAPS will need to re-evaluate its current
approach to policing terrorism. In this regard, the next chapter will consider various
policing mechanisms to counter terrorism and determine an effective mechanism that
may be applicable to the South African context.



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CHAPTER 5
POLICING MECHANISMS TO COUNTER TERRORISM: ARTICULATING A
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICING MECHANISM TO COUNTER TERRORISM

5.1 Introduction

The main burden of containing and defeating terrorism in liberal States
is carried by the police. Fighting terrorism is similar to combating
serious violent crimes - Wilkinson, 2006:68

?? to fully realize the potential of local police in counter terrorism, we
first need a philosophical shift, as occurred in criminal policing during
the 1990s. Instead of merely reacting to individual ??incidents,?? police
must proactively solve problems - William J. Bratton, Chief of Police,
Los Angeles Police Department (Quoted in Bratton and Kelling, 2006)

Policing has always been responsive to social and attitudinal shifts in society. Beginning
with the shift from traditional policing mechanisms as conceptualised by Sir Robert Peel
in 1822 to modern policing, systems of policing have changed in fundamental ways
within a relatively short period. Most recently, scholars, practitioners, and elected
officials have noted trends towards new paradigm shifts in policing. In response to the
terror attacks of September 11, 2001 countries such as the US, UK, Canada and Australia
have called upon their contingents of local police to take a more active stance in counter
terrorism initiatives. Furthermore, the countries have moved away from community
policing towards what is emerging as intelligence-led mechanism of policing, a system
that emphasizes intelligence gathering, covert investigations, and information sharing.

With these new shifts in policing paradigms noted as a response to emerging terrorist
threats, it is imperative that South Africa contextualise its mechanisms of policing within
emerging dynamics and evaluate the relevance of its current approach to policing. Should
South Africa maintain and enhance its mechanism of community policing or should the
country follow international trends or alternatively, can a purely South African approach
be borne from emerging trends that best proactively reacts to South Africa??s growing
security needs. As such, this chapter provides an overview and evaluates international
policing mechanisms as well as analyzes South Africa??s current mechanisms of policing.
The objective is to outline key concepts that will aid in determining whether South Africa
requires a paradigm shift in policing or whether current approaches are sufficient.

Arguments towards constructing a policing mechanism to counter terrorism in South
Africa made within this Chapter is supplemented with viewpoints from South African
academics across an array of disciplines spanning international relations, political science;
counter terrorism, criminal justice and policing. Such individuals have liberally provided
their perceptions on terrorism and policing mechanisms to counter terrorism in South
Africa. Their insights have been constructive in reinforcing and moulding perceptions on
the threat of terrorism as perceived to the South African context; as well as appropriate


114

measures that may be applied to the domestic scene to counter terrorism. Varying from
critical to supportive, the interviews conducted have been able to emphasize a ??plethora
of home grown ideologies to give impetus to South Africa??s approach to counter
terrorism??.

Information Box 5.1: Historical Overview of Policing


3000 BC – 400 AD: Many villages or communities had a rudimentary form of law
enforcement which was delegated from the authority of elders. In this type of policing,
the kin/family of the offender assumed the responsibility for justice. In Mesopotamia,
??civilised cities?? utilised the captured slaves as guards. Their visible presence may be
regarded as the first method crime prevention. Around 27 BC, the Emperor of Rome,
Gaius Octavius created the royal guard. Their duties included day/night patrols to ensure
security of the Empire. They were also empowered to arrest certain lawbreakers.

400 AD – 1600 AD: The middle ages had no specific system for law enforcement but
citizens volunteered to patrol streets and guard cities (the equivalent structure to modern
day neighbourhood watches). The objective of these volunteer missions was to be
vigilant and prevent crime in all manifestations. From the period 1066-1300, Shire-
Reeves, in England, were considered the representatives of royalty and had judicial
powers to hear cases and also correctional powers. Later on, constables were also
delegated with the task of enforcing justice in the realm.

1600 AD – 1800 AD: The first detectives came into existence in 1750 in England and the
Bobbies, first professional police force, came into existence in 1829.

1800 AD to 1900 AD: The US established federal police agencies. These included the
postal inspectors, internal revenue services, border patrol and the secret service. The
secret service later evolved into the FBI. The model for federal investigators was based
upon Alan Pinkerton??s private security agency.

1900 AD to present: In 1936 a unified police was established by Aldolf Hitler. This
placed policing in the hands of the military and is synonymous to totalitarian
dictatorships. The 1970s policing found itself directed towards community relations. The
current era has seen policing become more community orientated ??community policing??.
This form of policing goes beyond public community relations. Police and citizens work
together to deter crime. A network of community services and information is established.
Community policing focuses on moral decay of society and tries to enhance the social
cohesion. The 1980s saw the emergence of problem orientated policing whereby a
policing problem was identified and selective solutions were created to eliminate the
problems. Policing in democracies distanced itself from political influences in policing
processes.
Sources: A brief guide to the history of policing (http: //faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/205/205lect04.htm),
Bayley (1999), Reynolds (1926), Tonry and Morris (1992), History of Law Enforcement (http:
//www.barefootsworld.net/histlaw.html).


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5.2. The policing approach of terrorism as crime

Policing terrorism ideally occurs when terrorist activities manifest itself in the public
domain and are deemed illegal activities. States are constantly increasing their paradigms
to encapsulate terror activities. In essence, a State (exception of State Terrorism, refer 2.3)
responds to terror by resorting to legal means to curb activities such as violence,
explosions, damage to property, money laundering and the planning or execution of
terrorist acts. This process is also indicative of the UN counter terrorism strategy, in
particular resolution 1273, which obligates member states to promulgate and implement
legislature to counter terrorism. States in effect implement legislation as a process of
criminalizing terrorist activities (Dandurand and Chin, 2004: 4-5).

The purpose of this study, in part, is to contribute to the development of an effective
policing counter terrorism mechanism. The counter terrorism approach of countries was
reflected upon in Chapter 4 and it is of relevance to note that police departments
approach terrorism as a criminal activity. The response to terrorism was an activity more
relative to organized crime, which required a planned approach relying on a spectrum of
policing disciplines such as visible policing, intelligence and investigation. A large
discourse, spanning numerous research experts (Bibes 2001, Hubschle 2004), have been
conducted on the relationship between organized crime and terrorism but these
convergences and divergences concerning the two concepts do not contribute to the
study??s approach to policing terrorism.

Essentially, the policing methods adopted by police to curb acts of terrorism will need to
be explored. This will probe into the mechanisms that police utilise in its approach to
crime in general and more especially try to narrow the policing response to crimes of a
more intricate nature such as terrorism.
5.3 Overview of International Policing Mechanisms

The study will reflect on the many policing mechanisms which are considered to address
crime globally. It will evaluate the effectiveness of the mechanisms in relation to the
appraisals of relevant experts and experience of police organizations. Furthermore the
study were relevant will explore possible structuring of police organs to address
terrorism.
5.3.1 Types of Policing Mechanisms

Policing styles are and highly context and history specific. Introducing
the same mechanism into different historical and cultural contexts
results in very different applications of the mechanism – Brogden (1999:
125)

This in essence gives rise to variations of mechanisms that respond to the challenges that
are country-specific. Over the years the prominent variations to the evolution of policing
mechanisms have been the militaristic/para militaristic mechanism, the more prominent
Community Policing, and now an evolving Intelligence-led/problem orientated style of


116

policing. Whenever possible the study will explore important aspects that emanate from
these policing mechanisms. This section provides a brief overview of these international
policing mechanisms.

5.3.1.1. Militaristic

This mechanism of policing societies is prevalent in states that consider the enforcement
of the rule to be the preferred priority compared to the needs of a victim and the
community. The mechanism may be associated to autocratic or dictatorial regimes
whereby citizens are compelled to abide to legislation which is enforced usually by
military personnel, such as, Nigeria in the periods 1966 to 1979. States that experience
irregular change in governance usually establish military policing as the foremost
mechanism of enforcing the rule of law (Otwin, 1985 and Lambertus and Yakimchuk,
2007).

Militaristic policing may or may not comply with international regulatory norms.
Autocratic, suppressive regimes usually don??t comply with United Nations or humans
rights obligations. Iraq, which was recently invaded by the US led coalition, would
experience militaristic style policing (Stokes, 2004).
5.3.1.2. Para-military

One of the most important blurring of traditional boundaries occurring in the Post-Cold
War period is that between an internally orientated domestic police sphere and an
externally orientated military sphere (Andreas and Price, 2001: 32). As such, Para-
military units straddle the lines between conventional policing and military forces and
have been defined as: the application of (quasi) military training, equipment, philosophy
and organisation to questions of policing (Jefferson, 1990: 16).

Writers Kraska and Kappeler (1997) go a step further and define the para-military style of
policing in terms of the threat to use force instantaneously and not necessarily as an
option of last resort. Although originally established with a narrow remit to counter
terrorism, paramilitary units has since been readily incorporated and normalised into
mainstream policing (McCulloch, 2001: 25). Examples of countries using this style of
policing include Indonesia, Australia in the 1970s and China.
5.3.1.3 Criminal Justice

The Criminal Justice mechanism of policing is usually aligned with liberal states. The
police mechanism considers various liberal criteria such as accountability, legislation and
operational methodology (Lambertus and Yakimchuk, 2007). There are four distinct
components of the criminal justice mechanism. These are law enforcement, prosecutors,
courts and corrections. Law enforcement loads the system through investigations and
arrest. Prosecutors are the bridge between law enforcement and the courts. Courts form
the critical components of the administration of justice. Under the component of
corrections, the four commonly cited goals are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and
either rehabilitation/reintegration. The criminal justice components work in tandem with


117

the each other. However, these components have functions which are independent of each
other, but also overlap and their activities are directed at a common goal: crime
prevention and justice.

The mechanism satisfies the basic criteria of policing in democratic societies which are to
prevent crime, effectively prosecute criminals, protect the public, assist victims and
reassure communities (Biesheuvel and Chukwuma, 2006). The criminal justice
mechanism in democracies aim to achieve their policing mechanisms impervious of
influences from political authorities and be able to police the society with fairness and
accountability; however this may not be the case in all instances (Johnston, 2003;
Fielding, 2005). The criminal justice mechanism constitutes the basic mechanism of
policing in liberal democracies. Other mechanisms are then modified to address certain
criminal peculiarities.
5.3.1.4 Community
At the same time that para-military mechanism of policing was gaining momentum in the
1970s, community policing emerged as another distinct paradigm/ framework for
policing. The community policing mechanism is currently the prevalent mechanism in the
west (Murphy, 2005). Often, community policing is the ideal alternative method for
policing which are adopted by countries that have transcended from dictatorial colonial
and generally suppressive regimes. This can be expected since the community is cautious
to entrust unequivocal governance to the State. Examples of this include South Africa and
Nigeria (Gordon, 2001).
Community policing entails a shared public responsibility or crime. Community policing
is generally described as emphasizing a conciliatory rather than coercive approach to
policing. Crime is addressed by methods which include strategic partnerships with the
police and the communities (http://www.juneau.lib.ak.us/cbj/newsletter/spring99/policedef.htm). As
such, the community policing mechanism concerns itself with ??including the ordinary
citizens in decision making structures, so that operational strategies and techniques are
conscious of community as well as police interests??. Community based policing strategies
focus on building effective police community partnerships and the idea that community
should represent the interests of diverse communities (Findlay, 2004: 28-40; White and
Perrone, 1997: 27).

Two clear core components underlie the efficiency and effectivity of the community-
policing component. One is building trust between the police and community and
component two entails collaboration in problem solving. In terms of component one,
building trust is an essential element to furthering relations between the police and
community. For instance, one of the most successful cases of community policing is that
of the Chilean police, otherwise known as the ??Carabineros??. The Chilean police as an
institution ranks third in population confidence and trust levels, losing only to the Church
and the radio stations. The high levels of confidence in the Carabineros arise from the
development of police services premised on the populations needs (Lemle, 2007).

This of course, reintroduces the importance of component two which is ??problem
solving??. Policing recognises that community involvement is essential in its success.
Determining the underlying causes of crime depends, to a large extent, on an in-depth


118

knowledge of the community. Community participation in identifying and setting
priorities will contribute to effective problem-solving by the community and the police.
Cooperative problem solving also reinforces trust, facilitates the exchange of information,
and leads to the identification of other areas that could benefit from the mutual attention
of the police and community (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994: 18). Similarly in Chile,
Lieutenant Alfredo Lagao Gana asserts that prevention must intervene in risk factors
identified as precursors of violent and criminal behaviour. The Chilean Community was
able to identify school evasion, unemployment, domestic violence and excessive alcohol
and drug consumption as prevalent factors contributing to crime in the Chilean society.
Through collaboration and problem solving, the community and police were able to curb
these factors and facilitate social cohesion (Lemle, 2007).
Communities and police have become quite innovative in interpreting the joint
responsibility for crime. Israeli communities established the civil guard which was
involved in security function including crime prevention activities (Weisburd, Shalev and
Amir, 2002).
5.3.1.5 Intelligence Led /Problem Orientated

A pertinent development beginning in the early 1990s and more recently after the 9/11
attacks has been the enunciation of Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) and Problem
Orientated Policing (POP). Whilst they emerge from different origins, address different
problems and differ in their key indicators of success, they both share one commonality;
namely, they are both tactics that can support a broader traditional policing paradigm
such as community policing (Goldstein, 1990).

ILP originated in the 1990s in Great Britain and was originally called the ??Kent Policing
Mechanism??. The ILP is essentially defined as the ??application of criminal intelligence
analysis and as an objective decision-making tool in order to facilitate crime reduction
and prevention through effective policing strategies and external partnership projects
drawn from an evidential base?? (Ratcliffe, 2003). ILP focuses on key criminal activities.
Once crime problems are identified and quantified through intelligence assessments, key
criminals are targeted for investigation and prosecution (Bureau of Justice Assistance,
2005). The mechanism can be interpreted as follows:



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Figure 5.1: An intelligence-led policing and crime reduction process


Source: Ratcliffe, 2003

The first stage of the mechanism comprises being able to interpret the criminal
environment. This is usually performed by an intelligence unit that relies on a range of
information sources both internal and external to the police service. The information is
then analysed and conveyed to key decision makers (stage 2). Finally, in stage 3, decision
makers explore ways to reduce crime and invest in initiatives that might impact positively
on the criminal environment (Ratcliffe, 2003).

A mechanism that best encapsulates the ILP mechanism is the UK??s National Intelligence
Model (NIM) as developed by the National Criminal Intelligence Services (NCIS). NIM
is often described as a business mechanism because it organises knowledge and
information in such a way that the best decisions can be made about how to deploy
resources, so that actions can be coordinated within and between different levels of
policing, and that best practices experiences are continually noted. The mechanism
therefore targets the current trends towards addressing ??problem solving?? in the police
service (John and Maguire, 2003). The NIM mechanism considers the desired outcomes
of an intelligence function to be community safety, crime reduction, criminal control, and
disorder control. To achieve these results, the mechanism outlines the following
objectives:

• Establish a task and coordination process;
• Develop core intelligence products to drive the operation;
• Develop rules for best training practices at all levels of policing; and
• Develop systems and protocols to facilitate intelligence (Bureau of Justice
Assistance, 2005).

POP on the other hand, rather than focussing solely on intelligence, views crime control
as a study of problems that leads to successful enforcement and corrective strategies. At
the core of the POP mechanism is analysis, study and evaluation. The POP mechanism
requires assessing each new problem and developing tailored responses. This approach


120

requires ongoing creativity, not simply finding one solution and applying it unilaterally
(Goldstein and Scott, 2001). The Scanning, analyzing, Responding and Assessing
mechanism (SARA) is often considered to be synonymous with the POP mechanism, but
SARA is a broader analytical mechanism used in many fields; unlike the POP which is
more incident specific (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005).

The US policing mechanism has elements of POP, with the central focus being a process
called Computerised Comparison Statistics (Compstat). Within this paradigm, police
managers are held accountable for the crime in their precinct and empowered to
proactively crime issues of a neighbourhood (Walsh, 2001). Within Compstat, strategies
for crime and disorder control rely on timely, accurate intelligence, rapid focussed
deployment of resources, effective tactics, and relentless analysis and follow-up (Bratton
and Knobler, 1998).

The US police departments also launched various projects, which tend to align itself with
a POP approach to terrorism. One of the programmes which were implemented was the
Broken Windows project which targeted petty crime. The eventual aim was to instil a
??zero tolerance?? approach to crime. This resulted in the reduction of all types of crime in
New York City. Current projects aimed at the threat of terrorism included Nexus and
Hercules. These projects also aimed to influence the perceptions and conduct of the
public. Mock deployment of heavily armed counter terrorism units are executed to create
an impression of police readiness, attract public interest and to stimulate the public
awareness of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, these operations utilize the deployment of
police officials in sensitive areas and entail the surveillance of areas with the use of
cameras and radiation indicators. In addition, Chicago police have implemented an
information technology system that assists in the deployment of police patrols based upon
intelligence gathered (Connors and Pellegrini, 2005).

The US police mechanisms are supported by a local law enforcement capacity and a Joint
Terrorism Task Force which is strategically deployed in various areas in the country
(Connors and Pellegrini, 2005). In essence, the mechanism adopted by the US law
enforcement includes intelligence led policing and problem led policing.
5.3.1.6 Integrated Policing Mechanism

Policing mechanisms change and adapt to the demands of a dynamic society. Incidents
like the terrorist attacks in New York, high crime rates or an escalation of a specific
crime may warrant the need to re-examine the existing policing mechanism to circumvent
a threat. Traditional aspects form the basis of these mechanism and additional methods
are included to enhance the mechanism.

Canada post the New York 9/11, London 11/7 and Madrid 11/03 terror attacks,
considered threats of terror to emanate from certain ??suspect communities.?? Included in
their current community policing mechanism is a security dimension whereby members
of the community were encouraged to survey suspicious neighbours or activities. The
community became a strategic source of information which could then be utilized to
counter possible threats of terrorism (Murphy, 2005).



121

Canada has explored possible methods to execute their security community policing
mechanism. Firstly, they considered an approach of active participative interaction with
communities. Police were encouraged to invite participation from communities in
policing programs; local communities were then penetrated to provide intelligence in this
manner. The second approach which was less interactive resulted in police relying more
on undercover operations, surreptitious entries and other like processes to achieve their
objectives. These ??aggressive?? methods of policing had a greater likelihood of
undermining the trust between communities and police (Murphy, 2005).

The Canadian mechanism encourages a central coordinated policing structure to ensure
amongst others, strategic direction and effective sharing of intelligence (Murphy, 2005).
The mechanism adopted by the Canadians is a community based mechanism with a
certain securitization aspect.

In addition to their standard mechanism of intelligence-led policing and problem
orientated policing methods, the Australian police engage in a collective policing
approach to policing; network policing (Chan, 2001). The policing responsibility is
distributed to diverse entities which may be affected by terrorism in whatsoever manner;
these include other government agencies, like those responsible for immigration, finances
and energy departments. The Australians also consider private security to be able to
contribute to this multi-responsibility approach. Private security is responsible for the
protection of certain critical infrastructure and also assists in certain levels of policing.
Included in the shared responsibility is the public whereby an awareness campaign
against terrorism is in progress. This is done by the distribution of pamphlets and
advertising. The objective is to create a combined stance against crime irrespective of
cultural and ethnic differences (Palmer and Whelan, 2006).

The police mechanism structures which can be considered to address counter terrorism
are the deployment of special units. These units identify critical arrears of risk; assess the
risk and engages relevant responsible parties. The Australian government also provides a
forum to enable the exchange of information concerning critical infrastructure (Trusted
Information Sharing Unit) (Palmer and Whelan, 2006). In essence, the Australian
mechanism is a multilateral approach to counter terrorism and is prevention based.

Similar to Australia??s collective police mechanism, Russia in the post-Soviet era has
empowered private security companies to aid in their integrated style of policing
(Shelley, 1999 and Los, 2002).

In Finland and Switzerland, the predominant mechanism of policing was community
policing. However, this mechanism was flawed because it was limited in focus to
individual complex crime problems and systematic cooperation (Virta, 2002). In Finland,
policing considered a joint approach from a diverse spectrum of community-based groups
to create a working group to address security and prevention of crime. The police who
provided information and encouraged discourse on security related matters led these joint
processes. Switzerland similarly emulated the integrated approach of diversifying the
responsibility of crime to community-based agencies (Schedler, 2006).



122

Sweden compliments their community policing approach with a social interactive
perspective. Whilst police patrol certain areas, social workers who address crime and
general disorder accompany them. Furthermore, a more conducive environment is created
for interaction with the public and the police. This mechanism has been proven effective
in communities, which generally have limited trust in the police as an institution. The
mechanism is not an ad hoc approach to social patrols but a systematic approach (Terrill,
2003 and Lambertus and Yakimchuk, 2007).

5.4. South Africa??s Policing Mechanisms

?? The police shall be guided by the belief that they are accountable to
society in rendering their police services and shall therefore conduct
themselves so as to secure and retain the respect and approval of the
public. Through such accountability and friendly, effective and prompt
services, the police shall endeavour to obtain the co-operation of the
public whose partnership in the task of crime control and prevention is
essential??
- National Peace Accord 1991

South Africa post 1994 readily accepted the community policing mechanism after 40
years of authoritarian styled policing (Scharf, 2000). Accountability, transparency and
compliance with constitutional rights were essential ingredients to be included in the
policing mechanism (Rauch, 2006). The South African government, could with
confidence, accept this mechanism because it was a community interactive approach.
Many countries globally had also accepted the community policing mechanism (Murphy,
2005). However, pending the high levels of crime and the looming threat of global
terrorism, South Africa may need to reconsider the effectiveness of its current mechanism
of policing. As such, it may need to tweak the mechanism and enhance certain
mechanisms to ensure that policing will be effective in countering the threats facing a
democratic South Africa.
5.4.1 Transition to community policing

Policing and community policing has existed in some form or another in South Africa,
from day??s prior to colonialism, policing of tribes by chiefs; during colonialism, where
courts for Chiefs were established and community policing, which was adopted as a
mechanism post-1994 (Scharf, 2000).




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Information Box 5.2: Brief overview of ??community policing?? in South Africa

1940 – 1950: Rural areas had ??traditional?? justice groups officiated by a Chief. Urban
groups, generally young men, migrant labourers, church groups had own moral codes. In
certain townships were crime was prevalent informal police organisations were created.

1960: Minister of African affairs created provisions for residents to establish courts and
semi police type organisations.

1976: The state sponsored justice system was labelled as being minions of the state and
was challenged.

1984: United Democratic Front (UDF) was established and people??s court ensured
compliance in townships.

1991 – 2: South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) formed, less militant
resolution structures were present under Civic organs

1994 – present: South Africa accepted community policing as the predominate
mechanism and this developed in to variations and includes sector policing.
Sources: Burman and Scharf (1990), Scharf (2000).

Community policing was initiated as a policing mechanism in the Interim Constitution
(Act 200 of 1993) which provided for the establishment of community police forums.
The mechanism was introduced when South Africa became a democracy and the country
considered it essential to distance itself from the previous style of policing.
Accountability and oversight were thereafter an expected action to compliment the
policing mechanism. This duty fell under the auspices of the Secretariat for Safety and
Security in 1996 (Scharf, 2000).

Community policing although a widely accepted effective policing method in many
countries; was presented with certain fatal challenges in South Africa (Murphy 2005).
High crime, which when considering countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, can be expected in countries which had transitioned into democracy. These
amongst other factors such has shortages of actual skilled police officials may have
contributed to the high crime that is prevalent in South Africa (Shaw, 2002).
5.4.2 The transformation of South Africa??s policing mechanisms

South Africa??s police mechanism is gradually being restructured to be able to effectively,
counter the escalating crime in the country.
5.4.2.1 Current status of South Africa??s policing mechanism

The current policing mechanism adopted by the police is community policing (JCPS,
2006). The community is divided into sectors to dissipate community policing in regional
areas in the country. Sector policing results in the service area of a police station being
divided into smaller, more manageable areas, known as sectors. It is a practical form of


124

community policing. The policing mechanism ensures that focussed attention is given to
root causes of crime and further being able to understand the circumstances that may
contribute to crime. Sector policing according to SAPS, ensures more effective crime
prevention as well, by creating a visible policing presence. The additional advantages of
community policing includes a ??one to one?? involvement with the community and
improved community relations
(http://www.saps.gov.za/comm_pol/sector_policing/sector_policing.htm).

Core essentials of community policing in South Africa included: service orientation;
partnerships; solutions for crime; joint responsibility and accountability, that is, the
creation of national and provincial secretariats, Independent Complaints Directorate and
safety and security members of provincial legislature (Community policing policy
framework and guidelines, Department of Safety and Security. 1997). In addition, SAPS
has projected community policing to diverse community sectors by launching various
projects to ensure interaction and joint policing efforts.

The Tisa Thuto community based project was directed at learners and educators to create
a crime prevention strategy (JCPS, 2006). The crime prevention strategy considers the
community as a source of information for the trends of crime. Information gathered from
communities is bolstered by crime information and direct the strategic plans for sector
policing. SAPS has included in the community policing family: Business against Crime,
South African Banking Council and the South African Reserve bank to improve security
measures to curb aggravated robbery.
(http://www.saps.gov.za/_dynamicModules/internetSite/newsBuild.asp?myURL=675)

Despite emphasis being placed on the conduciveness of community policing as an apt
mechanism for crime prevention, there still concerns being raised about its effectiveness.
In his address to the nation in February 2007, President Thabo Mbeki stated:

Certainly we cannot erase that which is ugly and repulsive and claim the
happiness that comes with freedom of communities that lived in fear,
closed behind walls and barbed wire, ever anxious in their houses, and
the streets and on our roads unable to enjoy our public spaces.
Obviously, we must continue and further intensify the struggle against
crime??.

Furthermore, Mbeki listed government plans to address crime (State of the Nation
Address 2007). This included intention to increase the capacity of police officials whilst
also bolstering intelligence gathering. Crime statistics noted for the period 2001 to 2007
is illustrated in the Table 5.1 below:



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Table 5.1: Serious Crime between the period 2001-2007

Incidents Crime
Category 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007
%
increase/
decrease
2005/6 -
2006/7
Murder 21 405 21 553 19 824 18 793 18 528 19 202 3.5
Rape 54 293 52 425 52 733 55 114 54 926 52 617 -4.2
Assault 533 595 557 662 550 326 776 718 464 300 437 454 -5.3
Robbery 116 736 126 905 133 658 126 789 119 726 126 558 5.7
Burglaries 389 771 393 959 363 919 332 212 316 902 308 103 4.9
Carjacking 96 859 93 133 88 144 83 857 85 964 86 298 0.4
Source: http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2007/_pdf/crime_situation1.pdf.


Upon reflection of crime statistics, it can be deduced that crime is rampant in the
categories of murder, robbery, burglaries and car jackings. Within the statistics on
robberies, Cash in transits increased 21.9% over the 2005/6-2006/7 period and bank
robberies increased 118.6% over the same period. This demands that crime be addressed
in all forums of policing. In particular, the current policing mechanism may prove to be
lacking in effectively addressing the current crime trends.

5.4.2.2 South Africa??s evolving policing mechanism

Community policing became the cornerstone of South Africa??s policing structure after
apartheid. Police official??s general attitude to the public was that of tolerance and this
improved public satisfaction. However, high levels of crime have had the effect of certain
pockets of police officials reconsidering repressive techniques to stifle crime. Crime had
the spiral effect of undermining initial confidence the public had in the police (Marks,
2003).
Vigilantism had increased, including a burgeoning private security business. As a result,
the rights of victims and perpetrators were often exploited (Nina, 2000). The Mapogo Ma
Tamaga private security abused perpetrators in a self-executed justice system (Minaar,
1999. Communities themselves had little defence against crime and had to supplement
these with unscrupulous security companies whose conduct was not conducive to the
constitution and related security legislation (Sharf, 2000).

The police distanced itself from acts of vigilantism and responded to the high crime with
concentrated efforts against specific crime (Nina, 2000). These included joint operations
with the civilian intelligence community and the military as well. Various projects were
launched targeting specific areas of concern (Sharf, 2000). Successful operations against
PAGAD and the Boeremag provide credence to this specific approach as illustrated in the
pervious chapter.

SAPS identified gun smuggling and the existence of illegal arms as contributing factors
to the high crime rate in the country. Provisions were created to relinquish illegal arms,


126

whereby individuals were provided with reprieve when illegal arms where relinquished to
SAPS. Moreover new firearm legislation was promulgated to restrict the circulation of
legal arms. Furthermore, Operation Rachel was launched in Mozambique and targeted
the smuggling of arms whereby joint police operations where effected to eliminate arms
smuggling across borders (SAPS, 2005).

Institutional and human resource capacity deficiencies are considered to be an ominous
concern to SAPS. Firstly, skills and knowledge capabilities are questionably poor.
Literacy rates of SAPS are said to be low; these arguably may be attributed to inherited
problems from the previous regime. However, the lack of specialists to investigate crime
is an impending concern for SAPS. Special investigation teams were deployed in
provinces to deal with organised crime (Pelser, 1999). Yet, in conflicting approaches,
SAPS dissolved the Child Protection Unit; surprisingly this is in contradiction to their
objectives of deploying specialist investigators. It is essential to reflect that crimes
against women and children were considered as a priority in the SAPS Strategic plan
2006 and have become more pronounced over the years.

Secondly, SAPS and civil society in general are of the opinion that the lack of human
resource capacity contributes to the unregulated crime epidemic. In addition, increased
recruiting levels and amalgamation with other police types were always a consideration
(Pelser, 1999). Hence, one of the prime reasons why President Mbeki in his State of the
Nation speech 2007 reiterated prospects for increasing staff levels within SAPS in the
coming years and a more active role by the inclusion of municipalities. In his State of the
Nation Address for 2008, the President also indicated moves towards establishing a new,
modernised, efficient and transformed criminal justice system (CJS). Among other things,
the new CJS would entail setting up a new coordinating and management structure for the
system at every level, from national to local, bringing together the judiciary and
magistracy, the police, the prosecutors, correctional services and the Legal Aid Board, as
well as other interventions including the empowerment of the Community Police Forums.
In many ways, this decision reinforces moves towards and integrated mechanism of
fighting crime.

Former Minister of Safety and Security, Steve Tswete, in 2000 considered municipal
police to play an important role in crime prevention (Tswete, 2000). The Minister
considered the municipal police to strengthen the ability of police to find appropriate
crime prevention measures at a local level. Municipal police are empowered by South
African Police Service Amendment Act 83 of 1998, which allows any municipality to
apply for the establishment of a municipal police service.

The statutory obligations are traffic problems, policing of municipal by laws, regulations
and crime prevention. Municipal police are not empowered to carry investigations after
arresting an individual on suspicion of a crime. However, it is important to note that the
SA Constitution allows for a single police service and national legislation provides for
the establishment, powers, functions and control of municipal services (Rauch, Shaw and
Louw, 2001). The municipal police have interacted with and proved successful in
contributing to effective policing in municipalities. The Durban City Metropol, which has
a policing heritage since 1854, has successfully assisted the police in crime prevention
within its jurisdiction (Rauch, Shaw and Louw, 2001).


127


In essence, the policing mechanisms of the South African police have complied with the
international trend of being influenced by threats and demands of an ever-changing
environment. The concern, however, is impending crime which conclusively indicates
that the mechanism has not evolved effectively and efficiently enough to counter these
threats. Further, certain arguments, implore the notion that the mechanisms are more
reactionary to problems and not proactive in nature. Terrorism, a global challenge, may
then also prove to be a formidable threat against the police mechanisms.
5.4.3 Measuring the effectiveness of SAPS policing mechanisms

Policing analyst, David Bayley in his book, Changing the Guard (2006: 115), examined
the police reform processes in four countries in transition – Bosnia Herzegovina, El
Salvador, Ukraine and South Africa – and from his examinations construed that in
relative terms, ??South Africa is generally considered a heartening success??. However,
despite international recognition of SAPS transformation to democratic policing, on the
domestic front, SAPS is at the receiving end of a constant stream of criticism. As
mentioned earlier in the chapter, the core essentials of policing in South Africa includes
crime prevention, service orientation; partnerships; solutions for crime; joint
responsibility and accountability.

In a report conducted by the Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) in
2007 entitled ??In Service of the People??s Democracy: An Assessment of the South
African Police Services??, a number of interesting findings were disseminated on the
SAPS ability to accentuate the core essentials of its policing mechanism. Among the key
conclusions were (Bruce, Newham and Masuku, 2007):

• Protecting democratic and political life: overall, it is suggested that there is some
degree of progress made in this area of concern. This is attributed to SAPS ability
to support and protect the holding of national and local government elections
since the first democratic elections in 1994. In addition, its effectiveness as a
security-policing agency to deal with the threat of vigilantism by PAGAD and
insurrection by right wing groups such as Boeremag have been praised. However,
this positive change has been tempered by heavy handed policing of
demonstrations through instances of torture and other abuse against members of
social movements involved in non-violent opposition against government
programmes. Within KwaZulu Natal, there have also been assertions that some
police stations are still politically aligned (p. 3-4)
• Governance, accountability and transparency: in relation to this aspect, SAPS
had a good record in complying with accountability requirements, and subjecting
itself to the authority of the courts. However, these positive traits were offset by
SAPS inability to make crime statistics available and this undermined its
strategy of devolving responsibility to the local level and strengthening local
partnerships with communities (p. 4-5).
• Service provision for safety, justice and security: service delivery in terms of
safety, justice and security is regarded as uneven. The authors of the report
suggest that the evidence of their study indicate that service provision still
follows the logic of apartheid, with race and ethnicity continuing to play a role


128

as determinants of the quality of service delivery. Moreover, the statistics
presented in Table 5.1 on crime statistics suggest that SAPS has not quite been
able to curb impending threats of crime. The table illustrates an increase in
aggravated and violent crime. The authors of the study on the ??Assessment of
SAPS?? ascertain that SAPS suffers from a lack of clarity about the role of
policing, ??a problem exacerbated by confusion about the meaning of the word
crime prevention??. Overall, SAPS has failed to develop a proper strategic
approach to tackling specific types of crime and instead deal with crime in a
general and broad category (p. 5-6).
• Proper Police Conduct: The assessment identified several key areas of concern
in relation to police conduct. These include the use of lethal force, torture and
police corruption, specifically the abuse of African illegal immigrants. These
factors undermine SAPS ability to uphold the rule of law and reinforce relations
with the community.

Overall, while SAPS has undergone an incredible transformation of public order policing
since the apartheid era, the current policing mechanism still requires fortification of key
elements.

Pertaining to this study, as was illustrated in Chapter 4, SAPS counter terrorism efforts
proved effective during the terrorism ordeals in respects to the Boeremag and PAGAD.
However, these are domestic responses to terrorism and not much has been publicly
divulged in terms of the SA government stance on international terrorism; albeit
international terrorists?? incidents relative to SA have been, in certain instances, curtailed.
The measure of the police effectiveness to address these incidents has had little analyses
by SAPS or discourse in the public domain.
5.4.4. Proposed SAPS policing mechanism to counter terrorism

South Africa being a part of the international community is one of the countries in the
African continent that has complied with the United Nations Counter Terrorism Strategy.
South Africa is a relatively new democracy and has arguably a certain proclivity to
terrorism being utilised as an option to vindicate a groups actions. This may be attributed
to its previous dispensation during which the ANC was labelled a terrorist organisation
by the apartheid government. Included in this quagmire are the challenges of many
developing nations whereby the demand for socio-economic sustenance is overdue and
deemed a life threatening necessity. The threat of terrorism and South Africa??s perception
of the threat are pivotal in any approach to counter terrorism. Moreover, the response by
South Africa??s security matrix may be influenced by various factors, which warrant
circumspection. This section provides a brief introspection by South African academics
on elements that should characterise a policing approach to counter terrorism in South
Africa.

Interviewees Richard Gueli and Anneli Botha (2007) both contend that South Africa is
not necessarily a target of international terrorism but has the potential to be a safe haven
or possible planning base for international terrorists. Anneli Botha (2007) aptly points out
that ??SA has a false illusion that terrorism is occurring internationally, however, SA
citizens?? provision of financial support, in most instances by way of manipulation,


129

contributes to terrorism??. Richard Gueli (2007) equally emphasizes that South Africa is
merely a country of transition with porous borders and fallible systems with sympathetic
individuals whom are plied for support and resources. Dominant in these frail systems is
the ineffectiveness of the Department of Home Affairs to regulate the population in well-
defined parameters. Kurt Shillinger is emphatic that no counter terrorism strategy will be
realised without addressing this fundamental issue. Kurt Shillinger (2007) further
expanded with illustrations of certain small but albeit significant international terrorists
who have been associated with South Africa (in conformity with section 4.3). These
being Haroon Aswat (linked to the London 7/7 Bombings); Saud Memon (linked to the
Daniel Pearl kidnapping); Mohammed Patel (Heathrow Airport terror incident), and
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed (linked to the US Embassy Bombing in Tanzania).

South Africa post-1994 has been far more experienced with domestic terrorism in the
forms of PAGAD and the Boeremag. Johan Burger (2007), during his attendance at a
conference in the US concerning terrorism in 2000, was able to evaluate the structures
that underpinned terrorism in the US and was of the opinion that the current South
African structures which were being utilised against PAGAD and the Boeremag proved
to be far more sophisticated and effective. Kurt Shillinger (2007), in his assessment also
concurred with the provocations of Johan Burger regarding the successfulness of SA??s
approach to PAGAD and Boeremag. In particular, Kurt Shillinger commended the
intelligence that led to the demise of PAGAD.

Johan Burger (2007) considered that South Africa is able to effectively counter terrorism
when a threat is imminent, this can be ascertained by their successes against PAGAD and
Boeremag. The police were at the forefront of the approach which considered a joint
operation with various departments in the Joint Security Cluster (SANDF, NIA, SASS,
SAPS and NICOC). According to the Senior official from SAPS, Crime Intelligence, the
approach adopted was that of ??operational policing??. This entailed a number of operations;
which were primarily intelligence-led operations. These operations included visible
strategic deployment of the SANDF and SAPS who conducted roadblocks, searches,
seizures and arrests.

However, surpassing the threats of PAGAD and Boeremag, Anneli Botha (2007)
pertinently observes that the level of communication in the security cluster has resulted in
growing distrust and compartmentalisation. Richard Gueli (2007) supplements the
argument by recognizing that the structures were effective when a clear threat was
dominant but currently these structures have become highly politicized. Agencies in the
security matrix lack effective levels of coordination and communication. Boyane
Tshelhla further comments about the dismissal of Mr Billy Masethla, previous NIA boss
as well as investigations into the Commissioner of police Jackie Selebi as illustrations of
concern on the security clusters ability to act independent of political influence.

In addition, Michael Hough (2007) from the University of Pretoria indicates that the
current dispensation provides little insight into any strategy to address counter terrorism.
Furthermore, Hough (2007) considered the only clear strategy which was adopted by
South Africa was pre-1994.



130

In a colluding argument, Anneli Botha (2007), states that South Africa??s counter
terrorism approach, similar to the case of international approaches, proved to be more
reactive than proactive. This above-mentioned response entails continuously ??plugging
leaks??, but fails to address the underlying issues that give rise to the proscribed situation
of terrorism. Mathematically, for Anneli Botha (2007), a counter terrorism strategy
contributes 10% towards reducing threats of terrorism whilst addressing underlying
principles accounts for 90%. Anneli Botha (2007) purports that the spectrum of role
players involved to counter terrorism migrate beyond the norm of traditional security
structures and include other disciplines, which address socio-economic and related
disparities.

In light of the above insights on the limitations of South Africa??s current approach to
counter terrorism, the academics and experts in their excerpts, identified a number of
elements that should be considered for incorporation into the SAPS counter terrorism
approach. One of the key concepts, as outlined by all interviewees barring Hough (2007),
was the importance of effective intelligence. Boyane Tshelhla (2007), Andre
Thomashausen (2007), Johan Burger (2007) and Richard Gueli (2007), advocated for an
intelligence-led approach to counter terrorism. Within this paradigm, the intelligence led
stance should focus on crucial aspects of intelligence profiling. The basis of this assertion
as claimed by Thomashausen (2007) is that ??a typology of criminals effectively aid in
targeting terrorism??, and in this regard suggested the effective utilisation of profiling tools
such as GIS profiling systems as well as the US scenario building software of Proteus.
However, according to Kurt Shillinger (2007), the approach of considering typologies
must be approached with caution so as not to jeopardize the fragile confidence that
currently exist between respective communities in South Africa. In a related suggestion
on intelligence analytical tools, Richard Gueli (2007) advocated the use of the ??Beijing??
tool, which quantifies network links of sources or targets aiding in directing intelligence
and investigation processes.

Kurt Shillinger (2007) and Johan Burger (2007), in addition to the intelligence led
approach, further motivated for increased integration and coordination between existing
structures and special units concerned with counter terrorism. According to Kurt
Shillinger (2007), the approach should advocate for greater communication between the
police, intelligence, military, and home affairs. Gueli together with Shillinger also
advocated for the establishment of a Counter Terrorism Centre, which was proposed by
the Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils, but was never realized.

In addition to enhanced intelligence capacity, Anneli Botha (2007) reiterates the
importance of due process, the rule of law, and an open and effective judicial system.
Johan Burger (2007) and Anneli Botha??s (2007) insights also emphasized the importance
of community policing with key concepts being the reinforcement of public support,
openness, the need to equip the community with a framework, and terms of reference in
order to educate the public and create a sense of trust between the community and law
enforcement in efforts to subjugate threats of terrorism. Closely related to community
policing is the need to address issues related to inequalities. Botha primarily considers
that any counter terrorism strategy will need to consider the unique political and socio-
economic dynamics of the country.



131

Essentially, Hussein Solomon (2007) of the University of Pretoria, emphasizes that
terrorism cannot be fought by abandoning democratic norms and values. Moreover,
socio-economic factors that may contribute to terrorism must be addressed. Johan Burger
of the ISS concurs with the argument and deems that socio-economic factors create a
revolutionary climate and socio-economic disparity is a germ for revolution. Consider for
instance, the South African Institute of Race Relations in its report on socio-economic
inequality estimated the percentage of people living below the poverty line to be 43.2%
in 2006 (Mail and Guardian, 2007). As a contributing factor to socio-economic
disparities, the ability of the Government??s capacity to effectively facilitate service
delivery has been a cause for concern. This in effect represents a large portion of
disgruntled South African citizens. Analyzing just the case of service delivery in
KwaZulu Natal, of the 2 274 million households, 29% did not have basic access to clean
drinking water, 43.7% did not have sanitation, and 34.1% were not connected to the
national electricity grid (News24, 2007).

Frustrating the situation of socio-economic disparities and service delivery is the high
levels of crime and corruption. As illustrated in Table 5.1 on crime statistics, South
Africa for the period 2006/7 has had to deal with almost 19 202 cases related to murder,
126 558 cases of aggravated robbery and more than 52 617 cases of rape incidents
annually. This puts South Africa at the forefront of high crime rates globally. In terms of
corruption, South Africa ranks 48th out of 158 countries globally and 3rd out of 40
countries indexed in Africa in 2006 (Heritage Foundation, 2007).

Further to building effective partnerships with the community, Anneli Botha (2007) also
advocates for an integrated approach to terrorism but campaigns instead for coordination
at the highest level of government with all departments. Richard Gueli (2007) concurs
with the assessment and stresses that for counter terrorism to be considered seriously
enough it will need to be adjudicated from the highest echelons of government. The
mindset behind this argument is that ??higher authority equates to higher status of the
issue??. If there is no representation at the highest level – in this instance Cabinet – then
the issue will not be centralised and without such authorities acknowledging terrorism,
the issue will subside.

In a contradicting yet controversial viewpoint, Hough (2007) believes that militaristic
approach should be adopted to counter terrorism. However, as illustrated by the examples
of Algeria and Russia in Chapter 3, a militaristic approach is not as effective in
constraining potential threats of terrorism. Furthermore, Solomon (2007) applauded the
approach of liberal democracies and considered the policing approach to be more
conducive to countering terrorism.

In essence, the prominent insight of the above-mentioned experts rests on the elaboration
of intelligence and integration with the incorporation of elements of community policing
as the founding basis of a SAPS counter terrorism strategy.

The underlying question then becomes ??Is South Africa??s current security infrastructure
and efforts suitable to negating such threats??? The overwhelming perception was that
South Africa??s domestic response to counter both PAGAD and Boeremag was indicative
of the level of expertise to successfully counter such threats. However, post- Boeremag


132

and PAGAD, a number of concerns such as lack of interaction and coordination between
agencies in South Africa??s security matrix emphasize imperfections that may impact on
South Africa??s efforts to counter terrorist threats. In this regard, utilising the
recommendations by the above-mentioned academics and experts, the following elements
should be utilised in creating a South African approach to counter terrorism:

Figure 5.2: Elements of South Africa??s Counter Terrorism Approach as
conceptualised from interviews with experts and academics



5.5. Summary

Earlier in the chapter it was noted ??Policing styles are highly context and history
specific??; the statement holds true in the changing dynamics of the global environment as
pertaining to crime. Community policing, beginning the 1990s, was considered the ideal
mechanism for policing as it coincided with the new wave of democratisation in the post-
cold war period. The elements of community policing exhibited the core fundamentals of
democratic ideals and presumed that incipient networking between community and police
would impact positively on reducing crime. While the principle in theory is faultless, in
reality, the success of the mechanism is dependent on the dedication of the community in
cooperating with law enforcement.

In South Africa, this has been a fundamental challenge. Community policing as
advocated in 1994 still seems to be overcoming institutional development obstacles as
well as the community??s inability to trust police officials. An increase in crime coupled
with the rise of vigilantism (as espoused by PAGAD), private security companies and
neighbourhood watches illustrates the limited levels of trust that SA communities have in
SA law enforcement. In addition, as global threats become more relevant to South Africa




Integrated: SAPS
(lead) +SASS+NIA+
NICOC
Intelligence
Led Approach
High Level Oversight
(Cabinet) (All government
departments represented)
Effective
Judicial
System (rule
of law, due
process)
Community
policing
(importance
of educating
the
community


133

in the form of organised and transnational crime and terrorism, more has to be done to
strengthen the existing policing architecture that exists. In essence, this chapter as
supplemented by pertinent literature and relevant interviews with credible experts
indicate that SA??s policing approach to countering terrorism should at the core rest with
mechanisms encapsulated in intelligence and integrated policing, supported by elements
such as high level oversight, an effective judicial system and proactive community
policing.



134

CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TOWARDS A POLICING
NEXUS MECHANISM TO COUNTER TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA


6.1. Summary of findings


And so one skilled at employing the military??Subdues the other??s
military but does not do battle, uproots the other??s walled city but does
not attack, Destroys the other??s state but does not prolong??- Sun Tzu,
400 B.C.

The above quote is symptomatic of the importance of strategic planning over the years.
Utilising this sentiment, terrorism??s demise can be emulated through the strategic
planning of an effective counter terrorism strategy. The SAPS??s ability to successfully
counter terrorism will require a policing mechanism that is able to address the various
challenges of the threat of terrorism. However, it is of essence to note that terrorism is not
merely a policing concern. Policing response to socio-evils in society often emanates
from grass root levels and addressing these origins may be a correlating solution in
conjunction with efforts from the policing structures.

South Africa??s current dispensation is considered to be one of the more liberal developing
democracies in the global hierarchical political system. This is attributed to its approach
to international relations, economic standing in the global arena and respect for human
rights. South Africa??s respected image also emanates from the anchorage of its historical
emancipation and the birth of a great African leader, Nelson Mandela. Moreover, South
Africa??s case study of negotiated settlement to civil unrest has served as a beacon of hope
to most developing and less developing conflict countries in Africa, Asia and Latin
America.

However, despite its international standing, the country is not devoid of impending
challenges. This study has illustrated that although terrorism is not a direct threat to South
Africa??s fledgling democracy; elements within society provide an environment conducive
to rudiments for terrorism and related security apprehensions. Expert Anneli Botha
(2007) aptly pointed out that socio-economic disparities provide an important avenue for
terrorists to feed off and enhance its support base (refer section 5.4.4.). South Africa is
plagued with the problem of large socio-economic inequalities that to a huge extent stems
from the apartheid regime, which manifests itself in discernible areas of unemployment
and poverty (as illustrated in section 5.4.4). South Africa??s domestic situation was
appropriately coined by President Mbeki as the ??tale of two nations?? caught between the
limited groupings of the haves and the majority of the have not??s??.

The ramification of this deluge as perceived to South Africa is a pernicious embryonic
climate for terrorism and related malignance. Firstly, identified socio-economic


135

hindrances create a divide in society whereby marginalised groups question their current
frail disposition and the systems through which their concerns must be addressed. Once
plausible grievances exist, it tends to exponentially increase in a developed democratic
environment. Media and communication provides the exponential factor and the
communities?? human nature tends to lament about problems rather than consider
plausible solutions. There may be substance in the argument for the defence of socio-
economic ills, but these are generally tangential. This creates an opportunity for radical
ideologies to fester.

Crime and corruption in society undermine the basic pillars of systems that regulate co
habitual existence. Besides contributing to the delta of distrust of the aggrieved, it also
contributes to the disruption of the conduit of the public to basic justice and rule of law.
Public disorder provides ample sustenance for the marginalised to consider alternate
options for discourse. Furthermore, crime and corruption placates concern on the ability
of set structures to manage existing tensions. Pertinently, if SAPS is considered to be the
custodian of crime prevention; it is questioned how effective the organisation is in
reacting to crime in a country that has a high crime rate (refer Table 5.1). Likewise, if
terrorism is considered as an aspect of crime in developing countries such as South
Africa, it is reasonable to deduce that SAPS would face comparable inhibitions as it does
with organised crime to deter threats of terrorism (refer chapter 5).

Within this context, South Africa??s neutrality with regards to its international political
aspirations and human right integrity are astute and should continue. However,
limitations with regard to its stance on terrorism are of concern. South Africa needs to
accept without reservation that the discourse of terrorism is not a medium of expression
in an interconnected globalised twentieth century. Furthermore, the act of killing innocent
individuals for any cause is ludicrous, and borders on acts of barbarity of an archaic
culture. Even of greater concern is that humanity is no more handicapped with fists,
sticks or knives but have resources which can be exploited for calamitous consequences
(see chapter 2 on terrorist tactics). South Africa will need to realize that counter terrorism
must not merely comply with international obligations but be predicated from the highest
echelons of government. Irrespective if the threat is distant or potential, the option of
terrorism must be brought to nought and any counter terrorism strategy will need to
emanate from this dispensation.

Reflecting upon an informal discussion with Clifford Shearing (2007) from the
University of Cape Town, South Africa was at a volatile precipice in 1994 during its first
democratic elections. The Goldstone Commission was tasked to ensure that police were
able to effectively ensure that the election was devoid of unrest and related security
concerns. The Commission??s intervention was from historic knowledge a resounding
success. This success can be based upon few fundamental tenets that are the effective
utilisation of available resources, capacity and knowledge which were extrapolated from
society. It is these very aspects of historical foundations of policing and elements such as
resources, capacity and knowledge that will aid in an effective mechanism to counter
terrorism in South Africa.

Yet, within the context of these dynamics, this study concludes by arguing that SA??s
approach to counter terrorism has to change to reflect the complexities of global and


136

national threats. In doing so, it must work towards a counter terrorism mechanism that
aptly considers these realities. As such, it is imperative that South Africa moves towards
institutionalising, rationalising and harmonizing its efforts towards curbing terrorism. The
opportunity itself has arisen with the President??s decision pertaining to the restructuring
and creation of an effective Criminal Justice System (CJS) as discussed in Chapter 5
(section 5.4.2.2.).

President Mbeki when reflecting on the New Partnership for Africa??s Development
(NEPAD) aptly pronounced that ??NEPAD starts at home??. Emulating this stance it can be
deduced that an effective counter terrorism strategy for South Africa will only originate
within the political, socio-economic, and cultural confines of South Africa.
6.2. Recommendations

This study, within the ambit of its research findings, recommends the following elements
and structure of an effective counter terrorism mechanism.

6.2.1. The basic elements of a policing mechanism to counter terrorism in South
Africa: integration, coordination, intelligence-led policing, and the community.

One of the key arguments as articulated by interviewees Kurt Shillinger (2007) and Johan
Burger (2007), has been the motivation for increased integration and coordination
between existing structures and special units concerned with counter terrorism.
According to Shillinger, the approach should advocate for greater communication
between the police, intelligence, military and home affairs (section 5.4.4.). In conjunction
with this statement, the summation of international strategies on countering terrorism also
advocate for an integrated approach amongst relevant departments to curb the threats of
terrorism (see figure 6.1 below). Within Figure 6.1, it can also be ascertained that other
effective elements to counter terrorism were predicated on an increased role for law
enforcement, the emplacement of effective legislation and international cooperation.

Taking into account these varying elements, the later two elements, namely legislation
and international cooperation are already features within South Africa??s attempts to curb
terrorism (as argued in section 4). However, the increased role for law enforcement is still
a debated issue. Counter terrorism initiatives remain fragmented across varying South
African departments and this provides an important basis to argue for the importance of
integration and coordination of efforts. As was argued in Chapter 3 (section 3.2), in the
United States of America, the consequences of the 9/11 attack were as a result of the
inability of the varying law and intelligence agencies to interact with one another
regarding crucial information as it pertained to terrorist activities within the country. If
this example is to provide important lessons for best-case practices, it will nonetheless
argue for more ??cohesion??. In addition, in terms of increasing the role of law enforcement,
it is argued throughout this thesis that SAPS should be the lead department in terms of
counter terrorism initiatives as it has warrant and arresting powers within the confines of
the borders of South Africa as opposed to the powers of intelligence agencies like NIA.
SAPS will do well in coordinating and monitoring counter terrorism initiatives within the
country.


137




Figure 6.1: Summation of International Counter Terrorism Strategies




Another essential ingredient to the SAPS counter terrorism mechanism will be the
importance of intelligence-led policing. As argued in section 5.3.1.5, intelligence-led
policing is emerging as an important mechanism internationally in dealing with criminal
activities; especially those of organised crime and terrorism. The strategy of intelligence-
led policing is also a proactive mechanism of dealing with crime. The argument of this
thesis has been the motivation for a more proactive strategy to dealing with terrorism and
the intelligence led policing mechanism is one avenue achieve such a goal. Also
important is to study the model of the United Kingdom??s National Intelligence Model
(NIM), which should also be analysed in conjunction with those programmes advocated
by the interviewees in this dissertation such as Thomashausen??s recommendation of the
Proteus programme (Interview with Thomashausen, 2007) and Gueli??s advocation of the
Beijing tool (Interview with Gueli, 2007). Within these three differing analytical and
profiling softwares??, a program can be created to tailor the conditions and dynamics of
South African society.

In addition to the importance of intelligence led policing, significance should also be
attached to the importance of sensitizing the population. South Africa??s counter terrorism
UK
Legislation
Integration:
JTAC and MPS
International
cooperation

India
Enhanced Law
enforcement and
Intelligence
Algeria
Legislation
Law enforcement
(police and
Army)
Russia
Legislation
Integration: NCC
International
cooperation
US
Legislation
Integration: JTTF
International
cooperation Proposed SA
Legislation
Integration: Led
by SAPS
International
cooperation


138

strategy is shrouded in mystery, due to the necessity of operations which has become
synonymous with the international approach by certain countries on counter terrorism.
The United States and the United Kingdom annually presents to the general public a
counter terrorism strategy, of which the essential clandestine techniques and operations
are not disclosed. This is an encouraging exemplar whereby the community and other
relevant players are not marginalised from governments approach on terrorism but
participation is encouraged in the general counter terrorism strategy. The same should
nonetheless apply to the South African context. Interviewees Johan Burger (2007) and
Anneli Botha (2007) in section 5.4.4. emphasized the importance of community policing
with key concepts being the reinforcement of public support, openness, the need to equip
the community with a framework, and terms of reference in order to educate the public
and create a sense of trust between the community and law enforcement in efforts to curb
threats of terrorism. It is imperative for the police to interact with the community; as the
public are in most instances vital assets in curbing crime.

These varying elements expounded above will help mould an effective policing
mechanism to counter terrorism in South Africa.

6.2.2. Executive authorization

The counter terrorism strategy will require executive authorization, through presidential
and cabinet orders to direct an integrated inter-departmental approach against terrorism.
These take the form of additional or amendments to existing legal frameworks and
supporting policies, which ensure obligatory interaction of relevant stakeholders (refer to
comments by Gueli and Botha, in section 5.4.4).

Within this context and based on the basic conception of legal frameworks, this study
ascertains that like most body corporates established in South Africa, there must be
primary legislation that drives the enunciation of SAPS Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU)
(refer Figure 6.2 below). The ascension of primary legislation breathes legality into the
functionality of such a structure. In this regard, the concept has to first be promoted to the
highest levels of government (President and Cabinet) for their acknowledgment of the
key importance attached to such a structure. The promoter in this instance would have to
be the SAPS as the structure will be housed within their capacity. Thereafter the relevant
Bill would be conceptualised and submitted to the relevant Portfolio Committee for
submission to Parliament to debate the concept. Once tabled, the idea would also require
public discourse. If accepted the Bill would then become relevant legislation.

Apart from the relevant legislation that would establish the CTU, executive authorisation
in the form of a mandate would have to given for the functionality of the Counter
Terrorism Interdepartmental Community (CTIC) and the Joint Security Cluster (JSC).
These institutions would have similar weighting to Cluster programmes of the Policy
Coordination and Advisory services (PCAS) which aim at policy analysis, mainstreaming,
coordination, and monitoring and evaluation on key government actions in terms of
policy objectives (The Presidency, 2008).

These policy formulations and regulations would form the basic tenets on the route of
executive authorisation.


139

6.2.3. The Establishment of an effective and institutionalized Counter Terrorism
Unit (CTU)

Taking into cognisance the above recommendations on basic elements and executive
authorisation, the proposed structure of the CTU is envisioned as follows:

Figure 6.2: Graphic illustration of the CTU set-up





Executive (Presidential and Cabinet)
Legislation
Policy
CTIC Selected
Departme
nts and
Entities
NICOC
SASS
NIA
DI
SAPS CTU
RAU

Research and
analysis
theoretical and
practical
applications

International
liaising with
research
institutes
IIU

Intelligence
investigations
operations
and analysis

Scenario
building

Operational
International
liaison
(Interpol,
Europol, etc)
LEGAL

Legal
operating
framework
for
processes


JSC


140

One of the core elements will be an integrated interdepartmental approach. The objective
of an integrated interdepartmental approach to counter terrorism is to quell the following
concerns:

• Target hardening: preventing these entities from becoming targets to terrorist
attacks .e.g. as illustrated in Chapter 2, government entities especially law
enforcement agencies which are the prime targets of terrorist attacks;
• Target exploitation: preventing these entities from being exploited in their normal
business processes, for example, assisting the Department of Home Affairs to be
aware of weak links in its operational capacities. Take or instance, the example of
the number of SA passports found in Britain through the investigation of the
Tantoushe case (Chapter 4).
• Risk and threat assessments: as attributed towards the threat of terrorism in that
specific department as researched by experts in the department. Consider the
example of the Nuclear Energy Council of South Africa (NECSA). Nuclear
scientists will conduct a threat assessment on the availability of their nuclear
arsenal and the consequences of their security setbacks. If terrorism were to be
characterised by a new manifestation of ??nuclear terrorism??, then it would be the
risk assessment by these nuclear scientists that would aid in determining the
extent of the terrorist threat as it pertains to South Africa.
• Counter terrorism inter-departmental governance: ensuring that measures and
concerns addressed by counter terrorism units in various departments are
complied and addressed in a common forum. One of the statements made in
Chapter 4 (section 4.7) about the United States departments during the 9/11
incident was that the ??right hand seldom knows what the left hand is doing??, and
within South Africa, the same conclusion can be deduced. Increasingly,
departments within South Africa seem to be working independent of each other
and often on the same issues. It is effectively known that pooling of resources and
knowledge aids in a more positive approach to dealing with threats and problems
rather than piecemeal efforts. Gueli and Botha aptly argued that coordination,
harmonization and rationalise of efforts will form a key component of an effective
mechanism to counter terrorism in South Africa.

The composition of the Counter Terrorism Interdepartmental Community (CTIC) will be
pre-determined by a risk and threat assessment of entities, which could be influenced by
threats of terrorism. This risk and threat assessment will be the responsibility of a counter
terrorism unit. Departments of relevance may include the Department of Home Affairs,
Department of Education, National Treasury and Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC),
Department of Defence, Department of Science and Technology etc. Experts from these
respective departments will contribute to the counter terrorism unit (CTU).

Furthermore, these experts will remain in the employ of their respective units but will be
tasked under the direction of the CTU. Essentially, the representation of experts from the
various departments is required since it will be virtually impossible to include these
diverse spectrums of experts to be solely in the CTU. The access of these experts to their
relevant departments will be crucial as the interlinking element between the Department
and the CTU. These relevant experts will fortify the interconnectedness of the process


141

and a sense of ownership of all relevant national departments for the counter terrorism
mechanism.

The Joint Security Cluster (JSC) (a combination of NIA, SASS, DI, SAPS) efforts on
counter terrorism are coordinated in NICOC. There efforts in countering terrorism have
proven to be successful in the past, and it is suggested that these structures remain as they
are currently positioned. However, it is envisaged that the counter terrorism unit should
fall within the structure of SAPS. Various motivations as extrapolated from international
best practices (Chapter 3) indicate that to have counter terrorism within a policing
environment is the most amicable disposition in a democratic state. Although the efforts
of NICOC are commendable, concerns have arisen concerning coordination (Section
5.4.). In order to coordinate and effectively have a common approach to terrorism, it is
suggested that representatives from these structures also report to the envisaged CTU.
These will include support structures, which will be utilised by the CTU as well the
important counter terrorism experts input from differing departments.

Substantiating arguments in this regard is that ownership is obtained for the common
strategy. Various information regarding counter terrorism, which were previously
restricted to departments, should become available to all role players. Limitations to
counter terrorism by the respective security cluster agencies should be addressed in
keeping with the common counter terrorism perspective. In essence, the distribution of
resources and diverse spectrum of expertise also become accessible and aligned to a
common approach. An illustrative of this concern is that if a threat of an impending
nuclear bomb and the only expert is at a conference abroad; this in itself may prove
disastrous. It is therefore essential to be able to correlate resources, experts and threats to
ensure effective counter terrorism responses.

The SAPS CTU as envisaged will have an integrated approach on terrorism. Essentially,
the approach is of an intelligence led operation (see chapter 5 on intelligence led
policing). Although intelligence led policing will be at the forefront of countering
terrorism, it will not impede on the current dynamics of community and sector policing.
Intelligence led policing will compliment the current sector policing dynamics in that a
??soft approach?? will be deployed for intelligence gathering. It has been proven through
research (Chapter 3 and 4), that through an interactive community operation, intelligence
has proven to be more effective against counter terrorism. Communities are not
marginalised but collectively contribute to eliminating impending threats. In a South
African perspective, the philosophy of ??Batho Pele?? and ??Ubuntu?? could be effectively
utilised to encourage a collective community and police approach to counter terrorism.

The operationalisation of the CTU will flow from the establishment of the Research and
Analysis Unit (RAU). The RAU will primarily be responsible for conducting research
and analyses on processes and measures to counter terrorism. This study has highlighted
that research on terrorism and counter terrorism is lacking in South Africa and due to the
very dynamics of the subject and the country, it is a fundamental requirement (refer to
Richard Gueli??s statements in section 5.4.4.). It will also be responsible for conducting a
broad based risk and threat analysis of departments and related entities, which are at risk
by threats of terrorism. These departments, if not already included in the counter
terrorism set-up, will then be included to ensure that they are aligned to current counter


142

terrorism dispensations. The RAU must also interact with the NICOC forum with regard
to eliciting and reporting counter terrorism responses and concerns. Furthermore, liaisons
with regard to the processes and measures mentioned above will be included in RAU??s
ambit.

Supporting the CTU will be the realisation of a legal department. The department will
regulate all processes of the CTU; be it operationally or administratively. Reflected upon
is the ??rendition?? of Rashid (Chapter 4), if the person was an illegal immigrant, would it
have been more amicable to follow the prescribed procedures to extradite an illegal
immigrant rather than follow a much more volatile neutralisation process. Furthermore,
the operations of the CTU needs to be governed under the auspices of a liberal
democracy and this legal department must ensure that counter terrorism measures do not
infringe on South Africa??s founding tenets of democratic principles underlying the
Constitution.

The intelligence and investigation Unit (IIU), is already in existence as predisposed by
operations conducted against PAGAD and Boeremag. However, the response by SAPS
towards crime and organised crime is of concern and therefore their intelligence ability
becomes questionable. These can be substantiated by various remarks by experts in
section 5.4.4 of this study and the consequential implications of SAPS to limit organised
crime to an acceptable level. These arguments have also raised concerns on the IIU??s
ability to conduct operations. This unit will also filter into the CTU but with certain
critical transformations. The IIU has to have clearly defined parameters and although
difficult be able to quantify its intelligence operation. Quantify intelligence entails
implementing intelligence operations and achieving tangible results.

The analysis wing of the IIU needs to be effective in optimally utilising the most modern
and sophisticated analysis tools such as Proteus and the Beijian model to direct
intelligence operations. The key output of the IIU will be the development of a common
database that will be easily tapped for relevant information on terrorist profiles and
counter terrorism measures. Furthermore, international liaisons for operational counter
terrorism will need to be exploited in this forum to ensure a common approach to
international terrorism. There must be a synthesis within the IIU, such as strategic tactical
vision incorporated with good analysis and effective operational techniques. Concerning
the intelligence unit is the expertise of the personnel.

South Africa is a young democracy and embryonic in its international counter terrorism
endeavours. These amongst other threats to the IIU need to be conceptualised and
explored to obtain best practices. The integrated CTIC and the Joint Security Cluster will
form sub-units of the CTU and filter into the common practices of the mechanism.




143

ANNEXURE 1: BACKGROUND ON USAMA BIN LADEN

(A.k.a. Usama bin Mohammad bin Laden, Shaykh Usama bin Laden, the Prince, the
Emir, Abu Abdallah, Mujahid Shaykh, Hajj, the Director)

Usama bin Mohammad bin Laden, now known in the Western world as Usama bin laden,
was born on July 30, 1957, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the seventeenth son of Mohammad
bin Laden. Bin Laden??s family inherited a financial empire that today is worth an
estimated $10 billion. The Saudi bin Laden Group is now run by Usama??s family, which
has publicly said it does not condone his violent activities (Hunsicker, 2006: 48).

Whilst his family??s construction firm was rebuilding holy mosques in the sacred cities of
Mecca and Medina in 1973, Usama bin Laden developed a religious passion for Islam
and a strong belief in Islamic law. In the early 1970s, he began to preach the necessity of
armed struggle and worldwide monotheism, and he also began to associate with Islamic
fundamentalist groups. Usama bin Laden??s religious passion ignited in December 1979,
when the Soviet Union invaded Muslim Afghanistan. Bin Laden??s worldview of seeing
the world in simplistic terms as a struggle between righteous Islam and a doomed West
prompted him to join the Mujahideen in Pakistan, just a few days after the invasion
(Hunsicker, 2006: 48).

In the early 1980s, he returned home to fund, recruit, and transport and train a volunteer
force of Arab nationals, called the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF), to fight alongside the
existing Afghan Mujahideen. He co-founded the Mujahideen Services Bureau (Maktab
al-Khidamar) and transformed it into an international network that recruited Islamic
fundamentalists with special knowledge. According to Hunsicker (2006:48-49), the
mujahideen were from various Arab states, and were of different ages, most of them were
young. They held high scientific degrees: such as doctors, engineers etc. They left their
families and jobs and joined the Afghan Jihad. In addition, bin Laden volunteered the
services of the family construction firm to blast new roads through the Afghan
mountains. As commander of a contingent of Arab troops, he experienced combat against
the Soviets first-hand, including the siege of Jalalabad in 1986-one of the fiercest battles
of the war, and he earned a reputation as a fearless fighter. Following that battle, bin
Laden and other Islamic leaders concluded that they were victims of a U.S. conspiracy to
defeat the jihad in Afghanistan and elsewhere (Hunsicker, 2006: 48).

Following Iraq??s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, bin Laden, according to
Hunsicker (2006:48), urged the Saudi government not to taint its Islamic legitimacy by
inviting infidel Americans into Saudi Arabia to defend the country, but he was ignored.
Although bin Laden, unlike most other Islamic leaders, remained loyal to the regime
while condemning the U.S. military and economic presence as well as the Iraqi invasion,
Saudi officials increasingly began to threaten him to halt his criticism (Hunsicker, 2006:
48-49).

Consequently, bin laden and his family and a large band of followers moved to Sudan in
1991. Sudan served as a base for his terrorist operations. In 1992, his attention appears to
have been directed against Egypt, but he also claimed responsibility that year for


144

attempting to bomb U.S. soldiers in Yemen, and again for attacks in Somalia in 1993. He
also financed and help set up at least three terrorist training camps in cooperation with the
Sudanese regime, and his construction company worked directly with Sudanese military
officials to transport and supply terrorists training in such camps (Hunsicker, 2006: 48-
49).

In the winter of 1993, bin Laden travelled to the Philippines to support the terrorist
network that would launch major operations in that country and the United States. His
calls for insurrection prompted Saudi authorities to revoke his Saudi citizenship on April
7, 1994, for ??irresponsible behaviour??, and he was officially expelled from the country.
He subsequently established a new residence and base of operations in the London
suburb of Wembley, but was forced to return to Sudan after a few months to avoid being
extradited to Saudi Arabia. In early 1995, he began stepping up activities against Egypt
and Saudi Arabia (Hunsicker, 2006: 48-49).

That summer, he uprooted his family again form Sudan and returned to Afghanistan on
board his unmarked, private C-130 military transport plane. Bin Laden established a
mountain fortress near the city of Kandahar southwest of Jalalabad, under the protection
of the Afghan government. After attending a terrorism summit in Khartoum, bin Laden
stopped in Tehran in early October 1996 and met with terrorist leaders, including Abu
Nidal, to discuss stepping up terrorist activities in the Middle East (Hunsicker, 2006: 48-
49).

























145


Annexure 2: Major Terrorist Organisations: An illustration of Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda (the Base) was founded by Usama Bin laden and Abdullah Azzam. Bin laden is
the seventeenth son of a wealthy building contractor who made a fortune carrying out
major construction contracts in Saudi Arabia (Wilkinson, 2006:39).

Azzam, according to Wilkinson (2006:39), was a teacher of Islamic Law at King Abdul
Aziz University in Jeddah. Azzam exerted considerable influence on Usama bin Laden
while he was a student in the same university. Azzam was a follower of Sayyid Qutb, an
influential Egyptian Islamist. Qutb??s teachings included that the world was divided
between those who do submit to Islamic law and those who do not submit to Islamic law.
Qutb, according to Wilkinson (2006:39), believed that all Muslims had a duty to wage
holy war (jihad) in order to establish Shari?? a rule not only in Egypt but globally. In order
to achieve this ultimate objective Qutb was prepared to include secular Arab regimes and
those considered of collaborating with the ??infidel?? governments of the west, as legitimate
targets of jihad.

The second most important factor in the shaping of Al-Qaeda was the experience of the
Muslim resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Wilkinson, 2006:39). Bin
Laden was an active participant for the Afghanistan resistance. Bin laden also supported
the resistance by using part of his father??s construction company to build fortifications
and tunnels (Wilkinson, 2006:39).

Wilkinson (2006:39) considers the third key factor in the early development of Al-Qaeda
to be an audience of the Egyptian radical Islamists, particularly Ayman Zawahiri. Ayman
Zawahiri became the leading theoretician and strategist of Al-Qaeda. Ayman Zawahiri
was the revolutionary terrorist activity leader of al-Jihad, the Egyptian extreme Islamist
group, which carried out the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Zawahiri
was arrested by the Egyptians after the assassination and was released three years later
because a lack of specific evidence of his involvement in the crime.

Zawahiri travelled to Afghanistan in 1980 where he met bin Laden and arranged the
merger of the Egyptian al-Jihad Group with Al-Qaeda. Abdullah Azzam, who had
developed major differences with bin Laden over strategy, was assassinated in 1989
whilst in Pakistan. It was Zawahiri, a fanatical believer in the use of terrorism as the key
weapon in the global jihad, who became deputy leader of Al-Qaeda (Wilkinson, 2006:39).

Bin Laden and his followers were elated by the success of the forcing the Soviet Union to
withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, an achievement made partially possible by the
substantial financial assistance (estimated at $3 billion), modern weaponry (including
??Stinger?? missiles and technical assistance from the United States (Wilkinson, 2006:39).

Al-Qaeda is considered more dangerous than other traditional terrorist groups. From an
early stage in its development, it was clear that Al-Qaeda was not going to resemble the
traditional terrorist groups with monolithic structures and centralised control: instead, it
was developed into a worldwide network of networks. According to Wilkinson (2006:42),


146

the ??horizontal?? network structure means that although bin Laden and Zawahiri provide
ideological leadership and inspiration it is left to the affiliated networks and cells to carry
out attacks against the types of targets designated by Al-Qaeda??s ideology and combat
doctrine. The Al-Qaeda movement is able to maintain its ??global reach?? through its
widely dispersed terrorist network (Wilkinson, 2006:42).

Another key feature of Al-Qaeda is that although it uses the language of extreme
fundamentalist Islam, its core ideology is a grandiose plan to wage global jihad against
America and its allies and against all existing Muslim government in order to bring about
nothing less than a revolutionary transformation of international politics. Ultimately Al-
Qaeda wants to create a pan Islamist caliphate to rule all Muslims. Their ideology is
absolutist and ??incorrigible??, ,that is there is no basis for diplomatic or political
compromise. However impracticable this ideological project may seem to most in the
West, Al-Qaeda members certainly believe that their revolutionary global transformation
will happen because they believe Allah is on their side and that they will ultimately be
victorious, however long it takes (Wilkinson, 2006:42).

A key feature of the Al-Qaeda movement is its terrorist attacks which have an explicit
commitment to mass-killing. In a notorious ??fatwa?? announced to the world in February
1998, bin Laden and a group of leading fellow extremists declared that it is the duty of all
Muslims to kill Americans, including civilians and their allies, whenever the opportunity
arises. The 9/11 attacks which killed almost 3000 and a whole series of other Al-Qaeda
attacks, including those in Nairobi, Bali, Madrid and London demonstrate that the
movement has no hesitation or compunction about killing hundred of innocent civilians,
including fellow Muslims (Wilkinson, 2006:42).

Closely connected with Al-Qaeda??s innate tendency to engage in mass killing is their
modus operandi in tactics, targets and areas of operations. Their typical tactic is to mount
coordinated ??no-warning?? suicide attacks using car or truck bombs designed to maximise
carnage and economic destruction. Their choice of targets shows that they have no qualm
about attacking soft targets were crowds of civilians are likely to be gathered, such public
transport systems, tourist hotels and restaurants, etc. these suicide ??no-warning??
coordinated attacks on the general public are partially difficult for the police to prevent in
open, democratic societies (Wilkinson, 2006:43).

According to Wilkinson (2006:41), Al-Qaeda??s aim is to kill large numbers of people and
cause maximum economic damage and disruption to create a climate of fear. Typical
methods include: no warning of imminent attack; coordinated suicide attacks which hit
several targets simultaneously. Its most commonly used weapon has been suicide
bombers (Wilkinson, 2006:41).

According to Wilkinson (2006:41) Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda is more of a global trans-
national movement in history. The records show that it has global reach. Bin Laden and
his Deputy Zawahiri provide ideological and strategic leadership and direction. They are
assisted by a Shura (council of advisers) and specialist committees which deal with
matters such as ??military?? planning, teachings of Islamist doctrine and indoctrination etc.
(Wilkinson, 2006:41).



147

Wilkinson (2006:41) mentions in addition that the organisation consists of a wide and
complex network of cells and affiliated organisations (e.g. Jemaah Islamiyah; Salafist
Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). These groups are used as vehicles for waging
terrorism around the world.

Wilkinson (2006:41) considers the case of Al-Qaeda when determining the modus
operandi of terrorist groups. Yet, it must be understood, that different terrorist groups
operate, while having some similarities also diverge in other regards when it comes to
their modus operandi.




148

Annexure 3: UN Conventions

UN Conventions on Terrorism

Hague convention on the unlawful seizure of aircraft, 1970: The convention makes it
an offence for any person on board an aircraft in flight ??unlawfully, by force or threat
thereof, or any other form of intimidation, to seize or exercise control of that aircraft?? or
to attempt to do so. Parties to the convention are required to make aircraft hijackings
punishable by ??severe penalties??. South Africa ratified the convention in May 1972. The
Civil Aviation Offences Act of 1972 gives effect to the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal
conventions. The act criminalises, in general, the interference with aircraft in flight, or
endangering flight crew, passengers, aircraft and aviation facilities.

Montreal convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil
aviation, 1971: The convention makes it an offence for any person unlawfully and
intentionally to perform an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft, if that act
is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft. It is also an offence to place an explosive
device on an aircraft. The convention mandates ??severe penalties?? for persons guilty of
the aforementioned acts. South Africa ratified the convention in May 1972.

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally
protected persons, including diplomatic agents, 1973: The convention defines
internationally protected persons as a head of state, a minister of foreign affairs, a
representative or official of a state or of an international organisation who is entitled to
special protection from attack under international law. The convention requires each
party to criminalise and make punishable ??by appropriate penalties which take into
account their grave nature??, the murder, kidnapping, or other attack upon the person or
liberty of an internationally protected person; or, a violent attack upon the official
premises, the private accommodations, or the means of transport of such a person. South
Africa had not ratified the convention at the time of writing. In South Africa,
internationally protected persons enjoy the same common law protections as any South
African citizen. The Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act of 1989 affords certain
privileges and protections to some classes of internationally protected persons (see
above).
Convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials, 1979: The convention
criminalises the unlawful possession, use and transfer of nuclear material, the theft of
nuclear material, and threats to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to
any person, or substantial damage to property. The convention had been signed but not
ratified by South Africa at the time of writing. Most provisions of the convention are
contained in the Nuclear Energy Act of 1999.
International convention against the taking of hostages, 1979: The convention
provides that ??any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to
continue to detain another person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any
acts as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence
of taking of hostages within the meaning of this convention??. South Africa had not


149

ratified the convention at the time of writing. In terms of the South African common law,
the crime of kidnapping is committed when a person is unlawfully and intentionally
deprived of their freedom of movement. Hostage taking falls within the common law
definition of kidnapping. Moreover, the definition of intimidation contained in the
Intimidation Act of 1982 is broad enough to include hostage taking.
International convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings, 1997: The
purpose of the convention is to enhance international co-operation to eliminate the use of
explosives or other lethal devices in acts of terror. Conduct that amounts to the unlawful
and intentional delivery, placement, discharge or detonation of explosives or other lethal
devices into or against public places, state facilities, infrastructure facilities or public
transportation systems is prohibited. Such actions constitute an offence in terms of the
convention where the intention is to cause death, serious bodily injury, or extensive
destruction that results in actual or potential economic loss of such places or facilities.
South Africa signed the convention in December 1999, but had not ratified it at the time
of writing.
Source: United Nations website: www.un.org


150

Annexure 4: The London Bombings

The London Bombings: 7 July 2007

Attacks on the Underground

08:50 am

Three bombs on the London Underground exploded within fifty seconds of each
other:

• The first bomb exploded on eastbound Circle Line sub-surface Underground
train number 204 between Liverpool Street and Aldgate. The explosion
occurred about eight minutes after the train left King??s Cross St. Pancras tube
station.
• The second bomb exploded on the second carriage of westbound Circle Line
sub-surface Underground train number 216 at Edgware Road.
• The third bomb exploded on southbound Piccadilly Line deep-level
Underground train number 311 between King??s Cross St Pancras and Russell
Square.

Attack on a double-decker bus

09:47 am

• An explosion occurred in Tavistock Square on a No. 30 double-decker bus
operated by Stagecoach London travelling its route from Marble Arch to
Hackney Wick

The bombers

• Hasib Hussain: No 30 bus, age 18, Pakistani descent, from Colenso Mount,
Leeds.
• Jamal (Germaine) Lindsay: Piccadilly Line train, Jamacain-born resident of
Aylesbury.
• Mohammad Sidique Khan: Edgware Road train, age 30, married and recent
father, Pakistani descent, from Dewsbury, near Leeds.
• Shehzad Tanweer: Aldgate train, age 22, Pakistani descent, from Colwyn
Road, Leeds.

Accomplices

The following people are being or have been investigated in relation to the attacks:

• Magdi Asdi el-Nashar: Egyptian-born Ph.D. lecturer at the University of
Leeds; renter of the house where explosives were found; he was arr3ested in
Cairo on 15 July by Egyptian police


151

• Ejaz ??Jacksy?? Fiaz (also named as Eliaz Fiaz): possible co-conspirator, in his
early thirties, from Beeston, Leeds. Initially thought to have been the suicide
bomber on the Piccadilly Line traine; he has disappeared.
• Naveed Fiaz: brother of Ejaz, detained by police in the days after the attacks,
but released without charge on 22 July. He was connected to three of the
bombers via the Hamara Youth Access Point.
• Haroon Rashid Aswat: an Al-Qaeda operative and possible M16 informant.
believed to be the bomb-maker or cell organiser, initially described as a
Pakistani in his 30s, who entered Britain through a port some time in June
2005, and left the country on 6 July. Reports on 28 July said he had been
arrested in Livingstone, Zambia some days earlier. He was deported to the
UK on 7 August and arrested by British police on his arrival. Authorities in
the United States have expressed a desire to have him extradited to face
charges relating to the setting up of a terrorist training camp in Oregon in
1999.

Source: (http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7_July_2005_London_bombings)


152

Annexure 5: The eight new challenges confronting the Indian counter terrorism
managers and policymakers between 1989 and 2001:

• The emulation of the Afghan Mujahideen of the 1980s by some organizations in
the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in order to exercise pressure on the
Government to concede their demands, which related to either independence for
the State or its annexation by Pakistan. The cadres of these organizations, which
have been active in the State since 1989, are funded, trained, armed and guided by
the ISI.
• The infiltration initially into J&K and subsequently into other parts of India of
trained and armed members of four Pakistani pan-Islamic Organisations, namely,
the Lakshkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-
jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). These organizations,
which have since joined Usama bin Laden??s International Islamic Front (IIF)
formed in 1998, were initially recruiting their members from Pakistan, but since
2003, they have also been recruiting from the Indian Muslim Diaspora in the Gulf
and from the Indian Muslim Community in India itself. All these organizations
operate from Pakistan. Two of them –the LET and HUJI- also have sanctuaries in
Bangladesh.
• The emergence of suicide terrorism as a strategic weapon of great lethality.
Suicide terrorism was first used in Indian Territory by the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi in Chenna in May 1991. Since
the four Pakistani pan-Islamic organizations joined bin Laden??s IIF in 1998, they
have been increasingly resorting to suicide terrorism.
• The acquisition of a maritime terrorism capability by the LTTE. This capability
consists of a fleet of commercial ships for guns and narcotics running and a naval
capability for covert acts of maritime terrorism, including sea-borne suicide
terrorism.
• The beginning of economic terrorism with the attacks on the tourist infrastructure
in J&K and with the explosions of the March 1993 in Mumbai, which were
directed against carefully selected economic targets such as the stock exchange.
• Narco Terrorism and the increasing use of narcotics by different terrorist groups
as a source of funding for their terrorist operations.
• The emergence of links between the Pakistan-based pan-Islamic jihadi terrorist
organizations and the trans-national mafia group headed by the Karachi-based
Dawood Ibrahim, who has since been designated by the US Treasury Department
in October 2003, as an international terrorist following evidence of his contacts
with Al-Qaeda. He has master-minded the Mumbai explosions of 1993.
• Large-scale illegal immigration into India from Bangladesh, which is threatening
to change the demographic composition of sensitive areas in India??s North-East
and provides sanctuaries for jihadi terrorists based in Bangladesh for their
operations in Indian Territory (Raman, 2003b).


153

Annexure 6: Illustrative example of the Western Cape Organisational structure of
PAGAD and the Boeremag



Source: Botha, 2001
Boeremag Structure






Military Command
Transvaal Free State Natal Cape
2X Sector
HQ
2X Sector HQ

2X Sector
HQ
2X Sector
HQ
4X
Commandos
4X
Commandos
4X
Commandos
4X
Commandos
8X Cells 8X Cells

8X Cells

8X Cells



154

Annexure 7: South African Legislation against Terrorism

Emergency situations

State of Emergency Act of 1997: The act provides for the declaration of a state of
emergency in South Africa. According to the constitution, a state of emergency may be
declared only when 'the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general
insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency, and the declaration is
necessary to restore peace and order'.

Defence Act of 1957: The act contains various provisions relating to the combating of
terrorism.These include the mobilisation of the Citizen Force, the Reserve and the
commandos for: service in the prevention or suppression of terrorism; compulsory
service outside South Africa for the prevention or suppression of terrorism; the
safeguarding of the borders of South Africa for the prevention or suppression of
terrorism; the commandeering of, amongst other things, buildings, vehicles, aircraft and
equipment for the prevention or suppression of terrorism, and assuming control over
transport systems for the prevention or suppression of terrorism.

Terrorism, sabotage and intimidation

Internal Security Act of 1982: In terms of the act, a person is guilty of the offence of
terrorism if he, inter alia, commits (or threatens to commit) an act of violence; or incites
aids, advises or encourages any other person to commit an act of violence with the intent
to: overthrow or endanger the state authority in South Africa; achieve, bring about or
promote any constitutional, political, industrial, social or economic aim or change in the
country, or induce the government to do or to abstain from doing any act or to adopt or
abandon any particular standpoint.

Intimidation Act of 1982: The act is targeted at persons who intend to frighten,
demoralise, or incite the public (or a particular section of the population) to do or abstain
from doing any act.

Assisting and training terrorists

Criminal Law Second Amendment Act of 1992: The act prohibits any person from:
taking part in the control, administration or management of any organisation; organising,
training, equipping or arming the members or supporters of any organisation, or
undergoing training in any organisation.

Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1998: The act regulates the rendering
of foreign military assistance by South African persons—both natural and juristic—
including citizens, permanent residents and foreign citizens from within the borders of
South Africa. The act prohibits anyone from recruiting, using or training persons for, or
financing or engaging in, mercenary activity.





155

Targeting the tools of terrorism

Armaments Development and Production Act of 1968: The act regulates the
manufacture, possession and importation of armaments. The meaning of armaments is
broadly defined to include 'bombs, ammunition or weapons, or any substance, material,
components?? of whatever nature capable of being used in the development, manufacture
or maintenance of armaments'.

Explosives Act of 1956: The act regulates the manufacture, storage, transport,
importation, exportation and the use of explosives. A 1997 amendment to the act holds
that no person may manufacture, import, possess, sell, supply or export any plastic
explosive that is not marked with a detection agent.

Dangerous Weapons Act of 1968: In terms of the act, a 'dangerous weapon' is any
object, other than a firearm, which is likely to cause serious bodily injury if used to
commit an assault.

Firearms Control Act of 2001: According to the act, it is an offence to possess a
firearm without a licence. The possession of 'prohibited firearms' including fully
automatic firearms, grenades, bombs and explosive devices is also a criminal offence.

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1993: The act provides for
control over weapons of 'mass destruction', that is, a weapon designed to kill, harm or
infect people, animals or plants through the effect of a nuclear explosion, or the toxic
properties of a chemical or biological warfare agent.

National Key Points Act of 1980: The act empowers the minister of defence to declare a
place or area as a national key point

Civil Aviation Offences Act of 1972: The act creates a number of offences relating to
aircraft and airports.

Merchant Shipping Act of 1951: According to the act, no person may without a
reasonable excuse do anything to obstruct or damage any equipment on a ship, or
obstruct, impede or molest any of the crew in the navigation and management of the ship
or otherwise, in the execution of their duties on the ship.




156

Annexure 8: Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related
Activities Act, 2004


To provide for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities; to
provide for an offence of terrorism and other offences associated or connected with
terrorist activities; to provide for Convention offences; to give effect to international
instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities; to provide for a mechanism to
comply with United National Security Council Resolutions, which are binding on
member States, in respect of terrorist and related activities; to provide for measures to
prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities; to provide for
investigative measures in respect of terrorist and related activities; and to provide for
matters connected therewith.

Chapter 2
Part 1
Offences associated or connected with terrorist activities
(1) Any person who -
(a) does anything which will, or is likely to, enhances the ability of any entity to
engage in a terrorist activity, including providing or offering to provide a
skill or an expertise;
(b) Enters or remains in any country; or
(c) Makes himself or herself available,
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any entity engaging in a
terrorist activity, and who knows or ought reasonably to have known or suspected,
that such act was done for the purpose of enhancing the ability of such entity to
engage in a terrorist activity, is guilty of the offence associated with a terrorist
activity.
(2) Any person who -
(a) Provides or offers to provide any weapon to any other person for use by or
for the benefit of an entity;
(b) solicits support for or gives support to an entity;
(c) Provides, receives or participates in training or instruction, or recruits an
entity to receive training or instruction;
(d) Recruits any entity;
(e) Collects or makes a document; or
(f) Possesses a thing.
connected with the engagement in a terrorist activity, and who knows or ought
reasonably to have known or suspected that such weapons, soliciting, training,
recruitment, document or thing is so connected, is guilty of an offence connected with
terrorist activities.

Part 2
Offences associated or connected with financing of specified offences
(1) Any person who, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, and by any means or
method -
(a) Acquires property;


157

(b) collects property;
(c) Uses property;
(d) Possesses property;
(e) Owns property;
(f) Provides or makes available, or invites a person to provide or make available
property;
(g) Provides or makes available, or invites a person to provide or make available
any financial or other service;
(h) Provides or makes available, or invites a person to provide or make available
economic support; or
(i) Facilitates the acquisition, collection, use or provision of property, or the
provision of any financial or other service, or the provision of economic
support,
intending that the property, financial or other service or economic support, as the
case may be, be used, or while such person knows or ought reasonably to have
known or suspected that the property, service or support concerned will be used,
directly or indirectly, in whole or in part.

• Offences relating to explosive or other lethal devices
• Offences relating to hijacking, destroying or endangering safety of a fixed
platform
• Offences relating to taking a hostage
• Offences relating to causing harm to internationally protected persons
• Offences relating to hijacking an aircraft
• Offences relating to hijacking a ship or endangering safety of maritime navigation

Part 3
Other offences
• Offences relating to harbouring or concealment of persons committing specified
offences
• Duty to report presence of person suspected of intending to commit or having
committed an offence and failure to so report
• Offences relating to hoaxes
• Threat, attempt, conspiracy and inducing another person to commit offence


INVESTIGATING POWERS AND FREEZING ORDERS
Investigating powers
(1) Whenever the National Director has reason to believe that -
(a) Any person may be in possession of information relevant to –
(i) The commission or intended commission of an alleged offence under
Chapter 2.

Freezing order
(1) A High Court may, on exparte application by the National Director to a judge in
chambers, make an order prohibiting any person from engaging in any conduct, or
obliging any person to cease any conduct, concerning property in respect of which
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the property is owned or controlled by


158

or on behalf of, or at the direction.

Cordoning off, stop and search of vehicle and person
(1) If, on written request under oath to a judge in chambers by a police official of
or above the rank of director, it appears to the judge that it is necessary in order.




159

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LIST OF INTERVIEWS
Anneli Botha, Senior Researcher on Counter Terrorism. African Security Programme,
International Security Studies (ISS), 25 October 2007, 9-10:30 am

Boyane Tshelha, Head of Crime and Justice Programme, ISS, 1 November 2007, 1-2pm.

Dr. Johan Burger, Senior Researcher on Crime and Justice: Crime and Justice Programme,
ISS, 8 November 2007, 10-12pm.

Kurt Shillinger, Senior Researcher on Counter Terrorism. Counter Terrorism Programme,
South Africa Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 2 November 2007, 10-11:30am.
Professor Andre Thomashausen, Professor at the Institute of Foreign and Comparative
Law, University of South Africa (UNISA) 25 October 2007, 11-1pm.

Professor Clifford Shearing, Professor of Criminology and the Director of the Institute of
Criminology, University of Cape Town, 1 November 2007, 12 -1pm.

Professor Hough, Director of International Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, 30
October 2007, 11-11:30am

Professor Hussein Solomon, Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 14 November 2007,
10:30-11:45pm.

Richard Gueli, Research Fellow on Counter Terrorism. Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research (CSIR), 7 November 2007, 9-11am.


178


SAPS Senior Official, Crime Intelligence, 10 November 2007, 10-1pm.

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